Digging deeper into the state–democracy nexus

The role of civic participation in fostering impartial bureaucracy

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Abstract: The growing body of research on the relationship between the state and democracy has remained inconclusive both in terms of causal direction and sign. One key factor contributing to this inconclusiveness is the lack of precision in the conceptualization and measurement of democracy and state capacity. Drawing on this argument, my study takes an original approach to the topic by shifting the focus on more specific aspects of the two concepts. Through a statistical analysis of two precise attributes of democracy and state capacity—namely, civic participation and impartial bureaucracy—my study provides new evidence on their dynamic relationship in a comparative cross-country setting of over 160 countries after World War II. My findings strongly support the hypothesis that a vibrant civic society is an important prerequisite of impartial bureaucracies. They also highlight the importance of digging deeper into the concepts of democracy and state capacity to achieve a more thorough understanding on the state–democracy nexus and its underlying mechanisms.

Key words: democracy, state capacity, civic participation, impartial bureaucracy, state–democracy nexus

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1   Introduction

In the last decade or so, especially in the fields of comparative politics and international development, there has been a significant increase in research analysing the relationship between democracy and state capacity, as well as the related 'sequencing' debate. The topic is of major scholarly interest, as it connects and examines the link between two key political science concepts: state capacity and democracy. Additionally, it has fundamental policy implications, as building democratic governance is a central objective of current international development policy. Yet, despite a good deal of large-N cross-national studies on the state–democracy nexus (e.g., Andersen, Møller, and Rørbæk et al. 2014; Bratton and Chang 2006; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Carbone and Memoli 2015; Charron and Lapuente 2010; D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017; Fortin 2012; Møller and Skaaning 2011; Wang and Xu 2018), empirical evidence on the topic remains inconclusive and the underlying mechanisms of the link remain unclear. The debate over whether a capable state apparatus needs to be developed first to sustain democratic political institutions or whether democratic political institutions need to be put in place first to sustain successful statebuilding efforts is thus still unsettled, both theoretically and empirically.

The starting point of the study at hand is that one of the main factors contributing to the existing inconclusiveness in the literature originates in the complexity of the concepts of democracy and state capacity as well as in the challenges in measuring them. Recent studies have demonstrated that different measures of democracy capture different aspects of democracy (e.g., Boese 2019; Gerring et al. 2021) and that different measures of state capacity capture different aspects of state capacity (e.g., Hanson 2018; Savoia and Sen 2015). Conceptual and measurement issues are particularly pronounced in the state capacity literature, where scholars tend to disagree on the core dimensions of the concept and the fit between concept and measure is often poor (D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2021). In the light of these problems, it is likely that findings on the state–democracy nexus have remained inconclusive because different studies have actually measured completely different things in the name of the two concepts. Indeed, empirical evidence supports this argument, given that frequently used cross-country measures of democracy are not empirically interchangeable (Casper and Tufis 2003; Högström 2013; Vaccaro 2021) and results on the overall relationship between democracy and state capacity are idiosyncratic to the measure used (Vaccaro 2023).

In discussing some of these conceptual and measurement issues, a few scholars (e.g., Andersen and Doucette 2022; Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning 2014) have recently called for a disaggregated approach that examines specific aspects of democracy and state capacity. The study at hand responds to these calls for disaggregation and, instead of focusing on the overall relationship between democracy and state capacity, digs deeper into selected aspects of these two complex concepts. By building its theoretical framework on Putnam's (1993) and Banfield's (1958) studies on civic community and institutions in Italy, it investigates the relationship between two core attributes of democracy and state capacity: civic participation and impartiality of public officials.

My results—based mainly on a battery of dynamic regression models on countries around the world between 1945 and 2017—provide robust statistical evidence that, in general, more vibrant civic communities pave the way for more impartially behaving public officials both in the short and in the long runs. The selected approach addresses the conceptual and measurement challenges that have contributed to the lack of consensus in the literature, as it enables the use of precise definitions and measures of civic participation and impartial bureaucracy. While my approach does not enable me to make strong interpretations on the overall link between democracy and state capacity, it does contribute to the state–democracy literature by offering a better understanding of

what happens beneath the broader conceptual level and by generating new knowledge on the underlying mechanisms of the sequence between democracy and state capacity. Therefore, my study also corroborates the argument that a disaggregated approach that digs deeper into specific aspects of democracy and state capacity provides a viable solution to bring forward the research agenda on the topic.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of the two opposing arguments of the broader sequencing debate. Second, I develop a theoretical framework that focuses on the more specific relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials. Third, I discuss the selected data and my empirical strategy. Fourth, I present and analyse the empirical results. Finally, I conclude the paper by summarizing the key findings of my study and describing the implications it has for our understanding of the state–democracy nexus.

2   On the sequencing debate

Traditionally, the state-first argument has dominated the research agenda on the state–democracy nexus. The state-first argument, rooted in Huntington's (1968) ideas on effective governments that must control the governed before controlling themselves, has found support in numerous studies (e.g., D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017; Linz and Stepan 1996; Rose and Shin 2001). According to this perspective, building a strong state apparatus must be the first step on a successful path to high-capacity democracy. Premature democratization in a low-capacity context can create 'a cycle of low compliance and low effectiveness' (D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017: 194) and can even limit further democratization by reinforcing traditional societal divisions (Mansfield and Snyder 2007).

Indeed, many European countries had strong state apparatuses before successful democratization (e.g. Mazzuca and Munck 2020). For instance Denmark and Sweden had developed effective state institutions well before their transition into liberal democracies (Andersen 2023; Knudsen and Rothstein 1994), and France and England had high coercive capacity prior to democratization (Mazzuca and Munck 2020). Evidence from recent efforts to promote political liberalization under fragile conditions in post-conflict settings also suggests that democratization can increase societal and political instability in weak states. For instance it has been argued that in Angola and Rwanda premature political liberalization attempts not only impeded successful statebuilding but also triggered new civil conflicts in the 1990s (Paris 2004).

It is certainly reasonable to assume that some kind of state institutions have to exist before democratization by definition because 'democracy is a form of governance of a state' (Linz and Stepan 1996: 7). A certain amount of political order also needs to exist prior to democracy because political participation would be impossible in complete insecurity (Fukuyama 2014a). Yet the state-first perspective has proven to be somewhat ill-suited in explaining why so many contemporary high-capacity states have not democratized, despite economic and social progress. For instance, today, countries like China, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore have well-functioning, effective state institutions but are unlikely to become democratic in the foreseeable future. Some scholars have then argued that state capacity may actually impede democratization by allowing dictators to repress democratic demands (Albertus and Menaldo 2012) and increase regime stability through better socio-economic performance (Gerschewski 2013).

As a result a more recent body of literature has emerged to analyse the reverse causal direction of the state–democracy sequence—the democracy-first approach—which is arguably 'a better guide to action than the state first thesis' (Mazzuca and Munck 2014: 1223). According to the reversed approach democratization is likely to facilitate the development and may even be a prerequisite of

well-functioning state institutions (Bratton 2008). Theoretically, the democracy-first argument remains less developed than its state-first counterpart, but primarily consists of three state-consolidating mechanisms (Carbone 2015): an increase in political order through democratic participation, an increase in impartial procedures through political competition and accountability, and an increase in administrative capacity and territorial presence through the processes of organizing and carrying out elections.

Empirical evidence provides partial support to the democracy-first argument. A classic example is early America. In the United States democratic institutions were established without a powerful state apparatus and, in fact, played a key role in the subsequent development of a high-capacity central state (Skowronek 1982). In more recent times it appears that in many sub-Saharan African countries modern democratic institutions have emerged because of state weakness, not because of a strong state apparatus (Stasavage 2020). Only some of these countries, however, have been able to build effective state institutions at a later stage. For instance, in Botswana, the establishment of democratic institutions preceded the development of state capacity (Handley 2017), but democracy's role in the country's statebuilding process remains unclear.

Recent statistical evidence from cross-country studies suggests that democracy may indeed foster statebuilding (Wang and Xu 2018), particularly in countries that are economically wealthy (Charron and Lapuente 2010) and already well on the path to full democratization (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Carbone and Memoli 2015). Yet the democracy-first thesis continues to be subject to significant doubts, given that numerous high-capacity states—such as the previously mentioned China, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore—have emerged under authoritarian political leadership. Moreover, the democracy-first argument does not explain why many 'early democratizers' have not built strong states with well-functioning bureaucracies. Greece, for instance, became one of the first countries in Europe to introduce universal male suffrage but has remained a country with relatively ineffective state institutions (Fukuyama 2014b).

At the end of the day theoretical arguments of both causal directions are appealing[1] but fall short of explaining why there have been so many exceptions throughout history. To shed light on the relationship between state capacity and democracy—upon which we have surprisingly little conclusive information about—we must start delving deeper into the various sub-dimensions of these two complex concepts. This is precisely what the next sections of this study aim to do.

2   Digging deeper into sequencing: on civic participation and impartial bureaucrats

Participation is generally considered one of the two main dimensions of democracy (Dahl 1971). In minimalist definitions of democracy it is often conceived mainly as political participation in elections. In a well-functioning democracy, however, citizens participate both through elections and 'in the life of political parties and civil society organizations, in the discussion of public policy issues, in communicating with and demanding accountability from elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct, and in direct engagement with public issues at the local level' (Diamond and Morlino 2004: 23–24). Hence, in a broader view of democracy, in which the principal actors are not only formal political institutions but also single citizens, territorial communities, and various forms of civic associations (Morlino 2012), civic participation can be considered one of its core elements. There is little doubt that in between elections civil society organizations play a key role in controlling and participating in the democratic political process

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[1] See Mazzuca and Munck (2014) for a comprehensive review of both arguments.

(Lauth 2015). Additionally, a vibrant associational life requires at least freedom of association, which is one of Dahl's (1971) institutional guarantees of a democratic society.

A Weberian bureaucratic organizational structure, instead, is one of the main pillars of a modern state apparatus (Norris 2012), and impartiality is one of the central principles of a well-functioning Weberian bureaucracy (Cornell et al. 2020). While some scholars argue that impartiality itself is not necessarily a characteristic of effective state institutions (e.g. Fukuyama 2013), a meritocratic, professional bureaucracy is widely considered to be a crucial aspect of administrative capacity, which is central to state capacity (Hanson 2018; Lindvall and Teorell 2016). Considering that meritocracy and professionalism imply the existence of impartiality, and as Rothstein (2019: 26) puts it, 'meritocracy, everything else being equal, increases the competence in the public sector and thereby state capacity', it is reasonable to assume that the impartiality of public officials is a core element of a well-functioning, effective state apparatus.

According to Putnam (1993) differences in civic participation play a key role in explaining variation in the quality of public institutions, because when a society has a vibrant civic community its citizens see the public field as much more than only a playground in which to achieve personal interests. Similar ideas were put forward earlier by Banfield (1958) and his theory of 'amoral familism' through a case study in a small village in Southern Italy. According to Banfield (1958), in a society of amoral familists, citizens do not take interest in public issues and official positions are used by their possessors to gain private advantage. Citizens of such a society are unable to act in the public interest because civic participation and cooperation among citizens is inexistent (Banfield 1958).

Both Putnam's and Banfield's theories suggest that societies with a vibrant civic community are less likely to have public officials who engage in partial actions and pursue private gains. Citizens in societies with a high level of civic participation 'demand more effective public service, and they are prepared to act collectively to achieve their shared goals' (Putnam 1993: 182). A broad implication of both studies is that there is a relationship between democracy and state capacity. Specifically, both studies claim that a strong civic society results in more impartial and less self-interested behaviour by public officials in the long run. Indeed, historically, civil society has been a fundamental actor in the fight against the unequal treatment of citizens by the state (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006).

Conversely, the opposite is true when a vibrant civic community is absent. In a society where citizens have no civic virtues, both ordinary citizens and public officials see the public sphere merely as an arena for pursuing and achieving private interests. When this is the case, people actually expect public officials to act unfairly (Putnam 1993). Putnam's and Banfield's findings, however, are limited to the Italian case. It remains to be seen whether the relationship implied by both studies holds not only in Italy but also in a broader cross-national setting.

Following some more recent theoretical propositions, we can suspect that a strong civil society is likely to play a key role in affecting the behaviour of public servants outside Italy as well. Carothers (2007) and Bäck and Hadenius (2008) point out some specific mechanisms that can be particularly valuable for the development of a well-functioning impartial administrative apparatus. According to Carothers (2007: 20), 'creating space for independent civil society permits advocacy groups to monitor and critique state performance and work together with the state to offer new policy ideas'. In similar vein, Bäck and Hadenius (2008: 15) suggest that an active civic society can increase administrative capacity through 'steering and control from below' or, in other words, by cooperating with the administrative apparatus and by reviewing, evaluating, and inspecting the actions of public officials. Civic participation thus seems to lead to an impartial bureaucracy mainly by enabling better monitoring of state officials and by fostering control over them.

Nevertheless, opposing views on the association between civic participation and impartial bureaucrats have also been put forward. For instance, an excessively powerful civic society can lead to bureaucrats whose interests coincide more with civic society organizations than the state, thereby compromising impartiality and the effective implementation of policies (Migdal 1988). In addition there are cases where countries with active civil societies have failed to establish an impartial bureaucracy, while other countries have been able to develop an impartial bureaucracy without any meaningful civic participation. Rothstein (2011) highlights the contrast between Jamaica, where the administrative apparatus is highly clientelist despite a strong civil society, and Singapore, which has successfully created a well-functioning, impartial civil service despite repressing all forms of civic participation.

Next, I discuss the chosen data and the empirical strategy of my study and test the empirical validity of the hypothesized relationship. As we shall see, my findings provide robust evidence of a positive effect of civic participation on the impartiality of public officials, contributing to a better comprehension of the interplay between these two specific aspects of democracy and state capacity and, thus, yielding new insights on the broader state–democracy nexus.

3 Data and empirical strategy

To quantify specific aspects of democracy and state capacity—and to obtain accurate results—it is essential to use measures that closely represent the concepts we are interested in. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020) provides suitable indicators to capture the key variables of the study at hand. Specifically, I rely on two indicators that capture civic participation and one that captures the impartiality of public officials.

Civic participation is operationalized with the core civil society index (CCSI), which aggregates three expert assessments on the topic. These assessments quantify (1) the amount of control of the government on civil society organizations, (2) the amount of repression pursued by the government to repress civil society organizations, and (3) the amount of popular involvement in civil society organizations. A robustness check is provided with the civil society participation index (CSPART), which aggregates four expert assessments on as many questions on the topic: (1) how large is the involvement of people in civil society organizations? (2) are major civil society organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members? (3) are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations? (4) how centralized is legislative candidate selection within parties? Both civic participation indices run from 0 (low) to 1 (high) on an interval scale. All the sub-indicators of these two indices are also components of the broader V-Dem measures of electoral or participatory democracy.

The impartiality of public officials, instead, is operationalized with the rigorous and impartial public administration indicator. The measure is an expert assessment that answers the question 'are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?' (Coppedge et al. 2020: 164). A robustness check is performed with another specific indicator measuring the impartiality of public officials. This latter indicator is taken from the QoG Expert Survey II dataset (Dahlström et al. 2015) and measures 'to what extent government institutions exercise their power impartially'. However, as the QoG Expert Survey measure is not available over time, it can be used only in a cross-section setting. Both measures of impartiality run on an interval scale. V-Dem's measure follows approximately a normal z-score scale with a mean of 0 for all available country-years in V-Dem's dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020). The QoG Expert Survey's measure ranges from 1 (low) to 7 (high).

As for the control variables I consider several frequently used predictors of well-functioning bureaucracies. In the baseline models I control for GDP/capita, for the simple reason that 'rich nations have better governments than poor ones' (La Porta et al. 1999: 266). More complex specifications include controls for education (e.g., Charron and Lapuente 2010), natural resources (e.g. Charron and Lapuente 2011), total population (e.g. Wang and Xu 2018), and ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Carbone and Memoli 2015). Furthermore, to ensure that other democratic aspects are accounted for, I add controls for regime type according to V-Dem's Regimes of the World fourfold typology. Full models control for all the abovementioned factors. The sources of the selected data are presented in Appendix Table A1 and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table A2.

If civic participation indeed affects the impartiality of public officials, it is plausible that its impact may not only be immediate but also persist over time. As a consequence, we are interested in assessing both the short-run impact of civic participation and whether its effect on impartial public officials lasts in the long run. As long as our variables are stationary, we can estimate both short-term and long-term relationships with simple adjustments to 'static' specifications in ordinary least squares (OLS). For instance, one straightforward way to take account of dynamics is to add one or more lagged dependent variables on the right-hand side of the regression equation (e.g., Beck and Katz 2011; De Boef and Keele 2008). Therefore, before further proceeding with the statistical analysis, I explore the stationary properties of my key variables of interest.

Unit-root tests (Appendix Table A3) indicate that I can reject the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots. Put simply, I find statistically significant evidence of stationarity in my key variables. This means that I can confidently estimate the relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials in a dynamic panel regression setting. As well as adding dynamics into the models, lagged dependent variables also purge the serial correlation in the error terms.

To allow for a more accurate estimation of the relationship between civic participation and impartial bureaucracy, all time-variant independent variables are lagged by one year and contemporaneous effects of independent variables are restricted to zero. It seems theoretically implausible to believe that variation in civic participation would affect the impartiality of public officials instantaneously. On the contrary, I assume that the short-term relationship occurs with a one-year lag. Furthermore, lagging time-variant independent variables helps to mitigate possible reverse causality, because the impartiality of public officials at time t is unlikely to affect any of the independent variables at time $t–1$.

The main regression models also include two-way fixed effects to account for time-invariant factors and common time trends. Although it is well known that combining lagged dependent variables with fixed effects causes biased parameter estimates (Nickell 1981), such bias is negligible when the time dimension is 20 or more (Beck and Katz 2011). As the average time dimension in my main models ranges between 41 and 61, Nickell bias should be sufficiently small to not to worry about. Leaving out unit fixed effects, instead, would lead to severe omitted variable bias. As the theoretical argument is that variation in civic participation affects variation in the impartiality of public officials within a country, the use of country-level fixed effect models is not only statistically, but also theoretically justified. The selected measure of ethnic fractionalization does not vary over time, so it is excluded from the dynamic panel models with fixed effects, but it is included in cross-section robustness tests.

In addition to the main set of models, I conduct a battery of robustness tests to increase the validity of the findings. First, I test the sensitivity of the results to an alternative measure of civic participation. Second, I restrict the sample of the models to a common sample of country-years. Third, I test whether the results vary across macro-regions in the world. The regional classification

is taken from Coppedge et al. (2020). Fourth, I re-estimate the full models with several alternative estimators. Fifth, I test the robustness of the results to different lags of y. Sixth, I regress an alternative measure of impartial public officials on both measures of civic participation. All models are estimated with country-clustered heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.

As well as testing my main hypothesis, rooted in culturalist approaches to the issue, I also test the empirical validity of an influential institutionalist theory that has been put forward in the broader literature on democracy and state capacity: the 'curvilinear relationship' theory. This theory was first formulated by Bäck and Hadenius (2008) in a landmark study on the state–democracy nexus. As already discussed in the previous section, according to Bäck and Hadenius (2008), civic participation enhances administrative capacity through civil society-driven, bottom-up control and monitoring. In their framework, however, this only occurs in well-established democracies, because autocracies do not have the ability to take advantage of any bottom-up participation (Bäck and Hadenius 2008). In highly autocratic countries the authors find that the broader state–democracy nexus is even negative.

Along these lines of thought it is possible, then, that the hypothesized positive effect of civic participation on impartial public officials is not linear but emerges only after civil society actors have acquired a certain amount of strength. Previous findings on the broader state–democracy nexus seem to support Bäck and Hadenius's general-level theory, yet it remains to be seen whether this theory also holds in a more specific analysis of civic participation and impartial public officials.

4   Results and discussion

A preliminary descriptive analysis of the key variables gives support to my main hypothesis and encourages its further analysis. A scatter plot (Figure 1) of the country-specific average values from 1945 to 2017 confirms that on an average the relationship between civic participation and impartial bureaucrats is strong, positive, and linear (Pearson's $r = 0.71$).

Civic participation, alone, explains as much as 50 per cent of the variation in impartial public officials. Yet it is noteworthy that in some countries the relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials seems to be at odds with the general trend. For instance countries such as Nigeria, Guatemala, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have considerably less impartial bureaucrats than one would expect from their level of civic participation, whereas the opposite is true in Bhutan, Singapore, and South Yemen. While these observations provide preliminary support for the hypothesized relationship, as we are interested primarily in within-country variation and as potential confounders should be controlled for, a comprehensive regression analysis could paint a completely different picture of the matter.

Figure 1: Civic participation and impartial bureaucrats (1945–2017 average)

Note: civic participation is measured with CCSI.

Source: author's construction.

Table 1 shows a summary of the results of the main set of dynamic panel regressions. Model 1 includes two-way fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable, and a control for gross domestic product (GDP)/capita. In Model 2 additional controls for natural resource rents, total population, and years of education are included in the specification. To control for differences in formal political institutions, Model 3 adds regime type dummies to the baseline specification. Model 4 adds to the baseline specification both regime type dummies and the aforementioned additional controls. Model 5 tests the validity of the theory of a curvilinear association between civic participation and impartial public officials.

In all the first four models, the association between civic participation and the impartiality of public officials is positive and significant, providing support to the main hypothesis of my study. According to these models an increase in civic participation is related to an increase in the impartiality of public officials both in the short and in the long runs. The result is statistically significant at the highest level across models. Even if the short-term point estimates of civic participation are relatively small in magnitude, varying from a minimum of 0.068 in Model 1 to a maximum of 0.154 in Model 4, they are all statistically significant from zero at the highest level.

Table 1: Civic participation and impartial public officials: main regression results

	Dependent variable: Impartial public officials t				
	Baseline model	Additional controls	Regime types	Full model	Squared participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civic participation $t-1$	0.068***	0.133***	0.092***	0.154***	0.046
	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.065)
Ln(GDP/capita) $t-1$	0.005	0.024	0.005	0.024	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Civic participation^2 $t-1$					0.023
					(0.062)
Ln(Natural resources) $t-1$		0.003		0.004	
		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Ln(Population) $t-1$		-0.006		-0.004	
		(0.034)		(0.035)	
Years of education $t-1$		-0.016		-0.016	
		(0.010)		(0.010)	
Impartial pub. officials $t-1$	0.924***	0.898***	0.925***	0.899***	0.924***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Long-run multipliers					
Civic participation $t-1$	0.898***	1.308***	1.216***	1.532***	
	(0.231)	(0.302)	(0.344)	(0.395)	
Civic participation^2 $t-1$					0.306
					(0.817)
Within R^2	0.89	0.86	0.89	0.86	0.89
N	9,935	5,447	9,913	5,433	9,935
Sample	1946–2017	1971–2017	1946–2017	1971–2017	1946–2017
Countries	162	133	162	133	162
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime type dummies $t-1$	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. Sample of years refers to dependent variable. Civic participation is measured with CCSI.

Source: author's construction.

As already mentioned, these dynamic specifications allow us to estimate both the abovementioned short-term effects of civic participation on impartial bureaucrats and the long-term effects. Unsurprisingly, the long-run effect $(\frac{\beta_{x_{t-1}}}{1-\beta_{y_{t-1}}})$ of civic participation on impartial bureaucrats is larger than the short-run effect $(\beta_{x_{t-1}})$. In models with additional controls (Models 2 and 4), the long-run effect of civic participation is nearly ten times its immediate effect. In models with no additional controls (Models 1 and 3), the long-run effect is around 13 times the immediate effect. In Model 4 a one-unit increase in civic participation is associated with a 1.532-unit increase in impartial bureaucracy in the long run.

This long-term effect does not occur all at once, but instead dissipates relatively slowly over time. In Model 4 the speed of adjustment $(1 - \beta_{y_{t-1}})$ of 0.101 indicates that in the case of a shock to civic participation in a particular year, 50 per cent of the total long-term impact of civic participation on impartial public officials takes place in approximately seven years and 90 per cent of the total long-term impact takes place in approximately 22 years. In Models 1, 2, and 3 one-half

of the total long-term impact on impartial public officials occurs respectively in around nine, seven, and nine years. As the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are well below 1, we can be relatively confident that the models are correctly specified.

Model 5 evaluates the empirical validity of Bäck and Hadenius's (2008) previously discussed theory on a curvilinear relationship between our main variables of interest. The results of my regression analysis do not support this alternative theory. Whether it is in the short-term or in the long-term, according to the estimates, the level of civic participation does not play an important role in explaining the relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials.

To test the robustness of my findings, I run a series of alternative specifications and estimations. Dynamic panel regressions (Table 2) with an alternative measure of civic participation—V-Dem's civic participation index—do not alter the interpretation of the previous results. In fact, if anything, they reinforce the findings of the first set of regressions. Again civic participation and impartial public officials are positively related to each other in the first four models, both in the short run and in the long run. On average higher levels of civic participation seem to be conducive to bureaucrats that act more impartially in their public duties, as suggested by Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993) in their seminal studies.

As before in the first four models, short-run slope coefficients of civic participation are small in magnitude but statistically significant at conventional levels and range from a minimum of 0.054 in Model 1 to a maximum of 0.116 in Model 2. According to Model 4—the full model—a one-unit increase in civic participation increases the impartiality of public officials by 0.114 units in the short run. The cumulative long-run effect of civic participation instead ranges from a minimum of 0.736 in Model 1 to a maximum of 1.200 in Model 2. In Model 4 a one-unit increase in civic participation increases the impartiality of public officials by 1.171 units in the long run. Considering a shift in civic participation in a particular year, 50 per cent of its long-run effect occurs in around seven years and 90 per cent in around 23 years.

Table 2: Civic participation and impartial public officials: robustness tests with an alternative measure of civic participation

	Dependent variable: Impartial public officials $_t$				
	Baseline model	Additional controls	Regime types	Full model	Squared participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	0.054**	0.116***	0.063**	0.114**	0.078
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.072)
Ln(GDP/capita) $_{t-1}$	0.004	0.021	0.004	0.020	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Civic participation^2 $_{t-1}$					-0.027
					(0.073)
Ln(Natural resources) $_{t-1}$		0.004		0.004	
		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Ln(Population) $_{t-1}$		-0.001		-0.001	
		(0.033)		(0.035)	
Years of education $_{t-1}$		-0.017*		-0.017	
		(0.010)		(0.010)	
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-1}$	0.927***	0.903***	0.927***	0.903***	0.927***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Long-run multipliers					
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	0.736**	1.200***	0.866**	1.171***	

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.291)	(0.357)	(0.390)	(0.435)	
Civic participation$^2_{t-1}$					-0.372
					(0.998)
Within R^2	0.89	0.86	0.89	0.86	0.89
N	9,935	5,447	9,913	5,433	9,935
Sample	1946–2017	1971–2017	1946–2017	1971–2017	1946–2017
Countries	162	133	162	133	162
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime type dummies$_{t-1}$	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. Sample of years refers to dependent variable. Civic participation is measured with CSPART.

Source: author's construction.

As indicated by the estimates of Model 5, the alternative hypothesis of a curvilinear relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials is not supported by empirical evidence. The estimates regarding the key explanatory variables are not even closely significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, in the first two sets of regressions, I do not find robust evidence of a significant relationship between any of the covariates and impartial public officials.

The coefficient plots in Figure 2 provide a straightforward illustration of the strength of both the short-term and long-term relationships between civic participation and impartial bureaucrats. The slope coefficients of the first four models in Table 1 (Figure 2 left panels) and Table 2 (Figure 2 right panels), represented by the dots and their respective 95 per cent confidence intervals represented by the spikes, are all completely above the horizontal line of zero, indicating that civic participation is positively related to impartial public officials. For the short-term effects (upper panels), Models 2 and 4 in both panels have higher point estimates compared to Models 1 and 3 but are also less precise. For the long-term effects (lower panels), similarly, Models 2 and 4 in both panels have higher point estimates than Models 1 and 3, but only Model 1 is distinctly more precise than the other models, regardless of the chosen measure of civic participation.

Figure 2: Short-term and long-term effects of civic participation on impartial public officials

As each model has its own set of controls, there is no doubt that one reason to different estimates across models is specification. Nevertheless, due to data availability, there are also some differences in the samples of each model. To investigate whether different samples lead to different results, I run again the first four models of the first set of regressions with a common sample of country-years. The re-estimated 'common sample' models (Appendix Table A4) show that differences in country-years play a certain role in differences across models in the first set of regressions. Once the estimates are based on the same sample of country-years, beta coefficients, standard errors, and confidence intervals become more convergent across models.

As another robustness check, I divide the common sample by macro-regions and re-estimate the full models separately for each macro-region. Even if we are looking at within-country variations, the average relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials could still vary across macro-regions. Interestingly, as reported in Appendix Table A5, this is precisely the case. On average there is a positive relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials in every region in the world. Nevertheless the result is statistically significant both in the short and the long runs only in Western countries (Model 1), sub-Saharan Africa (Model 2), Latin America (Model 3), and Asia (Model 5).

In Western countries the relationship is particularly strong. In the short run a one-unit increase in civic participation is associated with a 0.879-unit increase in impartial public officials, whereas in the long run, a one-unit increase in civic participation increases the impartiality of public officials by 5.988 units. As the dependent variable ranges in our sample approximately from –3.7 to 4.5, the magnitude of the association is indeed considerable. In former Soviet Union countries and in Middle Eastern and North African countries, there seems to be no statistically significant association between civic participation and impartial public officials.

As a further robustness test, to ensure that my findings do not depend on the chosen method, I run a set of full models with alternative estimators (Appendix Table A6). In Model 1, I run a 'static' model without a lagged y on the right-hand side of the regression equation. In Model 2, I run a pooled OLS model where both the intercept and the slope are assumed to be the same for all countries. In Model 3, I run a generalized least squares random intercepts model, where country-specific effects are not estimated but are taken into account by estimating the variance explained

by the country-specific effects. In Model 4, I run a random intercepts and random slopes maximum likelihood model where both the intercept and the slopes are allowed to differ across countries. In Model 5, I run the full specification in first differences to sweep out unit-level fixed effects and eliminate all long-term dynamics.

All five alternative estimators confirm that there is a positive relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials. As, in Model 5, I difference out both the dependent variable and the full set of independent variables, it is important to recall that with first differenced equations, the estimated results are based on variation in changes on both sides of the regression equation. This means that the interpretation of Model 5 is that changes in civic participation at $t-1$ are positively related to changes in impartiality of public officials at t.

Considering that a substantial amount of remaining residual serial correlation in an OLS model with a lagged dependent variable would lead to biased estimates and that 'adding additional lags of the dependent variable helps to correct residual autocorrelation' (Wilkins 2017: 17), I test the robustness of my findings to specifications with additional lags of the dependent variable (Appendix Table A7). The estimates of the full model in the first set of regressions (Model 1) remain largely unaltered by the inclusion of one (Model 2), two (Model 3), or three (Model 4) additional lags of y. The average short-term effect remains virtually the same (0.154 with one lag; 0.150 with two or three lags; 0.151 with four lags). The average long-run effect, which is particularly sensitive to the amount of remaining residual serial correlation (Wilkins 2017), becomes slightly weaker with the inclusion of additional lags of y (1.532 with one lag; 1.396 with two lags; 1.395 with three lags; 1.392 with four lags), but similar enough to convincingly support the previous findings of this study. Ultimately, the robustness of the results to additional lags of the dependent variable reinforces my findings: the relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials is strong both in the short and in the long runs.

So far, to quantify impartial public officials, I have used the models V-Dem's indicator of rigorous and impartial public administration. Thus, finally, I test the validity of my findings with an alternative measure of impartial public officials. Appendix Table A8 reports the cross-section regression results with an alternative measure of impartial public officials from the QoG Expert Survey. In the first three models civic participation is quantified with the CCSI. In the last three models I use the already discussed alternative measure of civic participation (CSPART). The hypothesized positive effect of civic participation on the impartiality of public officials receives strong support across our cross-section models.

In each of the six models, the linear association between civic participation on impartial public officials is positive and significant at conventional levels. In Models 1–3 a one-unit increase in civic participation is related to an increase of between 1.055 and 1.141 units in impartial public officials. In Models 4–6, where civic participation is measured with an alternative index, a one-unit increase in civic participation is related to an increase of between 1.345 and 1.545 units in impartial public officials. In contrast with my first set of dynamic panel regressions, some of the control variables are significantly related to impartial public officials. Specifically, in these cross-section models, economic wealth and education are positively related to impartial bureaucrats.

To sum up the results, my empirical analysis provides compelling evidence of an overall positive effect of civic participation on impartial public officials. Banfield's (1958) and Putnam's (1993) discoveries in the context of Italy seem to hold therefore also over time in a global sample of countries. The finding is consistent across numerous robustness checks, including alternative measures of both civic participation and impartiality, as well as different specifications that control for a wide range of factors commonly used to predict bureaucratic quality. Interestingly, however, I find substantial differences among macro-regions. In fact, if different macro-regions of the world

are analysed separately, the hypothesized relationship between civic participation and impartial public officials persists in Western countries, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia but does not hold in former Soviet Union countries or in the Middle East and North Africa.

My findings also provide robust empirical evidence to reject the opposing theory according to which a powerful civic society induces public officials to act more partially by strengthening their ties with civic society organizations rather than increasing their interest in the common good. Although relatively small in magnitude, the average short-term effect of civic participation on impartial bureaucrats is clearly different from zero. The average long-run impact instead is significantly larger and seems to dissipate relatively slowly over time.

Differences in the estimates between the panel models and the cross-section models can be explained by at least three factors. First, simply, panel models are based on data not only across countries but also over years, whereas cross-section models only take account of variation between countries and not over years. Second, my panel models takes account of dynamics. Compared to a static model where time is treated at best as a nuisance, with dynamic models we are able to capture both the short- and long-run effects, although it is good to remember that recent studies suggest being cautious in interpreting the long-run effects (e.g., Wilkins 2017). Third, most panel regression estimates in this study are based on within-country variation over time. In these models we assess how variation in civic participation in a given country over time affects variation in the impartiality of public officials over time in that particular country. Estimates from our cross-section models instead provide information on how much more impartial countries with high civic participation compare to countries with low civic participation in 2013, when civic participation is measured in 2012. Simply put, the two types of models do not predict the same and their interpretation is not the same.

The alternative hypothesis advanced by Bäck and Hadenius (2008), which posits a curvilinear relationship between state capacity and democracy, does not find support in my analysis. A deeper investigation of the reasons behind this discrepancy is outside the scope of my study, but it is worth noting that, in addition to some differences in the sample, Bäck and Hadenius (2008) analyse the association between democracy and state capacity as a whole, without going into any specific characteristics of the two concepts. Hence, even if my study provides robust evidence of a positive linear effect of civic participation on the impartiality of public officials and does not find support for a curvilinear relationship between the two, it is important to bear in mind that my empirical analysis does not address the overall association between democracy and state capacity.

It is also important to acknowledge potential endogeneity issues when interpreting the results of my study. I have interpreted the regression results causally, assuming that civic participation leads to impartiality among public officials. Nonetheless, in theory, an impartial bureaucracy can also facilitate the development of a dynamic and inclusive civil society. I have addressed potential problems of reverse causation by lagging independent variables in the regression models. As mentioned in the previous section, it is implausible that present values of impartial bureaucracy would affect past values of civic participation. That said, even if my findings strongly support the hypothesized relationship, the possibility of reverse causality cannot be completely ruled out. Any causal interpretation of the results must therefore be approached with caution.

5   Conclusions

This study contributes to the ongoing scientific discussion on the relationship between democracy and state capacity by investigating the link between two specific characteristics of the two complex

concepts: civic participation and impartial bureaucracy. My findings provide persuasive evidence of a statistically significant association between the two, across countries, and over time. A more vibrant civic community seems to constrain public officials to act more impartially both in the short and in the long runs.

My study highlights the advantages of focusing on precise aspects of democracy and state capacity. The selected approach enabled us to gain knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of the broader state–democracy nexus and to push forward the research agenda on the topic. As we saw, analysing specific characteristics of the two multifaceted concepts allows us to choose and use measures with high face validity, preventing a distorted understanding of any given concept (Bollen 1989). A drawback of the selected approach is obviously that my findings are not generalizable to the state–democracy nexus as a whole. However, they do provide valuable insights on how some of the more precise mechanisms of the 'sequencing' work in practice, contributing to the broader research agenda on the topic and indicating potential directions for future studies on the state–democracy nexus.

A few scholars have recently advocated for a disaggregated approach to the topic. Although some studies have analysed the impact of specific aspects of state capacity on democracy, little attention has been given to the effect of specific democratic features on the state. In response, Andersen and Doucette (2022: 414) recommend that 'future research should study whether different aspects of democracy strengthen bureaucratic quality'. My study directly addresses these calls. While my study has focused on the impact of civic participation on an impartial state bureaucracy, further research is still needed to explore the opposite causal direction of the relationship, as well as the causal links between other specific aspects of democracy and state capacity.

Even if the evidence of an overall positive association between civic participation and impartial public officials is strong and robust across several specifications and models, the relationship appears to be sensitive to macro-regional differences. In Western countries, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the hypothesized relationship holds at conventional levels of statistical significance both in the short and in the long runs. However, in former Soviet Union countries and in the Middle East and North Africa, civic participation does not seem to be conducive to more impartially behaving public officials. This heterogeneity across macro-regions helps to explain, for instance, why Putnam's (1993) and Banfield's (1958) observations on the Italian case differ so greatly from the consequences of the increased civil society activism of the Arab Spring. Indeed, despite evident increases in civil society engagement, the Arab Spring did not bring substantial improvements to bureaucratic impartiality in the affected countries.

To better understand the causes of this macro-regional heterogeneity, further research on the topic is necessary. The modern-era state–democracy nexus may operate through different causal mechanisms in former Soviet Union countries and in the Middle East and North Africa compared to other parts of the world. It is also possible that democracy and state capacity are simply not related to each other in these two macro-regions—at least not in the time period under consideration. If we look further back in history, evidence indicates, for instance, that in pre-Islamic Arabia elements of democratic participation were combined with a relatively sophisticated administrative system, but that the inheritance of this powerful state apparatus by Arab conquerors played an important role in impeding subsequent democratic development (Stasavage 2020).

Finally, this study has significant policy implications. Given that civic participation is a core characteristic of well-functioning democracies and an impartial public administration is a core characteristic of well-functioning states, my study demonstrates that—contrary to what some experts have suggested—statebuilding efforts in developing countries are not hindered by the promotion of democratic principles. In fact, on the contrary, my results indicate that strengthening

civil society and encouraging active civic participation in public affairs are effective ways to tackle dysfunctional state apparatuses. In order to facilitate the creation and consolidation of impartial bureaucracies, international development efforts should thus focus first on stimulating local participatory practices. Building more capable states is one of the main objectives of the international development agenda, and the study at hand sheds light on one of the mechanisms that can help with achieving this global goal.

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Appendix

Table A1: Data sources

Variable	Source
Civic participation (CCSI)	Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020)
Civic participation (CSPART)	Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020)
Impartial public officials (V-Dem)	Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020)
Impartial public officials (QoG)	QoG Expert Survey II (Dahlström et al. 2015)
GDP/capita	The Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al. 2018)
Natural resources rents	World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019)
Total population	World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019)
Years of education	Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020)
Ethnic fractionalization	Fractionalization dataset (Alesina et al. 2003)
Regime type dummies	Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020)
Region dummies	Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2020)

Source: author's construction.

Table A2: Summary statistics

Variable		Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Impartial pub. officials	Overall	0.186	1.505	-3.685	4.455	N = 9935
(V-Dem)	Between		1.303	-2.033	3.839	n = 162
	Within		0.725	-3.113	2.592	T-bar = 61.327
Civic participation	Overall	0.539	0.317	0.008	0.977	N = 9935
(CCSI)	Between		0.244	0.030	0.967	n = 162
	Within		0.207	-0.089	1.285	T-bar = 61.327
Civic participation	Overall	0.533	0.296	0.021	0.989	N = 9935
(CSPART)	Between		0.223	0.066	0.975	n = 162
	Within		0.193	-0.051	1.140	T-bar = 61.327
Civic participation^2	Overall	0.392	0.335	0.0001	0.955	N = 9935
(CCSI)	Between		0.264	0.002	0.936	n = 162
	Within		0.211	-0.276	1.145	T-bar = 61.327
Civic participation^2	Overall	0.371	0.314	0.0001	0.978	N = 9935
(CSPART)	Between		0.246	0.006	0.950	n = 162
	Within		0.191	-0.151	1.123	T-bar = 61.327
Ln(GDP/capita)	Overall	8.482	1.168	4.898	12.249	N = 9770
	Between		1.048	6.424	11.314	n = 162
	Within		0.538	6.061	10.820	T-bar = 60.309
Ln(Natural resources	Overall	0.772	2.101	-8.337	4.489	N = 6396
rents)	Between		2.081	-8.063	3.748	n = 158
	Within		0.660	-3.371	4.620	T-bar = 40.481
Ln(Total population)	Overall	15.922	1.643	11.010	21.050	N = 7974
	Between		1.608	11.238	20.773	n = 159
	Within		0.337	14.598	17.374	T-bar = 50.151
Years of education	Overall	5.869	3.463	0.043	13.610	N = 8453
	Between		3.191	0.594	11.819	n = 135
	Within		1.641	0.188	10.441	T-bar = 62.615

	Overall		Between		Within
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	%
Regime type dummies	9,915	100.00	391	241.36	41.43
Closed autocracy	3,439	34.68	123	75.93	45.48
Electoral autocracy	2,739	27.62	125	77.16	36.86
Electoral democracy	1,763	17.78	93	57.41	31.39
Liberal democracy	1,974	19.91	50	30.86	61.58

Note: summary statistics of variables used in main panel regressions (Tables 1 and 2).

Source: author's construction.

Table A3: Unit-root tests of key variables

Variable	Phillips-Perron test
Impartial public officials (V-Dem)	-3.823**
Civic participation (CCSI)	-7.197**
Civic participation (CSPART)	-1.990*

Note: inverse normal Z statistics; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

Source: author's construction.

Table A4: Civic participation and impartial public officials: common sample of country-years across models

	Dependent variable: Impartial public officials $_t$			
	Baseline model	Additional controls	Regime types	Full model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	0.126***	0.133***	0.148***	0.154***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Ln(GDP/capita) $_{t-1}$	0.017	0.024	0.016	0.024
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Ln(Natural resources) $_{t-1}$		0.004		0.004
		(0.005)		(0.006)
Ln(Population) $_{t-1}$		-0.010		-0.004
		(0.034)		(0.035)
Years of education $_{t-1}$		-0.016		-0.016
		(0.010)		(0.010)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-1}$	0.899***	0. 898***	0.900***	0.899***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Long-run multiplier				
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	1.253***	1.302***	1.490***	1.532***
	(0.285)	(0.305)	(0.395)	(0.395)
Within R^2	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86
N	5,433	5,433	5,433	5,433
Sample	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017
Countries	133	133	133	133
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime type dummies $_{t-1}$	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. Sample of years refers to dependent variable. Civic participation is measured with CCSI.

Source: author's construction.

Table A5: Civic participation and impartial public officials by macro-region: re-estimations of the full model in Table 1

	Dependent variable: Impartial public officials $_t$					
	Western countries	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America	Former Soviet Union	Asia	Middle East & N. Africa
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	0.879**	0.141*	0.283**	0.054	0.346***	0.075
	(0.379)	(0.077)	(0.114)	(0.176)	(0.112)	(0.143)
Ln(GDP/capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.023	-0.011	0.021	0.074*	0.165**	0.068
	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.061)	(0.070)
Ln(Natural resources) $_{t-1}$	0.006	-0.001	0.006	0.029	-0.029	0.018
	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.015)
Ln(Population) $_{t-1}$	0.088	-0.080	-0.120	-0.117	0.128	0.021
	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.162)	(0.255)	(0.157)	(0.167)
Years of education $_{t-1}$	-0.014	-0.012	-0.002	-0.120*	-0.071*	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.052)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-1}$	0.853***	0.919***	0.872***	0.808***	0.842***	0.864***
	(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Long-run multiplier						
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	5.988**	1.738**	2.210***	0.281	2.193***	0.550
	(2.701)	(0.840)	(0.677)	(0.877)	(0.601)	(0.965)
R^2	0.89	0.87	0.90	0.83	0.85	0.78
N	978	1,642	1,074	499	692	548
Sample	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017
Countries	22	38	23	20	17	13
Two-way FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime type dummies $_{t-1}$	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. Sample of years refers to dependent variable. Civic participation is measured with CCSI.

Source: author's construction.

Table A6: Civic participation and impartial public officials: alternative estimators

	Static FE	Pooled OLS	Random intercepts	Random slopes	First differences
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	1.703***	0.107***	0.107***	0.116***	0.485***
	(0.244)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.112)
Ln(GDP/capita) $_{t-1}$	0.280***	0.011	0.011	0.013*	0.025
	(0.102)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.082)
Ln(Natural resources) $_{t-1}$	-0.020	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Ln(Population) $_{t-1}$	-0.547**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.097
	(0.238)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.223)
Years of education $_{t-1}$	0.064	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.042
	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.073)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-1}$		0.961***	0.961***	0.955***	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.018)
N	5,433	5,433	5,433	5,433	5,293
Sample	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1972–2017
Countries	133	133	133	133	133
Country FE	Yes	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime type dummies $_{t-1}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Dependent variable: Impartial public officials $_t$

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. All variables in Model 5 are first differenced. Sample of years refers to dependent variable. Civic participation is measured with CCSI.

Source: author's construction.

Table A7: Civic participation and impartial public officials: different lags of y

	Dependent variable (DV): Impartial public officials $_t$			
	1 lag of DV	2 lags of DV	3 lags of DV	4 lags of DV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	0.154***	0.150***	0.150***	0.151***
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-1}$	0.899***	0.969***	0.969***	0.969***
	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-2}$		-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.077***
		(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-3}$			0.0001	-0.005
			(0.013)	(0.023)
Impartial pub. officials $_{t-4}$				-0.005
				(0.018)
Long-run multipliers				
Civic participation $_{t-1}$	1.532***	1.395***	1.396***	1.392***
	(0.395)	(0.394)	(0.365)	(0.369)
R^2	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86
N	5,433	5,432	5,431	5,421
Sample	1971-2017	1971–2017	1971–2017	1971–2017
Countries	133	133	133	133
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$. All models include full set of control variables. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. Sample of years refers to dependent variable. Civic participation is measured with CCSI.

Source: author's construction.

Table A8: Civic participation and impartial public officials: cross-sectional robustness tests with alternative measure of impartiality

	Dependent variable: Impartial public officials t					
	Baseline	Additional controls	Full model	Baseline	Additional controls	Full model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civic participation	1.055***	1.135**	1.141**			
(CCSI) $_{t-1}$	(0.368)	(0.442)	(0.563)			
Civic participation				1.395***	1.545***	1.345**
(CSPART) $_{t-1}$				(1.903)	(0.551)	(0.672)
Ln(GDP/capita) $_{t-1}$	0.742***	0.471**	0.333	0.757***	0.486***	0.341*
	(0.115)	(0.183)	(0.204)	(0.189)	(0.178)	(0.199)
Ln(Natural resources) $_{t-1}$		0.034	0.020		0.028	0.016
		(0.051)	(0.048)		(0.052)	(0.049)
Ln(Population) $_{t-1}$		-0.104	-0.074		-0.100	-0.073
		(0.066)	(0.067)		(0.065)	(0.066)
Years of education $_{t-1}$		0.156***	0.160***		0.154***	0.157***
		(0.059)	(0.059)		(0.058)	(0.058)
Ethnic		-0.361	-0.295		-0.476	-0.378
fractionalization $_{t-1}$		(0.436)	(0.406)		(0.433)	(0.415)
R^2	0.65	0.69	0.72	0.65	0.70	0.72
N	110	99	99	110	99	99
Region dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime type dummies $_{t-1}$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$. Constant coefficient measured but not reported. Dependent variable measured in 2013.

Source: author's construction.