

# **WIDER WORKING PAPERS**

**Middle Powers in the International System:  
A Preliminary Assessment of Potential**

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## **Middle Powers in the International System:**

### **A Preliminary Assessment of Potential**

#### Introduction

"Concrete compromises and working models of adaptation - are needed to get the world out of its maze of un-workable, overlapping, contradictory institutions and to offer it a number of concrete possibilities which look like beginning to work. Such experiments must be worked out, consciously, by governments....

But the number of governments which could, in an effective way, confront and redefine the crucial problem of state authority in the modern world are fairly limited. The superpowers are too vast, too unwieldy, too locked in their own responsibilities. The great mass of new states are too poor and too shaky. It is the middle powers - who occupy about the right position on the scale of influence..."

The above proposition, made by Barbara Ward in 1967, is increasingly echoed by a number of statesman and observers in the even more difficult conditions of the nineteen-eighties. The purpose of this paper is to report on a preliminary examination of the potential contributions of "middle", "medium" or "intermediate" powers in improving systems of international cooperation over the remainder of the twentieth century. It is a policy-research paper -- the results are intended to be useful to policy-makers and planners -- although it draws where useful on academic analyses and points specifically to the needs for more such scholarly work in some areas.

The scope of the topic is vast and the perspective has not been much developed elsewhere. The approach here is therefore experimental and eclectic. A number of generalizations and simple theoretical frameworks are

borrowed or modified from related fields and used to help make the issues manageable, and point in helpful directions.

Non-academic readers are urged to exercise their usual critical judgement in such matters to suggest any further clarification or revision for practical policy purposes. Scholars in the field are also invited to help refine and improve the treatment, always with a view to its policy-usefulness.

The present paper reflects progress, on the first third of the North-South Institute's project on "Middle Powers in the International System",<sup>1</sup> which has so far comprised theoretical and country-level surveys, to be followed by intensive studies of particular international negotiations and institutions.

The paper explores the hypothesis that a group of middle powers, collectively and/or individually, may have a much greater role to play in the effective management of international cooperation to cope with current world problems. It does not simply advocate that they do so since the obstacles to be overcome are sufficiently formidable that policy-communities in the countries concerned will have to come to any such conclusion through a great deal of informed debate and evolution in their self-conceived roles at the international level.

A clear objective here is to help stimulate and nourish such debate. For policy-makers, scholars, and publics, a recognition of the importance and obduracy of current international problems, together with the inadequacy of existing means for dealing with them, should be enough to encourage a wide-ranging search for new instruments, including possible strengthened roles for middle powers.

Three significant assumptions underlie the hypothesis:

(i) Interdependence (i.e., many forms of interconnectedness across national boundaries that have reciprocal, but not necessarily symmetrical, costs and benefits)<sup>2</sup> is a real and pervasive condition in the world, presenting new opportunities, but also challenges, especially for the management of international political and economic regimes and institutions.

(ii) Multilateral cooperation is the most logical avenue for coping constructively with these challenges, but, as the UN Secretary General has pointed out, "while contemporary realities have strengthened the need for the use of multilateral means for dealing with our problems and enlarged the scope for growth and development through multilateralism, there is an increasing questioning of the rules, instruments and modalities of multilateral co-operation. There is also, on occasion, an apparent reluctance to make the effort required to use international organizations effectively."<sup>3</sup>

(iii) One key problem in resolving this dilemma lies in finding leadership, particularly in the light of the diminished willingness and capacity of the post-war hegemonic leader, the United States, to continue filling that role, and serious questions about whether, and how, international regimes are going to be manageable without hegemonic leadership.<sup>4</sup>

The possible implications of these trends, together with other factors, for middle powers' potential leadership or catalytic roles, will be the special focus of this study (see especially section 2)

#### 1. What are "Middle Powers"? (and Why do they Matter?)

If most national histories have suffered from being the "history of kings", world history has focused similarly on the great powers, and, more recently, the "superpowers". It is common to see the world of interstate relations as a stage on which the giants compete -- or (more rarely) cooperate -- with "the rest" of nation states serving as their scenery, props,

supporting cast or bit players.<sup>5</sup> It may be that the traditional single distinction between the "great" and "the small"<sup>6</sup> cries out for reexamination mainly because of the unprecedented proliferation of states in recent decades, with dozens of very small, weak and even "micro"-states, whose real capacity to carry out their traditional interstate or even domestic responsibilities is far removed from the operating assumptions of formal sovereign equality. Some of the other trends in the international system in recent decades also stimulate thinking about new groups and their possible capacities.

In any event, there is a limited but thought provoking tradition that identifies a kind of "middle class" in the "anarchical society" of international relations, and a widening group of analysts and statesmen have begun to look to the roles they play, and might play, on the modern scene.

One far-reaching definition of the group is the following:

The Middle Powers are those which by reason of their size, their material resources, their willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and stability are close to being great powers.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps as interesting as the content of this definition is the fact that it was offered as early as 1947 by R.G. Riddell, a senior Canadian diplomat. Clearly, if there is a group of countries possessing such properties, their role in the international system merits more consideration than it has generally received.

But identifying such countries has difficulties in itself. The measurement and ranking of national power is done unconsciously by

policy-makers all the time, but rarely in an explicit or disciplined way. Scholars of international relations have ventured various schemes which provide grist for debate over the inclusion and appropriate weightings of such factors as military power, population, wealth (aggregate and per capita), and other material and non-material resources (including "prestige" or "influence").<sup>8</sup>

For the purposes of this paper, there is no need to revive these exercises in detail, particularly because they tend to suggest the availability of a remarkably simple and accessible single indicator of the relative power of nation-states that yields results consistently very close to those of the most intricate composite indices. The indicator is that of Gross National Product (GNP). Taking 1979 statistics, the last for which comprehensive GNP approximations are available, the first thirty-six countries in rank-order were as follows: Italy, China, Canada, Brazil, Spain, Netherlands, India, Poland, Australia, Mexico, Belgium, G.D.R., Sweden, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria, Austria, Denmark, Turkey, Argentina, South Korea, South Africa, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Romania, Norway, Finland, and Hungary.\* Although not falling strictly in this range, by reason of their special regional or global importance Pakistan, Algeria and Iran have also been included on our preliminary list.

It is striking how closely this list compares with rank-orders prepared for 1950, 1958 and 1967 by Cox and Jacobson (1973) based on a composite index of GNP, GNP per capita, nuclear capability and prestige. (See Appendix A).

\*Source: World Development Report, 1981, World Bank.



Determining the boundaries of the "middle" group is inevitably a more arbitrary process than is ranking countries' capabilities. For preliminary purposes here we have included countries that fall between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 36<sup>th</sup> in GNP rankings in 1979, plus the three special cases above. This produces a manageable group of about one-fifth of the total number of states. In 1979 the GNPs of the countries between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 36<sup>th</sup> rankings fell between the levels of US\$400 Billion and \$40 Billion.

Representing 65% of the world's total population, these countries, taken together, consistently account for about one-third of world GNP and over 40% of world trade. (see Appendix B)

The list includes huge disparities on other counts, such as population, development levels, nuclear weapons and other military capabilities, regional status etc. The list does seem to include most countries that would commonly be identified as middle or intermediate, although some of them are also arguably "great" or "minor" powers.

For the purpose of a preliminary identification of middle powers, the GNP selection criterion has the great advantage of its objectivity -- other methods require subjective judgements that can quickly become highly debatable.<sup>9</sup> It is also important to recognize that there are important qualitative and even ideological elements in much of the traditional thinking about middle powers. If it is not carefully monitored this can easily lead to loose and circular reasoning. Such thinking, rather than identifying "middle" countries primarily by their capabilities, does so on the basis of appraisals of their international behavior or "positioning". In such a view, candidates

are the "moderate reformers" in the international system (sometimes taken as synonymous with the Western "Like Minded Group"), or those countries whose positions and actions fall "in the middle" or who tend to act as mediators between extremes or contending blocs. One analyst, as early as 1965, distinguished such an "ideology of middlepowermanship" and hinted in quite a general way at the possibilities that it might provide the basis for a number of states,

to re-define their positions on the international scene and play a more useful role than they do at present in the solution of international conflicts...to play a more positive role as mediator -- if one understands by mediation the aptitude to cause international relations to evolve. To play such a role certainly power is needed, but more especially new convictions.<sup>10</sup>

It is clear that such a qualitative definition of middle powers would, in some important ways, anticipate or pre-empt the possible conclusions of studies like the present one, but without the benefit of careful, up-to-date analysis of the interests and actions of a rigorously selected group of countries in a current setting. Thus, the possible "mediatory" vocation of middle powers will be treated here as a hypothesis to be tested, rather than as a definitional characteristic to be assumed.

It is also true, however, that the object of this enquiry is not simply to assess the past or potential contributions of all middle powers (as qualified by capabilities, measured in GNP rankings) to international order. Rather than such capabilities or power itself, the main point of interest here is the international influence, actual or potential, of countries. The distinction is important:

..influence means the modification of one actor's behavior by that of another...Power means capability; it is the aggregate of political resources that are available to an actor...Power may be converted into influence, but it is not necessarily so converted either at all or to its full extent. Although those who possess the greatest power may also exercise the greatest influence, this is not logically necessary.<sup>11</sup>

On this basis, it is quite possible that numbers of countries that qualify as middle powers by virtue of their capabilities will be seen through detailed studies of behavior to fail to wield middle power influence in international systems. Under present circumstances South Africa and Iran might fall into such a category. Meanwhile, other, "lesser" powers may be found to exercise disproportionately large influence that would argue for their inclusion in any policy-relevant conclusions.

a) Systemic Trends and Middle Power Potentials

Given their shares in world population and economic activity, a group such as the thirty-three "middle powers" identified here would obviously merit attention in itself, but major trends in their international environment would seem to underline their potential. As mentioned earlier, this potential may be magnified by: pervasive and complex interdependence; the related paradox of rising demands on the multilateral systems and diminishing support for those systems, and the decline of post-war hegemony and uncertainty as to what is replacing it. These themes do not need extensive elaboration here, but some key aspects are worth reviewing.

b) Interdependence and its Reach

It is now possible, without being drawn too far into the ideological or academic debates that have surrounded the concept of interdependence,<sup>12</sup> to assert that the phenomenon has grown in its reach and importance and that it has major implications for the distribution and exercise of power. Some theorists argue that these changes are likely to enhance the influence of traditionally less-powerful states. Interlinkages, particularly economic ones, have made almost all states more reliant on the "external" sector and thus vulnerable (or open to benefit) from developments in other states. Pursuing this further, it is also argued that military force (the traditional mainstay of power internationally) becomes less relevant and usable under conditions of interdependence, and power itself becomes more fragmented among both issues and actors, presenting new opportunities to weaker states.<sup>13</sup>

Although much analysis suggests that growing interdependence tends to have this "levelling" effect, there is a forceful counter-argument that (while conceding the new vulnerability it has produced among great powers) lays much heavier stress on the even greater vulnerability to which smaller powers are exposed by interdependence.<sup>14</sup> Thus asymmetrical interdependencies can be seen as sources of power among states, power differences that will often (but not necessarily always) parallel the power disparities among states as traditionally conceived. However, it also remains true that, to whatever extent the most powerful states are rendered more vulnerable (or even more "sensitive") by interdependence, the relative influence of others may be increased.

One further factor to be considered is that the growth of interdependence has coincided, as both a cause and an effect, with some reduction in state control of trans-boundary relations. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that the state should be "dissolved" for analytical purposes, given the increased importance of "multiple channels" and "transnational" and "transgovernmental" interactions among individuals, corporations, other groups and official agencies. Such a reduction of governmental autonomy, affecting as it does governments of most states, can tend to reduce the importance of disparities in state power as such, although it can also introduce powerful new actors and forces for all states to contend with.<sup>15</sup> Once again there are debates as to how much the autonomy of state control and inter-state disparities have actually been reduced in practice, and these questions can now be tested to some extent.

c) Multilateral Cooperation - Demand and Supply

As mentioned earlier, the discordant relationship between growing interdependence and weakening multilateral cooperation raises some of the most interesting conflicts (or at least paradoxes) between theoretical expectations and the experience of recent decades. What is especially relevant here, however, is to examine the contemporary stakes, real and perceived, of middle-ranking countries in the systems of multilateral cooperation.

Few have ever questioned the assumption that the element of "safety in numbers" often gives lesser powers a higher relative stake in multilateral cooperation than greater powers - the latter being more capable of looking after their own interests by their own means. The general reasoning derives

perhaps from the specific sphere of military power and the importance of collective security. R.G. Riddell was more specific when he argued, in 1945, that "In a predatory world, the middle powers are more vulnerable than their smaller neighbors, and less able to protect themselves than their larger ones."<sup>16</sup>

In fact, of course, neither the demonstrated achievements of collective security nor the ease of extending the analogy to other multilateral fields should be overstated. In reference to economic systems and the "small European states" (most of which fall among the "middle powers" on a global scale), Peter Katzenstein suggests a coherent pattern of "multilateralist" behavior, and a cogent underlying rationale.

"The securing of a liberal international economy has been an overriding objective which the small European states pursue in the international economy. Since "in a 'bilateral' world the position of the small state is intrinsically weak," this group of states has a strong interest in lowering tariffs, in preventing the formation of economic blocs, and in strengthening the principle of multilateralism..."\*

"A liberal international economy is the preferred choice of the small European states, not because it eliminates dependence, but because it diffuses such dependence in a wider market rather than concentrating it on particular states. The pursuit of economic liberalism is thus not based on disinterested notions of aggregate world welfare, but is rooted firmly in the awareness that the political autonomy and economic welfare of the small European states are best served by such a strategy."<sup>17</sup>

Some of these strategies may be quite specific to the particular states in question, but, on at least some points, it is logical to assume that smaller states in other regions might share similar needs and preferences.

A far-reaching analysis on different state approaches to multilateral cooperation, and one that must be considered here, is that of Stephen Krasner in his discussion of the Third World's approach to international regimes. From a starting-point which emphasizes the extreme vulnerability of developing countries on the international stage (compounded by their domestic weaknesses), he argues that they - and indeed all groups of states - seek not just regimes of multilateral cooperation as such, but particular kinds of regime that might make their own basic values and interests more secure.<sup>18</sup> Specifically, they have pursued regimes that rely on more "authoritative" rather than more "market-oriented" modes of allocation since the latter are seen as being more influenced by the disparities of endowments among different participants and, even more importantly, mean that external shocks and pressures (to which developing countries are so vulnerable) are less amenable to control or amelioration. The realization of more "authoritative" regimes, he adds, depends on the reinforcement of one-nation, one-vote fora with interventionist mandates, and "to enhance the scope of activities that are universally accepted as subject to the unilateral control of the state."<sup>19</sup>

In this conception of the push for new international regimes by Third World coalitions over the post war period there is, as its author states, an inherent, inevitable, "structural" conflict with the perceived interests of the industrialized Western countries, as reflected in the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures of existing international regimes. This conception, or something like it, has also evidently been accepted by most state decision-makers because it has been at the root of the deadlock, "stalemate", and dissipation of the North-South Dialogue as it has been pursued over the past decade. The basic accuracy of this conception, through

time and changing circumstances, will be re-examined in the final section of this paper. For the moment, it is sufficient to recall how much it has shaped thinking, and action, on international regimes and multilateral cooperation for a substantial period, as the "dominant ideologies" of many international organizations, but not the goals of their most powerful members have shifted from "functionalism" to "developmentalism".<sup>20</sup>

This very period of conceptual turmoil has coincided with -- and to some extent been triggered by -- the real increase of demands on the system because of increased interaction and channels of interaction, as well as such factors as the proliferation of new state and non-state actors. As Robert Cox put it in 1980:

Universal intergovernmental organizations are particularly sensitive to the movement of world forces. Their proceedings reflect gathering pressures towards one or other of the rival visions of future world order<sup>21</sup>

It can also be argued, however, that the disembodied, abstract, ideological and rhetorical flavour of the dialogue was symptomatic of the blurred character of the visions of world order on both sides: the "Northern" side only marginally concerned about shortcomings in the status quo where it enjoyed dominant control and benefit; and the "Southern" side so amply equipped with evidence of problems, with diagnoses and with far-reaching prescriptions but with so few levers (even after OPEC's rise) of decisive economic or political power. It can be argued here, too, (and will in the final sections of this paper), that this situation has now changed fundamentally on both sides.



While the "dialogue des sourds" went on, so did the real world, and the international regimes and organizations -- in a kind of escrow as the object of dispute -- were hamstrung in responding to the changing needs, and middle powers seemed to be almost as locked into patterns of immobility as other states. Third World countries did not have an effective enough stake in most of the organizations to give full commitment and support, but were able to be just influential (and vociferous) enough to help dampen the commitment of the "North", which tended to create and use more narrow "shadow organizations to deal with business of direct concern to the rich countries."<sup>22</sup> But waning Northern commitment was also a result of the very shortcomings of the post-war machinery in responding to new needs and indeed of the underlying shifts of real power, hegemony and leadership in the system.

d) After Hegemony, What Leadership?

There is no debate about the overwhelming importance of the United States in the design and management of most of the post-WWII international systems; the term "hegemony", short of any derogatory implication, is fully applicable. Nor is there any doubt that the system has been substantially affected by the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the decolonisation process and tripling-plus of the community of nation-states, and the consolidation of the Comecon community and of China.<sup>23</sup>

What is not fully agreed is just how, and how much, these and other changes (e.g., the expansion of the nuclear club, the changing international division of labour, the apparent emergence of new centres and aggregations of economic, political and military power) have basically changed the structures

and operations of the international system. For example, there is still disagreement about whether American hegemony (or at least the effective relative power of the U.S.) has in fact diminished, and a great deal of theoretical debate about whether the current international system is best depicted as being unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or any one of a number of hybrids or alternatives. Nor are these, in the current climate, simply questions of fact or analysis, but they have become loaded with nationalistic and ideological fervour, particularly among American "reassertionists".<sup>24</sup>

The desire to reassert American power and predominance has had a distinctly unilateralist spirit. There is a definite, and often articulated, assumption among its adherents that the rules and constraints of multilateral cooperation (which had once provided the basis for the "American" order) have now become illegitimate shackles and irritants to the giant, which can do better for itself, and perhaps the world, by cutting around, through or down the cumbersome machinery of cooperative systems.<sup>25</sup> Part of this perception, paradoxically, while refusing to acknowledge any diminution of U.S. power, places great emphasis on the increasingly disproportionate or unfair share of responsibility that the U.S. has had to carry in the management and financing of these systems.

In a less polemical variant of this latter point, the American economist Charles P. Kindleberger has argued that much of the recent dislocation in the world economy has in some measure been attributable to the "free-riding" attitude of most small and middle-sized countries, which have refused to share with the United States the burdens and costs of economic stabilization. These countries are said to expect the U.S. to keep on paying the price alone of

providing certain "public goods" to the international economic system - such as "a market for distress goods, a steady flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity" - at a time when the ability of the U.S. to provide these public goods at acceptable domestic economic and political cost has been declining.<sup>26</sup>

These emotive issues of "leadership" and "free-ridership" do touch on questions of analytical importance and complexity, and there is extensive analysis among scholars in the field as to the implications of declining hegemony.

As Robert Keohane states:

U.S. hegemonic leadership fostered a pattern of asymmetrical cooperation, in which the United States made some adjustments to the needs of its allies and partners while imposing other adjustments on them.<sup>27</sup>

Believers in the "theory of hegemonic stability", "given a decline in American power" would predict "a decline in cooperation." Analyses of this view concluded that "the decline of American hegemony provides only part of the explanation for the decline of postwar international economic regimes."<sup>28</sup>

Keohane concludes that in the field of oil, the erosion of American hegemony accounts quite well for the sharp changes in international petroleum regimes over the past twenty years"... but that:

The theory of hegemonic stability is less useful in accounting for the disintegration of the specific rules of the Bretton Woods balance-of-payments regime or for the continuing decay of the GATT-based trade regime."<sup>29</sup>

Other factors include changing domestic political pressures (some derived from changing belief systems and coalitions), and the role of international institutions (such as international economic regimes) in fostering and shaping patterns of cooperation.<sup>30</sup>

It remains true, however, that:

Hegemonic leadership is unlikely to be revived in this century for the United State or any other country...As long as a world political economy persists, therefore, its central political dilemma will be how to organize cooperation without hegemony.<sup>31</sup>

The legacy of post-war international institutions, as modified over time, remains very important to this challenge, as do experiences with limited but still extremely powerful U.S. management, efforts at "trilateral" leadership, and the diverse experience of group and individual state behavior in many international institutions.

It is also important to recognize that the leadership requirements (and the importance of declining hegemony) may be very different in different kinds of task:

- a) the creation of new international regimes or institutions;
- b) the reform of existing ones;
- c) the maintenance and marginal improvement of existing ones;
- d) the promotion of international climates of understanding about needs for cooperation.

Such distinctions may be helpful in assessing realistically the roles that different states, or groups of states, might play in leading or catalysing change. For middle powers, a careful assessment of past performance and present perceptions must underlie the assessment of future potential.

## 2. Precedents and Prospects for Effective "Middle Power" Action

### a) Early Precedents

If there is an identifiable and significant grouping of countries with intermediate power capabilities, existing in an international system where interdependence may increase their relative leverage, and where past patterns of multilateral cooperation and leadership are breaking down, what concrete evidence supports the theoretical expectation that they might rise to the challenges and opportunities offered?

Explicit historical precedents for middle-power action in the international system are not well-documented -- since the middle-power focus itself has been little developed -- but, beneath the surface, they are interesting.

One early recognition of an intermediate category of states was at the peace conference of 1919 where four different groups of countries were distinguished, with weighted representation. The League also wrestled with the problem, with Brazil, Spain, and Poland asserting claims (accepted in practice until 1926) to continuous membership on the council. When the practice was abandoned, Brazil and Spain withdrew from the League.<sup>32</sup> In the

latter stages of the Second World War and the planning for what was to become the United Nations organization, Canada and a number of other countries pressed the view that power and responsibility went together and should reflect the stake and potential contribution of "medium powers". Prime Minister MacKenzie King declared to the Canadian Parliament:

The simple division of the world between great powers and the rest is unreal and even dangerous. The great powers are called by that name simply because they possess great power. The other states of the world possess power and therefore, the capacity to use it for the maintenance of peace - in varying degrees ranging from almost zero in the case of the smallest and weakest states up to a military potential not far below that of the great powers. In determining what states should be represented on the council with the great powers, it is, I believe, necessary to apply the functional idea. Those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected. The military contribution actually made during this war by the members of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a selective principle of choice.<sup>33</sup>

At the time, of course, the focus on military capability, and potential contributions to the maintenance of peace, were uppermost considerations, and the persistent campaign for middle power recognition, led mainly by Australia and Canada, concentrated on amendments to the draft charter to ensure special representation on the Security Council. In the event, only two oblique amendments were made to help assuage these concerns, although the first-elected group of non-permanent members of the Council -- Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Poland, the Netherlands and Australia -- was an interesting mix of the results of functional and geographical representation. Soon after, one scholar ventured a list of middle powers that included Belgium, the Netherlands, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Australia and India.

Over succeeding elections, the difficulties of selection were enormous, and ultimately gave way to the 1963 expansion and formal allocation by regional groups. The selections within groups could have been made so as to maintain functional principles but, perhaps in part because the functional rationale of the Security Council had been sidelined by the superpowers, the regional groups resorted to rotational patterns for Council elections.

In some of the specialized agencies such as the FAO and ICAO (as well as the World Bank Group and the IMF) certain kinds of functional distinctions have been recognized (on a de jure or a de facto basis). Significantly, it would not be right to suggest that overall, the shares of financial support provided have been the only, or necessarily the overwhelming, measure or lever of functional influence. This has been largely the case in the Bank and the Fund. Elsewhere, however, many different patterns have been discernable, in which the middle powers' functional roles need to be examined much more closely. As a general rule, it is fair to say that a country's institutional contributions have been tempered by its substantive interests and influence in the regime in question, its commitment of analytical and diplomatic resources, its participation on secretariats and relevant committees, its leverage through other linkage and coalitions, etc. It is worth noting that a 1973 study specifically studied patterns of influence in eight specialized agencies of the UN (ITU, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, IAEA, IMF, GATT, and UNCTAD) and, as part of the exercise, ranked the capabilities (resources and effectiveness in using them) of states within the "specific environment" of the organizations. These rankings were frequently very different from those of the general power of states.<sup>34</sup>

It can be argued that he who pays the piper, if not always actively calling the tune, at least retains the ultimate power to cut off or change the music, and this issue is probably being actively tested now in some of the budget-related pressure campaigns being conducted by the U.S. in the U.N. system.

None of the activity and involvement by middle powers in the design and launching of the post-war international systems, of course, was sufficient to offset the preponderance of the U.S. role, but it is clear that the middle power role was more significant than has been widely recognized, even within the countries concerned.

Theory suggests that hegemonic leadership is likely to be more indispensable in the setting up of international regimes than in their maintenance. Over the post-war period, a measure of managerial participation in the economic regimes has been diffused to Western Europe and Japan through membership in the Group of Five, and the Western Summit, but it remains extremely difficult to assess how, and how much, influence may have spread to a wide galaxy of middle powers. Such assessments are necessarily largely qualitative and will depend on detailed examination of the institutions, regimes or negotiations involved. Some of the related quantitative data on such issues as institutional membership, budget and voting shares, secretariat representation etc. are included in Appendix C. They yield a mixed sketch of participation and emphasis among the preliminary selection of middle powers, but overall levels for the group seem roughly consistent with the group's shares of world GNP or of trade.



b) Perceived Interests and Perceived Influence

For all states foreign policy reflects domestic and international interests and values. The middle powers seek to protect their interests and project their values, as perceived by their leaders. The resulting foreign policies represent a vivid and varied tapestry as might be expected.

Not all of this rich detail need overwhelm the present paper, since its focus on their experience in systems of international cooperation narrows the field somewhat. A preliminary survey of the foreign policy record of most of the middle powers reveals a number of relevant generalizations.

As a group, the middle powers tend to be more intensely preoccupied than the great powers with domestic and regional political and economic issues, rather than those at the global level. This is not simply to state the obvious -- that great powers tend to have global interests and global reach -- but also that in general the intensity of their domestic and regional preoccupations (political/security and economic) is much less, at least in relation to their capacity to handle such issues.

Well over half the middle-power group (unrelated to their particular political dispensations) have sufficiently serious domestic political divisions -- of ethnic, linguistic, religious, regional, ideological, economic and other kinds -- to constitute inhibiting preoccupations and sometimes specific vulnerabilities in their international dealings. Domestic economic development and management is also a more intense and demanding preoccupation for most middle-power governments (developing and developed-alike) than for

most of the great powers. At the same time, the external orientation of their economies (as suggested by the share of export values in their GDP) is fairly consistently higher than that of the great powers. The notable exceptions of Turkey, Argentina, Pakistan, China, Brazil, and India, the latter three being large and integrated, almost "continental", economies.

There is a longstanding assumption in much thinking about international relations that "middle" or "secondary" powers are practically synonymous with "regional" powers, and preliminary examination of the group in question indicates that many do find some of their main external concerns, responsibilities and opportunities in their regional arenas. (It should, of course, be recognized that in the politico-strategic and even economic arenas, contributions to effective regional order can be positive building blocks for order at the global level.)

For more than a third of the middle-power group, one of their principal regional preoccupations, in fact, lies in dealing with a neighbouring or nearby superpower, whether in an allied or adversarial posture. Most of the others in the group perceive themselves to be in regions of politico/strategic insecurity where they either face identified adversaries or feel the need to maintain strong preventive machinery against their emergence.

On the economic level, perhaps 40% of the group find their principal export relationships at the regional level, with the remainder divided about equally between those which depend most on distant markets and those with a fairly-balanced mix of regional and non-regional markets.

At the level of global issues, most of the middle powers, for whatever sets of reasons, are clearly less intensely preoccupied with the key politico/strategic issues than are the great powers. Quite obviously they understand that their own peoples' survival is at stake in these questions, as much as those of the superpowers', but either lack the sense of efficacy, the levers of influence or the resources, given their other challenges, to make these dominant focii of attention.

It is important here to note that there are exceptions to the general rule that middle powers have tended to be relatively more preoccupied with domestic and regional than global issues. A group, primarily made up of the "Western Likeminded" seems to have been able to sustain fairly consistent attention and energy across this range of levels, perhaps in part because of the relative situations. The Netherlands, perhaps Canada and Australia, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway and Finland seem to fall in this group, together with Yugoslavia, a country that, even with (or perhaps even partly because of) compelling domestic and regional preoccupations has managed to maintain consistent levels of preoccupation with global political and economic issues as well.

On the global economic front, a different, and very significant, pattern emerges, particularly in the recent past. For much of the post-war period most of the middle powers may have felt themselves to be mainly bystanders (or countries basically acted upon, rather than acting in these matters) with the implicit recognition that their role consisted in anticipating these external pressures and/or adjusting to them as skilfully as possible. Since about 1975, however, a different picture has emerged, with many of the middle

powers, particularly in the South, much more tightly linked to "front-line" issues of world economic vitality and stability. The critical changes can be summarized as follows:

(i) the assertion of OPEC's market power and its fundamental impact on the structure and operation of the world economic system, in decline as in ascendancy, which has major impacts on most of the middle powers, as producers and/or consumers.

(ii) the emergence of the newly-industrializing countries (NICs) and "major market" Third World countries as powerful agents of worldwide economic change and adjustment and targets of resistance and protectionism. (Once again, although some of the leading NICs are too small to fall among the GNP-based mid-power group, the next wave involves a great many of them).

(iii) the growth of problems of liquidity and indebtedness, (concentrated mainly in middle power countries) of a scale and seriousness that rank this as a central issue of global economic management.

It is noteworthy that each of these interrelated movements involves groups of middle powers among its major actors, and also that each exemplifies the "double-edged sword" of mutual vulnerability in conditions of more intense interdependence. The now-familiar anomaly of "debtor power" is perhaps the most striking illustration, but in "oil power", "NIC power" and "new market power" as well it is clear that global economic management matters more crucially to most of the middle powers, and they to it. What is also strikingly apparent is that this new mutual importance is not yet reflected, recognized or harnessed in the machinery of international economic cooperation.

c) "Cooperation-Mindedness" and Multilateral Systems

As suggested in an earlier section, with high stakes and substantial

capabilities, in the interdependent international arena, but the realization that their unilateral means are usually insufficient to shape global decisions, it is logical to expect that middle powers would tend to invest fairly heavily in international cooperative activities in order to advance their interests and project their values.

The record since World War II suggests that most of the middle powers have at times pursued international cooperative arrangements at various levels and in various fields as a major thrust of their foreign policies. It is also evident, however, that, except for a few, this involvement has been somewhat selective and intermittent, so that it would be inaccurate to suggest that there is an across-the-board record of cooperative or multilateral leadership or activism. They do, however, constantly re-emerge. In June 1985, for example, heads of government of four of the group were part of a special eight-nation appeal on the occasion of the UN's fortieth anniversary to seek the recommitment of all member-governments to the organization and its goals.

Appendix C indicates the range of formal middle power memberships in international organizations, together with their funding shares. It is evident that, like most states, almost all of the group belong to the majority of the key functional and other universal organizations, together with layers of more limited membership organizations of different types, such as the OECD or the Non-Aligned Movement. Particularly noteworthy gaps among membership patterns may be the absence of several Third World middle powers from the GATT and several of the Eastern European socialist states from the IMF and World Bank Group.

With respect to the level of commitment by middle powers to different organizations and regimes, one is quickly led into areas of qualitative assessments in order to get beyond the most bland of quantitative measures. Funding shares are generally not a very revealing index since they are usually fixed by negotiated formulae of various kinds. One notable exception is in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), where all contributions are voluntary and where the middle-power group has contributed a total more than 50% of the total cumulative receipts of UNDP and its predecessor organizations - very substantially more than its formula-based total share of general UN assessment (29.6%) or its shares-of-trade based portion in the IMF/IBRD group (42%). Rather than adhering to either any weighted voting system, or to formal votes (in line with its one nation-one vote franchise) it is perhaps significant that UNDP has consistently operated on the basis of consensual decision-making. It remains to be fully seen whether and how middle power influence patterns in the organization may be affected by this funding preference.

As to the middle powers' relative reliance on, and influence in, international cooperation and institutions, much more detailed analysis is needed on which to base measured judgements. In the security field, NATO, Anzus and the Warsaw Pact together claim 14 of the group's members which have opted for such alliances as an approach to collective security to meet their needs. Another nine of the group are members of the Non-Aligned Movement - three of them (India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia) among the founders and others among the most active members. For a number of these countries the policy of non-alignment (and its collective endorsement by a wide group of nations) remains a vigorous part of their approach to international politico/strategic

cooperation. It is perhaps significant in this context that some of them also fought so hard at the Movement's Havana Summit to resist the formal compromising of its "non-aligned" character. In the security area as well, four of the middle power group have taken part in the "five-continent" initiative to try to spur the superpowers to progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament measures.

In other areas of international cooperation and multilateral management there is, of course, a vast array of different involvements, commitments and degrees of influence among the middle-power group and these need to be illuminated by careful case studies of particular issue-areas and institutions. Earlier, we mentioned some comparative work in the 1970s, tracing patterns of influence within eight international organizations, and many individual and more far-reaching studies have been completed since. It is a fair generalization, however, that in each of the major multilateral fora of debate and negotiation on global economic, social and environmental issues over the past twenty years, (this would include all the key stages of "North-South dialogue" and the series of major UN issue-conferences), a number of the middle power group (from North and South) have emerged as key "influentials", in their own right, as regional or group leaders, and/or in bridging or mediating efforts between adversarial positions.

On preliminary examination, it does not seem fair to say that all middle-powers have consistently been more "moderate" or "mediating" in their behaviour than other states, although these "bridge-builders" are most often found within the middle category. The Western "Likeminded" have, at the broad political level, generally occupied such a position, and the special co-chair

roles of Canada and Venezuela at CIEC, and Mexico and Austria at Cancun, are other illustrations. However, whether there is potential for major new North-South convergences of middle powers as "the South of the North" and the "North of the South"<sup>35</sup> is more an issue of present and future conceptions of their most important interests and alliances by the powers concerned than simply a question of building on well-established habits of special cooperation with each other.

Immediate questions suggest themselves with respect to the trade and financial regimes. At a surface level, the current attitudes of countries like Brazil and India in particular toward a new round of multilateral trade negotiations are very different from those of many of the Northern middle powers, although some of the underlying sources of reservation are more widely-shared. On some issues of protectionism and industrial adjustment, some observers suggest that there may even be new and special sources of potential conflict (e.g. between the NICs and the Likeminded).<sup>36</sup> Whether underlying commonalities can be seized and turned to constructive purposes is an open question. In the area of finance, an urgent and critical issue for a number of the Southern Middle Powers, their Northern counterparts have to wrestle with divergent interests and priorities of the private sector, national government and international organization levels, but there is every reason to expect that as much creative thinking and constructive problem-solving initiative can come out of this combination as out of any other.

It must always be expected that cooperation among these states, as among any others, will have to be rooted in some calculation of shared interests and



at least a narrow base of shared values. Perhaps one of the most interesting arenas of action (in this and other regards) over recent decades is to be found in the UN Law of the Sea conference. There, many middle powers were active and prominent leaders, if more in their capacity as coastal states than as middle powers. Their middle-power status and capabilities, however, played a large part in their own, and the conference's, success as did a growing sense of shared efficacy in gradually evolving an important global regime without the leadership (and sometimes even against it) of the 'super' and 'great' powers. Great care is needed in assessing whether, and how, this set of negotiations may provide models or lessons for other international regimes. Some of the outcomes, at least measured against some of the most far-reaching ambitions for the 'common heritage of mankind' also raise questions about the extent to which even a marked increase in the influence of middle powers in international systems would necessarily lead to improvements in the situation of the poorer and weaker countries.

#### Opportunities and Obstacles

The preceding brief surveys of theory and experience lead to a number of general observations, and some pointed questions, about the middle powers' potential contributions to improving international systems.

First, it may be tentatively concluded that the collective influence of the middle powers in most systems of international cooperation has not been commensurate with either their capabilities and their stakes. Part of the reason lies in the fact that to date they have rarely acted in concert, pooling their resources in pursuit of shared goals. Indeed, their own

perceptions of their interests and goals have been disparate and sometimes contradictory, reflecting their other alignments and alliances much more strongly than any shared "middle power" perspective.

Second, it is clear that the systems are badly in need of infusions of new commitment, creativity and support, and that these are extremely unlikely to be generated by the super or great powers at the one extreme, nor by the plethora of vastly over-extended smaller states. For middle powers it may still be a calculated risk as to whether they can, by much greater commitment, achieve much greater influence than in the past in these systems, but their interest in doing so (particularly in the systems that handle trade, protectionism and adjustment, debt and finance) is now so critical that the investment required seems much less forbidding.

Third, a much greater measure of concerted action, would immeasurably increase the chances for any of the middle powers to achieve more effective influence. This is so not just, or even mainly, because the pooling of capabilities would yield "a force to be reckoned with" in abstract terms but because in the process of coming to shared positions which they could support, any reasonably balanced selection of countries from this group would be forced to come to terms with some of the most difficult differences in socio-economic and political world-views that characterize the entire international community. For them to do so, therefore, would require a prior determination that they do share superceding, practical interests in cooperation itself and that, not representing any of the most serious threats to each other, they may be well placed to test ways of resolving outstanding differences. Wherever

useful, they could of course also attempt to draw in other partners, whether middle powers or not.

Fourth, to evolve such a nucleus of cross-cutting coalitions or even "caucuses" would require from all participants a willingness to run the risks involved in adjusting their approach to their existing group positions and processes. To say this is nothing more than to reiterate that a measure of leadership is required, and to recognize the reality of intra-group differences which already exist. The existing group alignments and common core positions must be assumed to be strong enough to permit attempts at pragmatic problem-solving or they will become purely symbolic and wither away in any event.

Fifth, even with a common will among some of the middle powers (and definitely a wider group than the Northern Like Minded) to work together on improvements of international systems, the building of cooperation will be difficult and delicate, requiring mutual "confidence-building measures" and careful assessments of where and how progress can be achieved. Specifically,

a) Initially relatively less ambitious efforts such as "'climatic' improvements", "regime reforms" and "regime maintenance", are likely to be more amenable to effective middle-power influence or initiative than those of "regime creation".

b) The reassertion of "functionalist" claims for greater influence by middle powers within particular international regimes could be seen to weaken the

important sense of interrelationships among regimes. This can be guarded against, however, since acceptance of some of the key inter-linkages is no longer seriously disputed (e.g., between trade, protectionism and debt and finance.)

c) It may be useful to distinguish among the different types of decisions involved in international institutions to see which are most important, urgent and fertile for middle-power initiative. Cox and Jacobson suggest the following categories: representational; symbolic (i.e., configurations of opinion), boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervisory, and operational.<sup>37</sup> A few well-chosen salient and widely-supported initiatives in any of these areas could be powerful catalysts of further cooperation.

d) In addition to choosing the promising issue-areas on which to try to develop more middle power cooperation, choosing the most promising techniques and arenas will be vitally important. Informality and the use of existing fora will be essential at the outset: regular meetings of Permanent Representatives and Executive Directors in key institutions have been suggested; development among middle-powers of such techniques as the Groupes de réflexion recently used in UNCTAD or networks such as the "Friends of the UN" can play a role; maximum use of bilateral and cross-cutting contacts (e.g., through the Commonwealth, Francophone or Pacific Rim associations) to promote contact and cooperation.<sup>38</sup>

Perhaps most specifically, the middle powers' joint majority funding of UNDP raises the possibility that they could undertake extensive

experimentation through this multi-faceted vehicle for technical cooperation, with possible spillovers into the work of many other functional agencies.

Further analysis may well suggest a range of other precedents, models, lessons or even warnings about the potential for middle-power contributions to international systems. The preceding analysis suggests potential that has not yet been widely perceived by policy-makers, and may help identify some of the most promising lines of approach, although clearly no panacea.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>I wish here to acknowledge the contributions to this paper by the members of the Institute research team: Jock Finlayson, David Protheroe, Janis Doran and H  l  ne Cameron.

<sup>2</sup>Interdependence refers to a situation characterized by reciprocal costly effects to countries or actors within countries arising from interactions with other states or from events taking place in the international system as a whole. According to Keohane and Nye, costs are not necessarily symmetrical in their distribution and are determined by the constraints they impose on the autonomy of the actors. As such, costs may be either beneficial or harmful in particular cases. External linkages without costs is simply interconnectedness. Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1977 p. 8-11 and Oran Young "Interdependencies in World Politics," International Journal, Autumn 1969, p. 726.

<sup>3</sup>Javier Perez de Cuellar, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1984, New York, United Nations, 1984, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup>Needless to say, a focus on actors or forces other than states, such as socio-economic classes, corporations, ideas and ideologies can yield a somewhat different picture.

<sup>6</sup>David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 basically adopts such a single distinction.

<sup>7</sup>R.G. Riddell, cited in R.A. MacKay, "The Canadian Doctrine of Middle Powers," in H.L. Dyck and H.P. Krosby (eds) Empire and Nations..., Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969, p. 138.

<sup>8</sup>One of the most interesting such exercises was carried out by Cox and Jacobson who also, in an appended essay on "The Stratification of Power," compared their own rationale and results with those of other scholars and techniques. Much more recent review of the issues is found in Krasner. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.

<sup>9</sup>Holbraad, for example in his 1984 Middle Powers in International Politics, uses a slightly different approach to determine an international hierarchy of power, and ranks countries by region based on a formula of GNP and population. His qualification for middle power status varies between regions. In a historical context, Wight has also developed a gradient of international power, and distilled a category of middle powers. Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984; Wight, M., Bull, H., and Holbraad, C., (eds.) Power Politics, Leicester, Penguin and Leicester University Press, 1978.

<sup>10</sup>Paul Painchaud, "Middlepowermanship as an Ideology," in J. King Gordon (ed.), Canada's Role as a Middle Power, Toronto, CIIA, 1966, p. 35. See also John Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1970, and Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1974. R.G. Riddell, "Role of Middle Powers...;"

<sup>11</sup>Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization New York, Yale University Press, 1973, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup>A major academic critique of interdependence comes from scholars who maintain that the sovereign state and inter-state relations retain their primacy and dismiss the idea that transnational actors have displaced the state as the dominant international actor. Second, "realists" also criticise what they see as the ideological bias of interdependence and see "globalist" precepts as outgrowths of liberal economics. Third, "realists" are highly skeptical of the notion that military power has become less "usable"; systemic stability or peace derive from an international balance of power, not from international cooperation. Interdependence is also criticized on an

ideological basis from both "Left" and "Right". Dependency theorists and others see it as obscuring the profound asymmetries of power in international relationships and, as masking situations of complete dependence. Extreme nationalists also resist acceptance of the concept because of the limits it implies on national freedom of action.

<sup>13</sup>As skeptics about the growth of interdependence see Waltz, Gourevitch. Rosecrance and Stein and many others argue the opposite case. Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed," International Organization, vol. 32, Autumn 1978. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth and Reality," World Politics, vol. 26, no. 1, October 1973. Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, (ed.), The International Corporation, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.

<sup>14</sup>This leads some to stress the distinction between "sensitivity" and "vulnerability" with the latter being interpreted as sensitivity tempered by "the relative availability and costliness of alternatives that various actors face". For early thinking on the phenomenon of "sensitivity". See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 13 and Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence, New York, McGraw Hill, 1968.

<sup>15</sup>Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence p. 33-34 and Edward Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations New York, The Free Press, 1976, p. 128.

<sup>16</sup>Riddell (1945) cited in R.A. MacKay, "The Canadian Doctrine of Middle Powers," in Harvey L. Dyck and H. Peter Krosby (eds.) Essays in Honour of Frederic H. Soward, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969, p. 138.

<sup>17</sup>Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Small European States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporated Politics," in John Gerard Ruggie(ed) The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. \*p. 102 and \*\*p. 106.

<sup>18</sup>Krasner, Structural Conflict, p. 4-5.



<sup>19</sup>Krasner, Structural Conflict, p. 6. A much more sophisticated analysis of some of the underlying questions is reflected in G.K. Helleiner (ed.) For Good or Evil: Economic Theory and North-South Negotiations, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982.

<sup>20</sup>Cox and Jacobson, Anatomy of Influence, p. 404.

<sup>21</sup>Robert Cox, "The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organizations in the 1980s," International Journal vol. 35, no. 2, spring 1980, p. 395.

<sup>22</sup>Cox and Jacobson, Anatomy of Influence, p. 424.

<sup>23</sup>Miriam Camps and C. Gwin, Collective Management: The Reform of Global Economic Organizations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1981.

<sup>24</sup>This is perhaps most apparent in the United States, where a willingness to consider that American power may have declined is taken in some quarters as almost a self-fulfilling prophecy, and a form of disloyalty. In the wake of the perceived setback of Vietnam and decline during the Carter presidency, an active stance of "reassertionism" has been taken up by the Reagan Administration. Some of its proponents will argue that U.S. power has not diminished, others that any relative diminution is insignificant for U.S. responsibilities and capacities, given its still-preponderant weight. All the "reassertionists" will agree, with Alexander Haig, that "Confidence in ourselves [is] the crucial psychological element in any foreign policy." cited in Richard E. Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy, New York, W.W. Norton, Co., 1983, p. 15-16.

<sup>25</sup>There is also an interpretation that part of the US motivation beginning in the late 1960s was an attempt "to protect itself from the impact of economic interdependence." Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup>Charles P. Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation Public Goods and Free Rides," International Studies Quarterly, June 1981, p. 242.

<sup>27</sup>Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 182.

<sup>28</sup>Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 16.

<sup>29</sup>Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 215.

<sup>30</sup>Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 215.

<sup>31</sup>Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 9-10.

<sup>32</sup>F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, 1952) cited in R.A. MacKay, "Canadian Doctrine," p. 135.

<sup>33</sup>CHCD, vi, 1944, p. 5909. Cited in Mackay, "Canadian Doctrine," p. 134.

<sup>34</sup>Cox and Jacobson, Anatomy of Influence, passim, especially Appendix A.

<sup>35</sup>Edgar Dosman and David Pollock, "Canada-Mexico and the North-South Dialogue: The Need for Audacity", A Paper Presented to the Colloquium Mexico-Canada, Carleton University, Ottawa, September 26-28, 1983 (unpublished mimeograph).

<sup>36</sup>Some of the preliminary thinking of Professor Cranford Pratt and his colleagues in the project on "Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty" raises this possibility.

<sup>37</sup>Cox and Jacobson, Anatomy of Influence, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup>Dosman and Pollock, "Need for Audacity".

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Table A.1  
Rank Order of States according to Power

Rank Order	1950	Score	Rank Order	1958	Score	Rank Order	1967	Score
1	United States	24	1	United States	25	1	United States	26
2	USSR	21	2	USSR	23	2	USSR	24
3	United Kingdom	17	3	United Kingdom	18	3	France	20
4	France	16	4.5	China	17	5	China	19
5	China	15	4.5	France	17	5	Japan	19
7	Canada	14	6.5	Federal Republic of Germany	16	5	United Kingdom	19
7	Federal Republic of Germany	14	6.5	India	16	7	Federal Republic of Germany	18
7	India	14	8.5	Canada	14	8	Italy	17
9	Japan	12	8.5	Italy	14	9.5	Canada	16
12.5	Australia	11	10	Japan	13	9.5	India	16
12.5	Belgium	11	11.5	Brazil	12	11	Sweden	14
12.5	Brazil	11	11.5	Sweden	12	15	Australia	13
12.5	Italy	11	15	Argentina	11	15	Austria	13
12.5	Sweden	11	15	Australia	11	15	Brazil	13
12.5	Switzerland	11	15	Belgium	11	15	Netherlands	13
14.5	Indonesia	10	15	Indonesia	11	15	Spain	13
14.5	Spain	10	15	Switzerland	11	15	Switzerland	13
20	Argentina	9	19.5	Mexico	10	15	Yugoslavia	13
20	Mexico	9	19.5	Netherlands	10	21	Argentina	12
20	Netherlands	9	19.5	Spain	10	21	Belgium	12
20	South Africa	9	19.5	South Africa	10	21	Pakistan	12
20	Yugoslavia	9	26	Austria	9	21	Poland	12
27.5	Czechoslovakia	8	26	Czechoslovakia	9	21	South Africa	12
27.5	Denmark	8	26	Denmark	9	26.5	Czechoslovakia	11
27.5	New Zealand	8	26	German Democratic Republic	9	26.5	Denmark	11
27.5	Norway	8	26	Israel	9	26.5	German Democratic Republic	11
27.5	Pakistan	8	26	Norway	9	26.5	Indonesia	11
27.5	Philippines	8	26	Poland	9	26.5	Israel	11
27.5	Poland	8	26	Yugoslavia	9	26.5	Mexico	11
27.5	Turkey	8	26	Venezuela	9	31.5	Cuba	10
27.5	United Arab Republic	8	33.5	Cuba	8	31.5	Norway	10
27.5	Venezuela	8	33.5	New Zealand	8	31.5	Turkey	10
34	Finland	7	33.5	Pakistan	8	31.5	United Arab Republic	10
34	German Democratic Republic	7	33.5	Philippines	8	36	Finland	9
34	Israel	7	33.5	Turkey	8	36	New Zealand	9
37	Austria	6	33.5	United Arab Republic	8	36	Nigeria	9
37	Cuba	6	37	Finland	7	36	Philippines	9
37	Luxembourg	6	38	Luxembourg	6	36	Venezuela	9
39	Nigeria	5	39	Nigeria	5	39	Luxembourg	6



MIDDLE POWERS, EXPORTS and IMPORTS as % of GDP

Countries	as % GDP 1982		as % GDP 1979		as % GDP 1976		as % GDP 1973		as % GDP 1970	
	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports
Italy	27	25	28.7	26.5	25.1	26.1	19.1	21	17.8	17.2
China	10	7.3	6.1	7	----	----	----	----	----	----
Canada	27	19	28	27.3	23.1	23.4	24	22.5	23.3	20.6
Brazil	9	8	7.1	9	7	9.1	8	9.1	6.5	6.9
Spain	18	17.4	15	13	14	18.1	14.4	15.5	13.5	14.4
Netherlands	58	45.8	49.1	50.1	51	47.4	47.2	44.1	44.9	46.6
India	6	9.3	8	9.2	8	7.1	5	5.4	4.4	4.5
Poland	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Australia	15	14.7	19.1	18.3	16.1	17.1	15.2	15.2	14.9	15.1
Mexico	17	8.8	11.2	12.5	8.5	10.1	8.4	9.5	7.7	9.7
Belgium	69	68	56.1	58	48.1	48.2	47.5	45.5	43.9	41.6
G.D.R.	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Sweden	33	28.9	31	32.1	28	29.5	27.5	25	24.3	24.9
Switzerland	35	29.6	35.3	36	34	30.3	31	32	32.8	34.5
Saudi Arabia	68	26.5	59	43.1	73.1	26.1	74	20.4	59.2	28.7
Czechoslovakia	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	27	25
Nigeria	19	29	26.5	23.1	24	24.1	22.1	16.1	12.4	12.6
Austria	42	29.3	37.2	38	35.1	36.2	32.4	32	32.4	31.4
Denmark	36	30.1	30	33.1	29.1	33.5	28.5	30.4	27.9	30.9
Turkey	11	17.6	5.6	10	7.1	14.1	8.5	11.1	5.9	8.6
Argentina	13	8.3	9.4	9.1	12.4	8	10.1	7.5	9.2	9
S. Korea	39	35.4	30	37	33	34.4	30	33.1	14.3	24.1
S. Africa	----	25.5	35.1	25.1	28	29	25.2	22.1	21.5	24.7
Indonesia	22	18.7	30.1	24.1	23.4	23.1	20.1	20	12.8	15.8
Yugoslavia	23	19.6	16.1	23.1	19.2	22	22	25.4	18.4	23.7
Venezuela	25	16.8	30.5	29	30.3	29.1	29.1	20.1	23.7	19.1
Romania	23	18.5	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Norway	46	27.6	44.2	42	41.1	51	44.1	44.1	41.8	43.1
Finland	32	27.4	32.5	31	26.1	28.1	26.1	27	26.2	27.4
Hungary	38	42.5	41.1	44.5	38.3	43	38.2	34	30.1	32.4
Pakistan	10	21.9	11	23	11	20.1	13.4	16.1	7.8	14.6
Algeria	30	24.3	31.4	33.5	34.1	40.6	25.3	32	22	29.1
Iran	----	----	----	----	39	27.1	35.1	19.1	23.9	17.9

ECONOMIC OPENNESS  
(average 'Middle Powers'  
Exports as % of GDP)

1970	22.43%	
		+10.12%
1973	32.55%	
		- 5.15%
1976	27.4 %	
		- .12%
1979	24.28%	
		+ 3.92%
1982	31.2 %	

year AVG. %

MIDDLE POWERS in WORLD TRADE

	<u>YEAR</u>						
	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Middle Power Total Trade \$ US (millions)	1 050 555	1 319 605	1 619 641	1 608 486	1 489 596	1 448 285	1 485 027
World Total Trade \$ US (millions)	2 453 200	3 092 900	3 803 800	3 754 900	3 503 700	3 412 200	3 627 700
Middle Power % of Total Trade	42.82%	42.66%	42.58%	42.84%	42.51%	42.44%	40.98%
	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984

YEAR

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985

**Middle Powers in International Organizations:  
Contributions and Weight**

Countries	Nationals in Senior Secretariat Positions in United Nations Organizations	UN Total Budget Scale of Assessment %	World Bank (IBRD) Capital Stock Subscription %	IMF 1983-84 Voting Power %	IMF 1984 000 SDR Quota General	UNDP Voluntary \$US Contribu- tions 000 1950-85	UNDP
							Voluntary \$US Contribu- tions 000 1950-85
Italy	6	3.74	3.65	3.47	2909100	29341	155165
China	11	.88	4.32	4.09	2390900	24159	15782
Canada	7	3.08	3.39	3.22	2941000	29660	470693
Brazil	7	1.39	1.97	1.89	1461300	14863	36187
Spain	5	1.93	.84	.83	1286000	13110	16283
Netherlands	4	1.78	2.78	2.65	2264800	22898	735056
India	13	.36	4.23	4.01	2207700	22327	117073
Poland	8	.72	-	-	-	-	15269
Australia	6	1.57	2.35	2.24	1619200	16442	116139
Mexico	8	.88	1.17	1.14	1165500	11905	17789
Belgium	3	1.28	2.29	2.19	2080400	21054	175804
G.D.R.	4	1.39	-	-	-	-	8975
Sweden	13	1.32	1.36	1.31	1064300	10893	729117
Switzerland	2	1.10	-	-	-	-	117631
Saudi Arabia	1	.86	2.06	1.98	3202400	32274	35096
Czechoslovakia	2	.76	-	-	-	-	14135
Nigeria	12	.19	.54	.55	849500	8745	10188
Austria	2	.75	1.01	.99	775600	8006	66993
Denmark	3	.75	.95	.93	911000	7360	713470
Turkey	1	.32	.63	.63	429100	4541	21706
Argentina	7	.71	1.07	1.05	1113000	11380	22601
S. Korea	0	.18	.54	.55	462800	4878	9253
S. Africa	0	.41	.64	.64	915700	/***	-
Indonesia	3	.13	1.43	1.38	1009700	10347	20391
Yugoslavia	11	.46	.28	.30	613000	6380	28588
Venezuela	2	.55	1.39	1.35	1371500	13965	30646
Romania	3	.19	.37	.39	523400	5484	7540
Norway	9	.51	.44	.46	699000	7240	396759
Finland	7	.48	.62	.63	574900	5999	92784
Hungary	0	.23	.88	.40	530700	5557	6915
Pakistan	12	.06	.46	.48	546300	5713	26327
Algeria	5	.13	.88	.86	623100	6481	9285
Iran	0	.58	.29	.32	660000	6850	28410
"Great Powers"					36999900	367852	4268050
US	16	-	-	-	-	-	-
USSR	13	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	9	-	-	-	-	-	-
West Germany	9	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	17	-	-	-	-	-	-
UK	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
		*29.67%	**42.33%	40.93%	41.46%	40.24%	50.1%

\* 1985/85 = \$US 478,147,240. This is the contribution of Middle Powers to the UN; the remainder of the budget was financed by the "Great Powers" and by other countries having GNP less than that of Iran.

\*\* SDR 48,756,100,000

\*\*\* Did not participate in 1984 vote

