

Primeiro Comando do Capital (PCC) Presence
1993



Spread of São Paulo's PCC prison gang, 1993-2016.
Authors' coding

*Criminal Leviathans:
How Gangs Govern
from Behind Bars*

The Scramble for Brazil

Benjamin Lessing

UNU/WIDER Conference

May 17, 2022


The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC): Enemy of the state? Or partner?

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93-2000: PCC dominates a rapidly growing prison system

2001: “Mega-rebellion” in 23 prisons

2002-06: State crackdown, carceral expansion, RDD. Claims PCC is “dismantled”



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

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2006: Second Mega-rebellion (96 prisons) and citywide terror attacks paralyze SP


- State forced to negotiate and make concessions



2001 – Present: PCC’s “Law of Crime” (*lei do crime*)

Deadly Force

The number of homicides in São Paulo state has declined...



Source: São Paulo State Security Secretariat

- ◇ *Lei do crime* outlaws unauthorized homicide
- ◇ Trials (*debates*) via cellphones with jury of imprisoned leaders
- ◇ PCC leader Marcola: “Thanks to us, today in SP it’s a lot of red tape to kill someone.”
- ◇ *Lei do crime* detected in periphery by ethnographers in 2003 (Feltran 2008, Hirata 2010). Many locals voluntarily submit bc perceive as fair.
- ◇ PCC “entry” in slums correlated w local drop in homicides (Mello et al. 2015)
- ◇ State officials: homicide rate fell throughout the state. Must be due to our policies. But...


São Paulo Pacified: 2001-Present

Homicides

Tabela 4. Taxa de homicídios por unidade da federação UF. Brasil - 1999 e 2007.

Nº	UF	1999	2007	% 99 - 0
1	São Paulo	44,0	15,0	-65,8
2	Roraima	57,7	27,9	-51,6
3	Amapá	43,7	26,7	-38,8
4	Rio de Janeiro	52,5	40,1	-23,8
5	Rondônia	33,3	27,2	-18,4
6	Distrito Federal	33,4	29,2	-12,7
7	Mato Grosso	34,6	30,5	-11,8
8	Pernambuco	55,6	53,0	-4,6
9	Espírito Santo	51,9	53,3	2,8
10	Amazonas	20,4	21,1	3,3
11	Mato Grosso do Sul	28,2	30,0	6,6
12	Rio Grande do Sul	15,3	19,7	28,3
13	Sergipe	19,2	25,7	33,6
14	Tocantins	12,1	16,4	35,9
15	Santa Catarina	7,4	10,4	41,8
16	Goiás	17,5	26,0	48,6
17	Ceará	15,5	23,2	49,2
18	Paraná	18,2	29,5	62,2
19	Paraíba	11,9	23,6	97,6
20	Acre	9,7	19,2	98,7
21	Rio Grande do Norte	8,4	19,1	126,3
22	Minas Gerais	9,2	20,9	126,4
23	Piauí	4,9	12,5	156,8
24	Pará	10,9	30,3	177,8
25	Alagoas	20,4	59,5	191,3
26	Bahia	7,0	25,8	266,6
27	Maranhão	4,8	18,0	271,7
Total do Brasil		26,2	25,2	-3,7
Brasil menos ESP		21,2	28,1	32,4


Fonte: SIM/Datasus/MS



Brazil total

Brazil less São Paulo

São Paulo



◆ Key Events

▲ Homicídios per 100,000, São Paulo State

SP Homicide Rate


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
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Brazil total

Brazil less São Paulo


São Paulo



SP Homicide Rate

Rio's Red Command: The First *Facção*

1970s: Comando Vermelho (CV) forms in Rio's prisons through cohabitation with imprisoned leftist militants



Cândido Mendes Prison on Ilha Grande, "The Devil's Cauldron," ca. 1985

Rio: Violent but Stable Drug War

1980-1985: CV expands to take over favela-based drug markets, quickly wipes out or incorporates incumbent drug gangs

1985–Present: Sustained cartel--state conflict (Lessing 2017), but peaceful prisons!

1990–Present: CV splits into 3, inter-cartel turf war rages




Rio: Violent but Stable Drug War

2008-2012: UPP / Pacification reduces violence, seems to weaken CV

2012-2018: UPP erodes, CV resurgent

2017—: *Milícias* expanding, partnering with Terceiro Comando against CV





Rio: Violent but Stable Drug War

2022: CV still controls huge swathes of favela territory, most valuable areas



2010--: CV establishes “chain store” system throughout Brazil, countering PCC

2010—: Brazil “Factionalized”




PCC and CV present in almost every state, local copycat factions propagate.


The Scramble for Brazil

Cumulative waves of violent events by state and year

Waves of 3+ violent events




The Scramble: Orchestrated Attacks Spread



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
Number of Attacks
2002 - 2019, by region




The Scramble: Orchestrated Attacks Spread

Number of Groups Responsible for Attacks

2002-2019



Factionalization: Cumulative Number of Groups Participating in Attacks



How many distinct groups participate in attacks, accumulated by year

“The League of Factions”, and Terror Attacks as a Status Symbol

Open Letter from the PGC to The Righteous Criminal Element (“correct Crime”) of Brazil

27 de junho de 2015

Carta aberta do PGC – Primeiro Grupo Catarinense para todo o crime correto do Brasil

O PGC através desse documento oficial, elaborado na Torre de Alcantara, vem no total respeito, lealdade e transparência em consideração devida a todos os criminosos e faccoes criminosas no Brasil, especialmente aos nossos aliados do CV e da FDN e a todos que buscam organizar e lutar nessa causa que é de todos os criminosos no país, por esclarecer a posição oficial da faccao em relação à posição do PCC em nosso estado. O PGC foi fundado em 3 de março de 2003, como resultado de um entendimento que jamais seriam aceitos no crime os estupradores, caguetas, comandos de cadeia, e menos ainda a opressão na cadeia.

A luta do PGC para organizar o crime no estado e enfrentar os opressores custou vidas e a liberdade de muitos criminosos comprometidos com a causa e o sacrifício desses nobres guerreiros que consolidou a nossa disciplina no mundo e nas cadeias, como reconhecimento que o PGC é o crime correto catarinense e o único e digno no estado. O PGC é conhecido e reconhecido nacional e até mesmo mundialmente pela sua luta, ações e sacrifícios de seus integrantes que já dominaram a mídia nacional e espalharam nossa causa por penitenciárias no Brasil inteiro. No estado de SC toda a luta contra a opressão, os desmandos e ilegalidades do governo foram e são sempre travados no PGC e seus integrantes e se hoje o crime correto prevalece no estado é unicamente por conta do PGC. O PGC, com doze anos de fundação, a história do PGC é a história da luta do crime

“The PGC is open to friendship and alliance, provided that each faction respect the other’s space, not baptizing in the other’s state of origin and respecting the other’s discipline within [prison]... This is our understanding **of what a peaceful and harmonic coexistence of criminal factions in our beloved Brazil should be.**

The doors [of Santa Catarina state] are open to criminals from other states, and we also steal and traffic throughout Brazil, because for us Crime" has no borders.

But autonomy and discipline over baptisms *do* have borders, **and this border is demarcated by the existence of a local faction that has taken the lead in the struggle against oppression...** and that therefore deserves respect.

The PGC is known and recognized nationally and even worldwide for its struggle, [for the] actions and sacrifices of its members that have dominated the national media and spread our cause to penitentiaries throughout Brazil.”

Norm Entrepreneurship!

**Reference to the PGC’s 2012
wave of bus attacks**

Criminal Leviathans: The Puzzle

CW: Organized crime flourish where states are absent or weak. Illicit rents are also seen as critical factor. But:

- ◇ Brazil—hardly the weakest state in S. America, and peripheral to the international illicit drug trade—has its largest criminal organizations and highest rates of criminal governance, (~25%!).
- ◇ Subnationally, Brazil's wealthy and high-capacity southeastern and southern states, also have the strongest gangs. E.g. São Paulo.
- ◇ Central America: El Salvador state capacity > Honduras and Guatemala, yet it also has stronger *mara* prison gangs.

If organized crime grows strong where the state is weak, why do we see the strongest criminal organizations in relatively strong states?

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

Muscular state repression can foster criminal governance.

The Puzzle Recast

Why does criminal governance persist? Why don't states retrain their capacity to curb criminal governance? Aren't states supposed to strive to claim a Weberian monopoly?

- ◇ Myopia? Certainly, especially at beginning
- ◇ Corruption? Probably, but not decisive.
- ◇ Standoffishness?

Standoffishness? Not so much...



SP state prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya demonstrates his proudest achievement, mapping the PCC's internal command structure.

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These miss a central fact: Criminal governance is useful to states.

Indeed, I will argue, it is uniquely useful, bringing order to places the state finds perennially difficult to govern.

The Argument: The Double-Edged Sword of the State

- The Sword = State Repression. What makes the Covenant more than just words.
- Ideally, threat of coercion induces lawful obedience. Sword remains sheathed.
- Mass incarceration and drug repression: consistently intense, active repression.

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Two interrelated dynamics of this repression:

1. State repression nurtures criminal groups w/ capacity to govern. Many mechanisms, put under the heading “**Counterproductive Repression**”.
 - ◇ Mass incarceration propagates gangs, allows them to project power on street
 - ◇ Drug repression gives them incentives and resources to govern peripheries

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 - ◇ Mass incarceration propagates gangs, allows them to project power on street
 - ◇ Drug repression gives them incentives and resources to govern peripheries
2. As criminal governance expands from members to criminals to civilians in periphery, it becomes more useful to states. → “**Shared Projects of Governance**”
 - ◇ Provides order in places states find difficult to govern
 - ◇ Produces non-Weberian, unjust, but stable duopolies of violence

Birth of the Criminal Leviathan





FIGURE 1 Birth of the Criminal Leviathan. In a chaotic and violent status quo ante, guards maintain control through manipulation of inmate violence and sometimes direct abuse. By establishing a peaceful order among inmates, sophisticated prison gangs—what I call “criminal leviathans”—push guards out of daily prison life. This exemplifies a more general dynamic, seen in peripheries as well as prisons, in which criminal groups use governance over non-members as a tactic for keeping the state at bay.

What About the Scramble for Brazil?


The Scramble for Brazil Begins w/ PCC's Colonial Project

2013: PCC revises its founding statute;
Includes norms and guarantees for new
members not from São Paulo


“The Command does not have territorial limits. All baptized members of the PCC, regardless of their city, state, or country, everyone must follow our rules, hierarchy, and statute.”



“Opening the Book”: Rapid Recruitment



“Opening the Book”: Rapid Recruitment



PCC: War-Making and Faction-Making

PCC internal records:
 weekly personnel
 reports from state-level
 bureaucracies in each
 state, compiled by
 Central Management

Estado: MATO GROSSO DO SUL – 04/11/2012

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
264	46	61	04	12	01	131	19	17	02	156	20	34	06

Estado: MATO GROSSO – 05/11/2012

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
17	08	30	03	00	00	36	10	01	00	24	21	03	00

Estado: PARÁ

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
02	03	70	19	01	02	71	20	00	00	00	00	N/C	02

Estado: PARAÍBA

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
25	02	33	16	01	00	51	16	06	00	61	Total	08	00

Estado: PERNAMBUCO – 03/11/2012

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
56	04	00	09	01	00	21	11	00	00	23	13	04	00

Estado: PLAUI – 01/11/2012

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
07	00	04	00	00	00	00	00	06	00	02	00	01	00

Estado: PARANÁ – 04/11/2012

Membros Sintonia		Fon de Sintonia		Membros Puntidos		Membros a/ Resp.		Batismo no Estado		Excluidos		Membros de S.P. no Estado	
Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua	Presos	Rua
403	41	116	17	04	00	22	23	42	00	07	02	20	02


In Response, Rise of Local Factions Allied w/ CV

AS ALIANÇAS REGIONAIS

A maior organização criminosa do Rio de Janeiro se associou a pequenas facções locais para enfrentar a paulista

★ ESTADO DE ORIGEM

● DIVIDE O TRÁFICO COM O COMANDO VERMELHO



Fonte: Ministérios Públicos Estaduais de AM, RN, PB, SC e MA

ÉPOCA



PJL=Peace Justice and Liberty,
CV's Motto

Key setback for PCC: Most local factions, and especially FDN, ally with the CV

Who Said Colonization Was Easy?

PCC vs. The Locals: January 2017



Amazonas, FDN vs PCC, 56 dead, January 1, 2017




Roraima, PCC vs FDN, January 2017.



Rio Grande do Norte. PCC vs Sindicato RN, January 2017.

What Was The Role of the State in the Scramble?

The Role of the State in the Scramble: Mass Incarceration Goes Nationwide



The Role of the State in the Scramble: Mass Incarceration Goes Nationwide




FIGURE 5.5 Incarceration Rates in Brazil, by State, 2003-2019. Rates are per 100,000 people. “Low” to “Very High” categories are arbitrary, to aid visualization, not official. Source: INFOOPEN.

The Role of the State in the Scramble: The Federal Prison System

- Federal prison system created in 2006, partly to house CV boss Beira-Mar.
- States can send their most dangerous or difficult prisoners to federal system for (infinitely) renewable terms of 1 year.



CV and ADA members in **federal** and Rio state prisons

- **Federalization drove factionalization:** CV/FDN alliance formed there; local factions founded by returnees from federal w high-level CV/FDN contacts.
- “[The Federal Prison System] sadly nationalizes organized crime. In fact, never in the history of the country have prisoners from the most distant quarters been united by the State itself.” –Former director of Federal Prison System

Shared Projects of Governance?
How the Scramble Might be Useful to the State

Public Security in “Factionalized” Brazil

Fortaleza, Ceará State



Field visit to Pirambú favela, controlled by Comando Vermelho, May 2017



Visit to CPPL 2 prison,
after segregation by faction,
May 2017

The Good News: Ceará Pacified (2015-16)



Sources: Department of Statistical and Criminal Analysis, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics and the Death Information System

The Not-So-Good News: a “Union of Gangs”

- GDE is local faction, allied with and supported by PCC.
- In 2015, PCC, CV and GDE announce “União das Gangues” through graffiti tags and *salves* (communiqués from prison)



“Peace Liberty Equality!!
Peace Posse”

Guardians of the State (GDE)



“We are pacifying for peace but we won't flee from the WAR”
CV.RJ (Comandor Vermelho Rio) and FDN (Familia do Norte)



“The message came from prison”



Passeata comemorando a pacificação em bairro da periferia de Sobral. REPRODUÇÃO

“Crime March”
(*passeata do crime*)
Sobral, Ceará, June 2016



Gang member: “**The message came from prison.** They said we should go to [our rivals] turf in peace and march. **None of us could believe it at first: ‘How can we be allies of those who killed us? Who shot at us?’** Again, from inside prison came a new message, via WhatsApp audio. **The leaders of the PCC, the CV, and rival gangs reinforced the message that everything was now pacified, that “we were all now a single thing.”**”

Pacification as Factions' Coming-Out Party

Testimonials from Fortaleza field visits, May 2017 (cf. Paiva et al. 2017):

“There were parades here too! ...There was a huge party, with a cake! ...Residents were happy because they could finally walk around their neighborhoods again. And the *facções* banned robbery, so people finally felt safe.”

“The favela residentes were grateful to the *facções*... The poor who always suffered with the absence of state power were thankful, they could once again let their children play in the plazas. They could go out without being robbed. All thanks to the *facções*. After that... They began to show themselves... Grafitti... It all became highly visible.”

“We didn't realize at first that PCC, CV, GDE were different entities.”

Factionalization Involves Local Pacification

E.g. Mãe Luiza favela, Natal, Rio Grande do Norte

- ◇ Local faction Sindicato RN (SRN) takes over after PCC failed
- ◇ In Mãe Luiza, factionalization brought pacification at the local level
- ◇ This peace involved burying decades-old beefs, altering identities. C.f. EU
- ◇ But inter-faction war seems interminable



Factionalization “Improves” Criminal Governance




Bairro São José, João Pessoa

- Respect residents
- Don't use drugs in front of children
- Teach the Young
- Don't accuse in vain
- Don't talk to cops
- Be collectivist
- Don't rob in or near the community

President of AM:

“Aqui as coisas melhoraram com a vinda da facção. Antes tinha 20 ou 30 mortes por ano, agora tá zerado. Impuseram regras, mas são boas regras.”

Ceará: From “Union of Gangs” to “War of Factions”



- Why did truce fail?
- Breakdown seems to have occurred months after national PCC-CV truce collapsed.
- Paiva (2018) reports local groups tried to “hold back the tide” as long as possible.
- Did policing play a role?

“The order given by [Ceará] Governor Santana ... is to deny the existence of a pact between the GDE faction and the CV and the presence of the PCC in Ceará. Any officer who grants an interview to the media will be exemplarily punished.” --Fernando Ribeiro, local journalist

...And Back to “Union of Gangs” (with a twist)

CRIME ORGANIZADO

Informativo
03/01/2019

Vinhemos através deste edital

Comunicar ao senhor Governador Camilo Santana. Que este último ataque ao viaduto foi só para mostrar que não estamos aqui de brincadeira. Queremos que nossos direitos sejam respeitados. E não queremos ser oprimidos dentro do sistema, desta vez demos um pequeno arranhão numa coluna do viaduto, na próxima vez iremos derrubar. Queremos esse novo secretário fora do estado, que ele volte para o lugar de onde saiu. Se não o estado do Ceará irá ter dias difíceis, nós podemos derrubar todos os viadutos e pontes de todo o estado ou até mesmo do Brasil todo. Podemos parar o país, se quisermos. Portanto só queremos que nossos direitos seja respeitado e que nós podemos ficar em paz, sem perturbação senhor governador Camilo Santana. Não queremos deixar o estado num estado de calamidade pública, portanto isso só irá depender do senhor. Não iremos tolerar opressão e nem mudança alguma dentro do sistema. Se não estiverem acreditando vão pagar um preço muito alto. Porque não vamos aceitar regime de carrasco de braços cruzados não. Só pra lembrar temos um efetivo muito maior do que o estado, temos homens na rua prontos para lutar por nossos direitos. Se vocês querem paz, nos deixem em paz também porque nós não somos animais para aceitar tudo que vocês querem não. Tudo que queremos é que nossos direitos sejam respeitados e que tudo permaneçam como está sem mudanças.

Assim que vocês mexer com qualquer um de qualquer facção, a ordem é pra tocar o terror geral, tacar fogo em bancos, Correios, delegacias e derrubar pontes e viadutos. Vamos deixar o estado num estado de calamidade pública.

Já temos em vista mais de 20 pontes para nós explodir, vamos continuar os ataques, até que esse novo secretário seja exonerado do cargo (Sr Luis Mauro Albuquerque)


Assinado **O CRIME ORGANIZADO**

#PrisonGang bomb in **#Brazil** nearly levels a highway bridge. A letter to the governor from "**CRIME ORGANIZADO**" on WhatsApp: "We've identified more than 20 bridges to bomb, we'll continue the attacks until the new Prisons Secretary is sacked" It's textbook violent lobbying.



- Jan-Feb 2019: PCC, CV and GDE team up to launch attacks. Largest wave in state history, over 300 attacks in 50+ municipalities over two months.

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Não queremos deixar o estado num estado de calamidade pública. portanto isso só irá depender do senhor.

Não iremos tolerar opressão e nem mudança alguma dentro do sistema.

“ORGANIZED Crime”

Press release -- January 3, 2019


We convey... to Governor Camilo Santana, that blowing up the overpass was just to show that we’re not screwing around. ...

We want this new secretary [of prisons] out of the state... Otherwise Ceará will have difficult days, we can blow up all the overpasses and bridges in the state.

We just want our rights to be respected and to be left in peace... We won’t tolerate oppression or any change inside the prison system.

- Jan-Feb 2019: PCC, CV and GDE team up to launch attacks. Largest wave in state history, over 300 attacks in 50+ municipalities over two months.
- Violent lobbying (Lessing 2017): clear *de jure* policy demand to maintain segregation

Inter-Gang Dynamics Swamps All Else



- 2019: Homicide rate goes **down** as result of inter-gang truce!
- 2020—: Mauro stays, prisons desegregated (!), apparently breaks gangs' power within prison system. Street reverts to gang warfare.

Criminal Governance in Factionalized Brazil



Bairro São José, João Pessoa, pacified by Okaida faction, 2018

- Respect residents
- Don't use drugs in front of children
- Teach the Young
- Don't accuse in vain
- Don't talk to cops
- Be collectivist
- Don't rob in or near the community

President of Residents' Assoc.:

“Things got better with the arrival of the faction. There used to be 20 or 30 deaths per year, now there are none. They imposed rules but they are good rules.”

Duopoly of violence now the norm for tens of millions of Brazilians...



**Attack by Comando Vermelho prison gang
Rio de Janeiro, November 2010**

Thank You!

Benjamin Lessing

blessing@uchicago.edu

Counterproductive Repression




FIGURE 2 Counterproductive Repression. State policies meant to curb crime (red arrows) can foster and spread criminal governance (grey arrows). A few examples: 1) Mass incarceration worsens prison conditions, driving the rise of criminal leviathans and swelling their ranks. 2) Transferring gang leaders has repeatedly helped gangs propagate throughout prison systems. 3) High incarceration rates help gangs project power beyond prison, by giving street-level actors reason to obey imprisoned leaders. This combines with 4) drug repression to give prison gangs both the means and motives to pacify and govern retail drug markets and the peripheral communities that house them.

Shared Projects of Governance




FIGURE 3 Shared Project of Governance. Criminal leviathans are embedded within an overarching state leviathan that is responsible for governing the national territory. Since prisons and peripheries lie within that territory, the governance criminal leviathans provide, though it may push the state out of those spaces, nonetheless contributes to its overarching project of governance.

PCC Document Trove: Ledgers and Personnel Records from “upstate” São Paulo (*interior*), 2011-12

	A	B	C	D	E
1	FECHAMENTO GERAL DO MÊS DE FEVEREIRO DE 2012.				
2					
3	REGIONAL 19				
4		Débito	Abatimento	Valor atual	
5	PT TOTALIZADO	1,023,512.00	78,044.00	945,468.00	
6	ML TOTALIZADO	49,351.00	5,516.00	43,835.00	
7	BOB TOTALIZADO	9,255.00		9,255.00	
8				Valor do débito: 998.558,00	
9	REGIONAL 18				
10		Débito	Abatimento	Valor atual	
11	PT TOTALIZADO	13,169.00		13,169.00	
12	ML TOTALIZADO	5,643.00		5,643.00	
13					
14	REGIONAL				

SAIDA DE DINHEIRO.

Valor

- **3.050,00** → 01/02/ ao 28/02/12 Gasto com o pé de borracha (gasolina e pedágio).
- **310,00** → 03/02/ e 27/02/12 Gastos com créditos para o quadro do progresso (regional 014 e 017).
- **4.200,00** → 03/02 ao 25/02/12 ref. despesas de guias (créditos etc... reg. 012,016, 017 e 019).
- **6.800,00** → 03/02/12 ao 25/02/12 Ref. o Pagamento mensal das vans de w2 (reg.017).
- **1.880,00** → 03/02/ e 25/02/12 Gastos mensal com o carro que deixa os familiares em suas residências após cheg (reg.016).
- **300,00** → 27/02/12 gasto com o chão para o progresso (reg. 014).
- **1.200,00** → 24/02/12 Ref. a uma ajuda para a esposa do nosso irmão Dai de Sumaré, o mesmo faleceu em 2010. autorizado Juninho).
- **370,00** → 24/02/12 Ref. a compra de uma impressora para o quadro do progresso do interior.
- **1.000,00** → 17/02/12 Ref. a uma ajuda para a esposa do nosso irmão tartaruga de Paraguaçu paulista que se en (reg.016).

Raio-x p.t mês 11

$$1000 = 8.500,00 \text{pg.}$$

$$250 \text{ gr} = 2,125 \text{Pg } 2,125 \text{ pg.}$$

$$250 \text{ gr} = 2,125 \text{Pg } 2,125 \text{ pg.}$$

$$250 \text{ gr} = 2,125 \text{Pg } 2,000 + 125 \text{pg.}$$

$$250 \text{ gr} = 2,125 \text{Pg } 2,000 + 125 \text{ pg.}$$

$$\text{Iracemapolis } 1.000 \text{ GR} = 8.500,00 \text{pg.}$$


$$1.000 \text{ gr} = 8.500 \text{Pg. } 4,670 + 3,830 \text{ pg.}$$

1º PRAZO: 15 dias
se pagar sai se não pagar
ta' fora do comando.

2º PRAZO: 90 automático.
é mais 15 dias
para pagar.
se não pagar
ta' fora.

3º PRAZO: exclusão automática.
é entrega no prazo
de 20 dias de comparecimento

A Decentralized, Profitable, Consignment-Based Drug Empire



"Criminal Criminal Records"

PRASO de COMPANHEIRO.

nome.
mat.
Julg.
Queb.
Trib. V.T.
Limh + Ser.
Falso Divida.

Motivo do PRASO
maeucadobria.

Inicio do PRASO.
22/09/2012.
Fim. 12/10/2012.

CREdor.
Julg.
Queb.
(~~maeucadobria~~)
Limh +

acompanhamento
Disciplina da Cidade. R.P.
Regional 16.

Name:

Inmate number:

Nickname:

Neighborhood:

Last three places incarcerated:

Last three job posts held:

Current job post:

Previous punishment:

Hot line:

Disciplinarian of the city

Regional 16

“Criminal Criminal Records”

RIO CLARO .

NOME : Alessandro Boeno Das Costa .

VUGO : Chu . Na Linha Gordão MT : [REDACTED]

QUEB : Rio Claro .

DATA.B : 10-03-2006 .

LOC.B : Penita De Tirapina 2 .

PADR : Ró De Rio Claro , Príncipe Da Z Leste .

AS3 UT : Penita De Pacaembu , Penita De Ipero , Penita W1 .

AS3 UT. RESPOSTA : Sintonia Final Dos Gravatas , Sintonia Geral Do Estado Da Bahia , Sintonia Geral Da Financeira RG 19 .

RESPOSTA ATUAL : Progresso e Pé de Borracha da Cidade .

PUNIÇÃO : Não Tem .

DATA SAIDA : 16-04-13 .

LOCAL DE SAIDA : Penitenciária Pacaembu .

LINHA.V : [REDACTED]

CADASTRO NA DATA : 16-04-13 .

NA CIDADE : Rio Claro .

Name:

Inmate number:

Nickname:

Neighborhood:

Last three places incarcerated:

Last three job posts held:

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Hot line:

Disciplinarian of the city

Regional 16

“Criminal Criminal Records”

NOME = [REDACTED]
LUGO = [REDACTED]
MATRICULA = 12.308
REFERENCIA = NOEL
PADRINHOS = [REDACTED]

QUADRADA ORIGEM = TOUROS
QUADRADA ATUAL = TOUROS
DATA BATISMO = 30-07-015
LOCAL = BATISMO = PV. 2
IDEIA EM ABERTA = NÃO
DIVERSÃO = NÃO
PUNICÃO = NÃO
SITUAÇÃO CADEIA = COMPLEXO, PV2, PV5

SITUAÇÃO RESPOSTA = DISCIPLINA

RESPOSTA ATUAL = NÃO
AONDE SE ENCONTRA = PV. 5
CONTATO FAMILIAR = [REDACTED]

NOME: [REDACTED]
LUGO: [REDACTED]
DATA DE BATISMO:
10.03.2016
PADRINHOS:
[REDACTED]
RABICOR, DA NIKA, MAUVAS
REFERÊNCIA:
MULEKINHO
MATRICULA:
16285

From PCC member's notebook
seized by police in **Fortaleza, Ceará**

Found in Alcaçuz prison, **Rio Grande do Norte**

A Voluntary Transparency EQ

I: Every time a member or affiliate arrives here in our wing... **if he has something to tell us, if he has a debt with the Comando, he will pass along the information.** Transparency speaks volumes in a situation like that. If you arrive here full of lies, and later we get confirmation that those situations were true that you failed to tell us about, that generates a different type of *situation*.

BL: You won't trust the guy as much?

I: Right. [...] All of us, whenever there is contact. **If I were released today, I'll find the Comando wherever I end up, I will seek out the representative of that city, that neighborhood, that disciplinarian, that prison unit, and I'll pass along my record (*cadastro*).** I will have to act with transparency, because a Comando member is like that, he *is* transparency, he cannot lie.

--Interview, July 3, 2017.

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What exactly did he mean by "**situation**"?

PCC's Disciplinary Dictionary: 45 Situations



38. Prazo vencido: após a data, se o credor der continuidade é conduzido a exclusão e é conduzido ao prazo de companheiro, se não houver acordo a cobrança fica a critério do credor e é analisado pela sintonia.


19. Falta de transparência: fica caracterizado quando deixa de passar algo para a sintonia, pode ser caracterizado na hora do batismo em cima das perguntas da sintonia do livro branco, a falta de transparência supre a omissão se for perguntado e ele não passar, agrava a situação. Punição: exclusão. 90 dias só em caso muito relevantes que a sintonia não ver necessidade de punição maior.

From “Conceptualizing Criminal Governance”

Structure and basis of criminal authority: Charismatic-personalistic versus rational-bureaucratic


Charismatic-Personalistic:

- Confederal structure among bosses
- Clan-like substructures under bosses
- Non-alienable property rights
- Arbitrary punishments
- Rhetorical emphasis on identity, loyalty
- Leaders' personalities are prominent



Rational-Bureaucratic:

- Unified, hierarchical structure
- Standardized, replicated, rotating job posts
- Alienable property rights
- Graded, institutionalized punishments
- Rhetorical emphasis on universal norms
- Few well-known leaders or figures



Why no PCC Hegemony? Returns to Scale

Increasing returns to scale predict PCC hegemony

1. Typical economic returns to firm expansion: higher margins, increased efficiency
2. Governance: PCC “rational-bureaucratic” style; rotation of managers improves evaluation, innovation; “legitimate” authority reduces costly internal punishments.

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2. **IR: Norm entrepreneurship and Balancing favor allying with CV against PCC.**

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2. IR: Norm entrepreneurship and Balancing favor allying with CV against PCC.
3. **PCC cannot easily buy off local incumbents.**
 - ◇ **Recalls Meyerson’s (2016) model of federalism: need to be able to promise local leaders future benefits within the federal system if they give up autonomy.**
 - ◇ **Preferences: PCC can offer drugs, guns, and money, but not power and status. Criminals just like the CV (and Rio) better.**
 - ◇ **Commitment problem: PCC can’t commit to not killing locals once they submit.**

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But also: role of the state.

State Policy: Segregation by Faction

Prison riots and massacres force authorities to segregate wings and whole units by gang.



Rio: Benfica prison riot, May 2004, in response to state effort to desegregate Rio's gangs. CV prisoners kill 30 rival gang members, 1 guard. As a result, Rio state permanently segregates prisons. No riots or massacres since.

Faction war on streets / faction peace in prisons!

#PrisonGang bomb in #Brazil nearly levels a highway bridge. A letter to the governor from "CRIME ORGANIZADO" on WhatsApp: "We've identified more than 20 bridges to bomb, we'll continue the attacks until the new Prisons Secretary is sacked" It's textbook violent lobbying.



Fortaleza: 2019 attacks triggered when new Prison Secretary threatens to desegregate prisons.

Governor did not accede to demands to fire Secretary, but also did not desegregate prisons (yet).

Segregation as State Regulation Favoring “the Devil we Know”

Field visit, Penitenciária de Florianópolis. July, 2017:



PGC members live in the *Convívio*...



PCC members in the *Seguro*

SC: Officials deliberately minimizing PCC presence, even if that favors PGC

Rio: Officials got PCC members transferred back to SP, benefitting CV

SP, PN: Co-governance with PCC seems to keep rivals out. History of segregation opaque.

Hidden by officials and policy of gang denial at the time. Need to investigate further.

Some Larger Implications

For Theory:

What is state capacity in a context of prison-based criminal order?

- SP has largest police force, most prisons, high GDP, least homicide
- Yet even if no corruption, is dependent on PCC for co-governance

What *specific* sorts of state repression expand and order the criminal domain?

By what mechanisms?

For Policy:

Hegemonic peace, fragile truce, or war of factions. Which is preferable?

- Officials mostly say “None. We will eliminate the factions.”
- Police mostly say “Let them kill each other off.”

Could conditional repression for imprisoned gang leaders induce peace among factions? Is that a desirable outcome?