

The Incursion of Leviathan: Territorial Control and Post-Conflict State Capacity, Evidence from Peru


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Introduction

CW as the most usual type of conflict. One-third of countries since WWII.



CW as a destructive phenomenon.



High level of battle-deaths.

Millions of IDPs & Refugees.

Economic disruption.

More than 50% of CWs relapse into war
in the next five years.

Research Question

- How do states sustain peace in the aftermath of war? Key role of state capacity.
- The relation between conflict and state capacity is unclear.
 - Bellicist approach.
 - Opportunity argument.
- RQ: “Does wartime territorial control affect post-conflict state building measures?”
- Core finding: Yes. Focus on Contested/Rebel Areas: reduce the threat of insurgent revival.

- Civil war impact existent forms of order and structures of authority (Arjona 2016), as well as post-conflict attitudes, such as pro-social behavior (Bauer et al. 2016) or political identities (Balcells 2017).
- Endogenous effects of war. Combination of:
 - Exposure to violence.
 - Fragmented patterns of authority.
 - Novel types of governance.
- Changes at the institutional and individual level = New social order.

- How does the state deal with this after conflict?
- The state needs to invest in restoration of two main characteristics of state capacity:
 - Control: Political-military-social order → State forces.
 - Legitimacy: Erosion (state violence + rebel ruling) → Public goods/services
- Distribution of territorial control:
 - State controlled areas
 - Contested areas
 - Rebel controlled areas
- Where?

State Controlled Areas:

- Full effective control during wartime.
- Lowest level of erosion.
- Irrational if the aim is maximizing state reach.

H1: Lower levels of investments in state control/legitimacy.

Contested Areas:

- Vacuum/Dual power – Neither rebels/incumbents control.
- Highest levels of violence.
- Selective violence against state representatives.
- Lack of rebel governance institutions.

H2: Higher levels of investments in state control but not in legitimacy.

Insurgent Controlled Areas:

- Disruption of previous patterns of authority (Arjona 2016).
- Erosion of the social order = Minimum state power.
- Rebel institutions: Potential rupture of ties with the state.
- Signaling device of potential future insurgent re-emergence.
- Preference falsification (Kuran 1991).

H3: Higher levels of investments in state control and legitimacy.

Peruvian civil war


- Main actors:
 - State vs. Sendero Luminoso.
- Minor Actors
 - Comites de Autodefensa (self-defense forces, Rondas Campesinas).
 - Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA).
- Facts
 - 700.000 people died (CVR 2003).
 - Most of the conflict was concentrated in rural areas of the country.

Methodology

- Mixed methods: **Quantitative** and qualitative evidence.
- Data from Peru Census 1961-1972-1981-1993-2007.
- Unit of Analysis: Lowest administrative unit - Districts (1505).


Variables

- DV: State Capacity. Two proxies:
 - State bureaucrats.
 - Access to public electric power.
- IV: Electoral boycott as a proxy of control (De la Calle 2017).





(a) State Control



(b) Sendero Control



(c) Contested Control

Empirical Strategy

- Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design: Postwar and territorial control as time and group treatments.

$$(1) \quad Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta(\text{post}_t \times \text{insurgent}_i) + X_{it}\gamma + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$(2) \quad Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta(\text{post}_t \times \text{contested}_i) + X_{it}\gamma + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Y_{it} : State capacity (bureaucrats & electricity).
- α_i and δ_t : District-year fixed effects.
- β : Coefficient of interest.
 - Post_t : Postwar period (2007)
 - $\text{Insurgent} - \text{Contested}_i$: Type of territorial control (state reference).
- $X_{it}\gamma$: Vector of time-varying control variables.
- ϵ_{it} : Error term.

Table 1 – DiD Models without Controls

	<i>State Bureaucrats</i>		<i>Electricity</i>	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
SL * Post	0.585*** (0.0705)		7.170*** (1.900)	
CT * Post		0.344*** (0.0919)		0.461 (2.402)
Constant	3.224*** (0.0174)	3.252*** (0.0176)	11.22*** (0.326)	11.76*** (0.325)
Observations	5302	5168	5117	5024
R ²	0.436	0.429	0.664	0.655
Adjusted R ²	0.436	0.429	0.664	0.655

District and Year fixed effects.

Dependent variables: (ln) *State bureaucrats* by district and % access to public *electricity*.

Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2 – DiD Models with Controls

	<i>State Bureaucrats</i>		<i>Electricity</i>	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
SL * Post	0.556*** (0.0778)		8.934*** (2.083)	
CT * Post		0.301*** (0.100)		2.165 (2.563)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	3.674*** (0.110)	3.694*** (0.114)	-0.00810 (2.183)	-0.799 (2.190)
Observations	4368	4282	4303	4242
R^2	0.432	0.424	0.662	0.654
Adjusted R^2	0.431	0.423	0.661	0.653

District and Year fixed effects.

Dependent variables: (ln) *State bureaucrats* by district and % access to public *electricity*.

Control variables: Illiteracy, Population Density, % Spanish, Political Competition

Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

SL territories

- State Control: Around 75% higher than in state controlled areas ($p < 0.01$).
- Electricity: Around 8 percentage points more ($p < 0.01$).

Contested territories

- State Control: Around 37% higher than in state controlled areas ($p < 0.01$).
- Electricity: Positive but insignificant. (!)

In sum:

- Post-conflict state control is mainly targeted to SL & contested areas.
- Public goods and services only to SL areas.
- Small but relevant and significant impact.

DiD Assumptions

- Parallel Trends.
- Placebo regressions (Pre-treatment effect).

Robustness

- Different specifications of the DV and IV.
- Inclusion of army troops.
- Violence as an alternative explanation.
- Different conflict periods.
- Other model specifications (e.g. lagged DV).
- Provincial and Departmental FE.
- Spatial autocorrelation.


Limitations


- Imperfect proxies for state capacity & territorial control:
 - State capacity as a very convoluted concept.
 - Difficult to measure territorial control and rebel governance.
- Reverse causality:
 - Treatment is not exogenous.
- Data constraints:
 - Annual level data on state capacity: Effect might vanish over time.
 - Subnational measures of rebel governance.
 - Displacement.
- Stringent scope conditions:
 - Irregular wars, mid-level states, defeated rebels, strong insurgents.

Concluding Remarks

- Side-effect of civil wars: good way of bringing order during post-war.
- Post-war state capacity at the local level seems to be informed by conflict dynamics, concretely, by wartime territorial control.
- State is strategic in the deployment of state-building: it targets those with exposure to rebel influence (SL & contested).
- Outcome of bellicist approach also applies subnationally for CW.

Supplementary Materials









Figure A1 - Violence by Territorial Control



Source: CVR.




Table 1 - Spatial Lag Models

	<i>State Bureaucrats</i>		<i>Electricity</i>		<i>Secondary School</i>	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Control	0.390*** (0.148)	0.318** (0.148)	1.360 (1.886)	0.629 (1.896)	5.175*** (0.999)	3.813*** (0.966)
SL Control	0.468*** (0.136)	0.435*** (0.136)	7.057*** (1.745)	6.295*** (1.746)	3.494*** (0.917)	2.808*** (0.882)
State Killings	0.0002 (0.003)	-0.0003 (0.003)	-0.078** (0.038)	-0.078** (0.038)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.019)
SL Killings	-0.001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
Alto Huallaga	-0.087 (0.282)	-0.197 (0.281)	-1.776 (3.599)	-2.795 (3.601)	-0.042 (1.894)	-1.915 (1.823)
(ln) Size		-0.156*** (0.024)		-1.597*** (0.313)		-0.700*** (0.157)
Distance Prov. Capital		-0.003 (0.002)		0.021 (0.024)		0.017 (0.012)
Urban 1993		-0.008*** (0.001)		-0.074*** (0.017)		-0.114*** (0.009)
Population Growth		-0.001 (0.001)		-0.015 (0.009)		0.023*** (0.005)
Constant	-0.315*** (0.044)	0.946*** (0.159)	11.226*** (0.891)	23.487*** (2.245)	10.435*** (0.683)	20.006*** (1.260)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	-3,386.879	-3,300.876	-7,890.214	-7,753.620	-6,715.983	-6,569.885
σ^2	2.481	2.421	403.663	397.636	111.687	101.943
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,789.757	6,625.752	15,796.430	15,531.240	13,447.970	13,163.770
Wald Test (df = 1)	323.555***	247.617***	623.104***	589.558***	403.207***	309.599***
LR Test (df = 1)	322.955***	246.082***	448.782***	425.912***	344.518***	270.163***

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 2 - Spatial Error Models

	<i>State Bureaucrats</i>		<i>Electricity</i>		<i>Secondary School</i>	
	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contested Control	0.338** (0.156)	0.311** (0.156)	-1.861 (1.988)	-2.237 (1.988)	3.971*** (1.052)	2.983*** (1.010)
SL Control	0.448*** (0.149)	0.411*** (0.149)	6.390*** (1.943)	5.439*** (1.943)	3.384*** (1.011)	2.574*** (0.968)
State Killings	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.080** (0.040)	-0.069* (0.040)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.020)
SL Killings	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.002 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)
Alto Huallaga	-0.231 (0.384)	-0.308 (0.372)	-4.146 (5.227)	-4.834 (5.173)	-0.766 (2.644)	-2.235 (2.461)
(ln) Size		-0.152*** (0.028)		-1.789*** (0.367)		-0.646*** (0.181)
Distance Prov. Capital		-0.004* (0.002)		0.001 (0.032)		0.016 (0.015)
Urban 1993		-0.009*** (0.002)		-0.083*** (0.021)		-0.138*** (0.010)
Population Growth		0.00000 (0.001)		-0.015 (0.010)		0.021*** (0.005)
Constant	-0.573*** (0.078)	0.694*** (0.192)	29.569*** (1.274)	42.671*** (2.650)	23.348*** (0.577)	32.035*** (1.265)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	-3,389.165	-3,311.746	-7,891.656	-7,755.981	-6,721.076	-6,574.545
σ^2	2.486	2.446	403.412	396.867	111.923	101.684
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,794.330	6,647.492	15,799.310	15,535.960	13,458.150	13,173.090
Wald Test (df = 1)	326.582***	248.294***	640.412***	614.957***	424.439***	326.741***
LR Test (df = 1)	318.383***	224.342***	445.898***	421.189***	334.331***	260.843***

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Assumptions

- Budget constraints.
 - Scarce resources.
- Strategic:
 - Distribution targeted where they could maximize certain outcome.
- Maximizing state reach:
 - States aim to control as much territory as possible.
 - Avoid new revolutionary movements/insurgencies.

State Control

State bureaucrats and militarization of wartime areas:

“In several rural areas most affected by the war, the military embodied and represented the state itself” (CVR 2003).

“The government sought to re-establish the state presence in territories lost to SL” (Wilson 2000).



State Legitimacy

Public goods as “hearts and minds”:

“A second component of the counter-subversive strategy, which allowed to withdraw support from SL, was the progressive attention to the needs of the population through social programs” (CVR 2003).



State Legitimacy

SL vs. Contested:

“There was an important presence of SL, so we had to engage in a kind of cultural war [...] [In contested districts] we didn't expect the kind of ideological indoctrination and political changes that we observed in SL districts. [...] We had firstly to restore our power and cultural dominance in SL areas” (Interview).

