

Stabbed in the back:
Does sabotage follow mandated political
representation?

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Think development Think WIDER 2018

Motivation

Sabotage could undermine the benefit of affirmative action

Affirmative action

- Widespread
- A solution to persistent inequalities ?
- Problem : affirmative action is controversial

Concern : that there is some sabotage

- Induces an absolute losses for all agents
- But a relative gain for at least one of the agents

Affirmative action may trigger sabotage

Indeed such sabotage appears in

- theory
(Brown and Chowdhury 2017)
- games during lab or lab in the field experiments
(Banerjee et al. 2017 ; Fallucchi and Quercia 2016 ; Gangadharan et al. 2016 ; Leibbrandt et al. 2015)
- horse races
(Brown and Chowdhury 2017)

This paper

Question

Does 'real world' sabotage take place after affirmative action ?

Context

Nationwide

- policy of caste-based electoral quotas
- administrative data on caste-based crimes
- survey data on caste-based discrimination

Results

Consistent with sabotage taking place

Contributions

- Risk of a “one size fits all”
gender and caste quotas yield opposite results (Iyer et al. 2012)
- Confirm possibility that quotas trigger sabotage
including in real life
- Combining administrative and household data
caste-based murders reflect untouchability practices

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background**
- 3 Empirical analysis
- 4 Conclusions

Caste in India

Castes are persistent

- Hereditary, segregated, thus some persistence
Over 74% households are opposed to between jati weeding (Banerjee et al 2014)
- Thousands of jatis captured in 4 administrative groups (SC ST OBC OC)
- Over 220 million members of the Scheduled Castes

Castes are a source of inequalities and discrimination

- 29% hh of the SC are below poverty line, 12% OC
- 50% villages restrict SC hh access to water (Shah et al. 2006)
- 44.5% of the SC hh in the Hindi belt face caste-based restriction to movement (Girard 2018)

Caste based electoral quotas

Quotas in local political councils

- Quotas size mirror caste size in the state population
- Constitutional in 1993 but staggered implementation :
 - before 1992 : 4 states
 - between 1993 & 1995 : 8 states
 - after 1995 : 5 states
- Quotas rotate
 - rotate across villages at each election
 - rotation is an administrative decision
- Quotas are visible

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Proxying for sabotage with administrative data

Crime data (police records)

- State level, 1992 to 2013
- Condition to record : low caste victim + high caste perpetrator
- A measure of caste-based violence : evolves with
 - changes in relative wealth (Sharma 2015)
 - sharing some water sources (Bros & Couttenier 2015)
- Data tells about perpetrating, reporting and recording
- Separate record of penal code and special crimes (link to untouchability practices), murders, rape, etc.

Empirical model for the administrative data :

Exploit the staggered implementation of electoral quotas

$$\ln(\text{crime}_{st}/100,000SC_{st}) = \alpha_1 \text{post_quota}_{st} + \alpha_2' X_{st} + FE_s + FE_t + \varepsilon_{st} \quad (1)$$

post_quota_{st} = dummy with value one from the year of the first election with quotas onwards

X_{st} = literacy, GDP per capita and its square, ratio of low caste to high caste population and ratio square, urbanization

FE_s & FE_t = state & year fixed effects

ε_{st} = standard error (state cluster)

Special crimes and murders increase after quotas

	(1) special	(2) penal	(3) murders	(4) rape
post_quota	1.357** (0.566)	-0.749 (0.728)	0.274** (0.0967)	0.0552 (0.0992)
Observations	334	354	305	337
R-squared	0.766	0.601	0.859	0.916

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All specifications include state and year fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (literacy rates, real per capita GDP and its square, SC to non-SC share of the population and its square, urbanization). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.15$.

Results robust to varying the control set, cluster bootstrap, omitting years or States one by one.

Interpretation : Results are consistent with some sabotage

Special crimes increase by approx. 300% : open channels

Consistent with empowerment, or sabotage (or interpretation)

Murders increase by 32% : consistent with sabotage

- murders suffer from lowest declaration bias
- results inconsistent with mis-record
- results inconsistent with general increase in violence
- Consistent with qualitative evidence


Ex : "In the village of Melavalavu, Madurai district Tamil Nadu, following the election of a Dalit to the village council presidency, members of a higher-caste group murdered six Dalits in June 1997, including the elected council president [...]" Narula (1999)

Proxying for sabotage with household survey data

IHDS 2012

- nationally representative, here restricted to rural sample
- on attitudes and perceptions
- by household members of both the SC and non SC

Crimes and households answers correlation



Empirical model for the household survey :

Exploit the rotation of SC quotas

$$Y_{iv} = \beta_1^c \text{quota_SC}_v + \beta_2^{c'} X_i + \beta_3^{c'} X_v + FE_{district} + \varepsilon_{st} \quad (2)$$

Y_{iv} = outcome(s) of interest for households i of caste c living in village v .

quota_SC_v = a dummy equal to 1 in villages where the head of the local political council is a member of the SCs elected on a caste quota.

X_i and X_v = household and village controls, including the share of SC households in the village

$FE_{district}$ = district fixed effects

ε_{st} = standard error (village cluster)

Caste quotas increase conflicts and untouchability practice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	conflict	caste conflict	untouchability victim	practice
<i>Panel A : SC housheolds</i>				
quota_SC	-0.0132 (0.0347)	0.0210 (0.0479)	0.0312 (0.0551)	
Observations	6,234	6,233	5,815	
R-squared	0.419	0.361	0.287	
<i>Panel B : Non SC ST housheolds</i>				
quota_SC	0.0745* (0.0392)	0.0976** (0.0397)		0.0434* (0.0244)
Observations	17,071	17,065		17,075
R-squared	0.344	0.332		0.355

Standard errors clustered by villages in parentheses. All specifications include district fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (household caste, religion, the main source of income of the household, the number of household members, the income per capita in the household and the age of the household head, the share of SC households in the population of the

Caste quotas leave general trust unchanged

Dep. Variable : Trust in	(1) Politicians	(2) Panchayat	(3) Police	(4) Justice
<i>Panel A : SC households</i>				
quota_SC	0.0274 (0.0423)	-0.0112 (0.0242)	-0.0440+ (0.0288)	0.0163 (0.0139)
Observations	6,222	6,222	6,22	6,207
R-squared	0.253	0.218	0.225	0.125
<i>Panel B : Non SC ST households</i>				
quota_SC	-0.0327 (0.0290)	-0.0230 (0.0215)	-0.00439 (0.0171)	-0.00385 (0.00925)
Observations	17,063	17,048	17,051	17,01
R-squared	0.166	0.149	0.132	0.140

Standard errors clustered by villages in parentheses. All specifications include district fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (household caste, religion, the main source of income of the household, the number of household members, the income per capita in the household and the age of the household head, the share of SC households in the population of the village and the square of this share, and whether the head of the local political council is a woman elected after a gender quota).

Stabbed in the back: Victorine Girard
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1, +p<0.15.

Caste quotas leave general crimes unchanged

Dep. variable :	(1) Theft	(2) Break-in	(3) Attack	(4) Eve teasing
<i>Panel A : SC households sample</i>				
quota_SC	0.00576 (0.0101)	0.00852 (0.00870)	0.00381 (0.00719)	-0.0137 (0.0271)
Observations	6,234	6,234	6,234	6,232
R-squared	0.130	0.096	0.126	0.203

<i>Panel B : Non-SC ST households sample</i>				
quota_SC	-0.0162 (0.0114)	-0.000783 (0.00398)	0.00336 (0.00976)	-0.00730 (0.0261)
Observations	17,08	17,079	17,079	17,063
R-squared	0.065	0.043	0.057	0.209

Standard errors clustered by villages in parentheses. All specifications include district fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (household caste, religion, the main source of income of the household, the number of household members, the income per capita in the household and the age of the household head, the share of SC households in the population of the village and the square of this share, and whether the head of the local political council is a woman elected after

Note : the backlash is independent of the way quotas are implemented

Crimes are unaffected by implementation modalities of the quotas

- Moment of election
- Size of quotas
- Exclusive special courts

The increase in murders comes from quotas implementation itself

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Conclusions

This study : SC quotas

- increase murders of members of the SCs
- increase the declaration of untouchability practices by members of the non SC ST

We can not straightforwardly extend to castes the empowerment conclusion of Iyer et al 2012

Affirmative action is at risk of being undermined by sabotage

Opening

Affirmative action can be a powerful redistributive and empowerment tool

- minority leader : public goods funding, and access (resp. Besley et al., 2004 ; Iyer et al 2012)
+ a role model
- minority members : solidarity, aspirations, feeling of legitimacy (resp. Dunning, 2010 ; Beaman et al 2012 ; Iyer et al 2012)
- majority members : update in stereotypes, in the social norm (resp. Beaman et al 2009 ; Girard 2018)
in line with contact theory (Allport 1954)

Future work

- We need to keep in mind that affirmative action may also have unintended spillovers
- Open question : how to design affirmative action to reduce risk of backlash

Thank you !

Discussion

The staggered implementation of caste quotas

Year of first election with reservation for SC	Number of states
1962	1
1981	1
1991	1
1992	1
1993	1
1994	1
1995	6
1996	1
2001	2
2006	1
2007	1
Total	17

Descriptive stats

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	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Total	16.1	15.6	0	76.6
SLL	5.13	6.03	0	32.4
IPC	10.9	12.9	0	65.5
Murder	0.26	0.26	0	1.18
Rape	1.40	1.63	0	8.34
SC to higher castes ratio	0.22	0.09	0.08	0.48
Rural population (%)	0.67	0.20	0.17	1
Literate population (%)	0.64	0.15	0.33	1
Farming population (%)	0.15	0.05	0	0.29
per capita real GDP	2.27	1.10	0.42	6.15
police strength	158	103	8.37	730
Share SC seats GE	0.15	0.07	0	0.31

The correlation between crimes and households answers

	murder		SLL		Untouchability	
	average	in 2012	average	in 2012	Practice	victim
murder mean (1992-2013)	1.0000					
murder 2012	0.9203 (0.0000)	1.0000				
SLL mean (1992-2013)	0.3655 (0.1238)	0.4326 (0.0643)	1.0000			
SLL 2012	-0.1735 (0.4775)	-0.1728 (0.4793)	0.5934 (0.0074)	1.0000		
untouch. practice	0.5271 (0.0204)	0.4435 (0.0572)	0.2554 (0.2914)	0.1439 (0.5568)	1.0000	
untouch. victim	0.6452 (0.0029)	0.6040 (0.0062)	0.3437 (0.1496)	0.2477 (0.3066)	<i>0.1209</i> <i>(0.5648)</i>	1.0000

First overview : crime rates seem higher after SC quotas

	3 years before SC quotas	difference	3 years following SC quotas	$P > z $
Total	15.2 (0.60)	<	17.2 (0.90)	+
Special crime	4.57 (0.23)	<	6.06 (0.63)	*
Penal code crime	10.6 (0.74)		11.2 (0.37)	
Murder	0.22 (0.008)	<	0.29 (0.02)	**
Rape	1.27 (0.003)	<	1.46 (0.08)	*

The table displays means and standard errors (in parentheses). For each crime category and year to the date of reservation, I compute the national average of crime rates (per 100,000 SC population, or SC women in the case of rapes). The year of implementation of the quota is included in the sample of the “3 years following SC quotas” (and this year differs across states). I use a 3-year threshold because the crime statistics start in 1992 and most states implemented SC quotas in 1995. $P > |z|$ tells, for each sample, the p-values of the test that the difference between years just before or just after the implementation of the SC quotas is zero. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, + $p < 0.15$.

The increase in caste murders after caste quotas is independent of controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Dep. Var : ln (murders/100,000 low caste)</i>					
post_quota	0.221** (0.103)	0.274** (0.0967)	0.283*** (0.0901)	0.265** (0.0954)	0.274** (0.0987)
Obs	305	305	305	305	305
R2	0.855	0.859	0.859	0.861	0.859
Controls :	none	add to (1) demogr. & eco. controls	add to (2) BSP vote % state elections	add to (2) ln(inc. SC) and ln(inc. NSCST)	add to (2) p(encounter) around shared water source

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All specifications include state and year fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (literacy rates, real per capita GDP and its square, SC to non-SC share of the population and its square, urbanization). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, + $p < 0.15$.

How murders respond to quotas depends of the sample

Sample :	Iyer et al sample (1) 11 states with 95 and later quotas Stopping study in 2007	(2) Adding 2 states with 93 and later quotas	(3) Adding all states (17 major states)	my sample (4) Adding all years (crimes until 2013)
<i>Panel A. Controlling only for SC share and its square</i>				
post_quota	0.234 (0.155)	0.229+ (0.139)	0.255*** (0.0659)	0.221** (0.103)
Observations	146	161	225	305
R-squared	0.801	0.875	0.861	0.855
<i>Panel B. Standard controls</i>				
post_quota	0.154 (0.250)	0.220 (0.196)	0.268*** (0.0916)	0.274** (0.0967)
Observations	146	161	225	305
R-squared	0.812	0.881	0.864	0.859
<i>Panel C. Adding controls for the police strength</i>				
post_quota	0.158 (0.229)	0.238 (0.192)	0.285** (0.0977)	0.275** (0.0972)
Observations	146	161	225	305
R-squared	0.815	0.883	0.865	0.859

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All specifications include state and year fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.15$. Crime data from years 92-2013

Elections do not exacerbate violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	total	special	penal	murders	rape
post_quota	0.0101 (0.345)	1.432** (0.589)	-0.752 (0.743)	0.250** (0.106)	0.0369 (0.101)
election	0.382 (0.265)	0.655* (0.354)	-0.548 (0.873)	-0.209 (0.471)	0.472*** (0.102)
post_quota *election	-0.368 (0.286)	-0.814** (0.339)	0.500 (0.802)	0.244 (0.466)	-0.396*** (0.0934)
Observations	357	334	354	305	337
R-squared	0.891	0.768	0.602	0.859	0.917

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All specifications include state and year fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (literacy rates, real per capita GDP and its square, SC to non-SC share of the population and its square, urbanization). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.15$.

Variations in quota size do not exacerbate violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	total	special	penal	murders	rape
post_quota	2.590	-4.393	12.83	0.339	-0.0282
* share SC	(2.347)	(3.818)	(9.097)	(0.812)	(1.140)
post_quota	-0.366	2.001**	-2.565	0.224*	0.0594
	(0.563)	(0.860)	(1.832)	(0.114)	(0.205)
Observations	357	334	354	305	337
R-squared	0.892	0.769	0.615	0.859	0.916

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All specifications include state and year fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (literacy rates, real per capita GDP and its square, SC to non-SC share of the population and its square, urbanization). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.15$.

Same is true of the variation of the number of seats for members of the SCs in the state and national assemblies
However all are small magnitude variations

Dedicated judiciary system does not affect results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	total	special	penal	murders	rape
post_quota	-0.485	1.570**	-2.537+	0.349**	0.126
	(0.379)	(0.630)	(1.561)	(0.120)	(0.181)
post_quota	0.829*	-0.305	3.053+	-0.108	-0.108
* special court	(0.460)	(0.638)	(1.868)	(0.102)	(0.202)
Observations	357	334	354	305	337
R-squared	0.895	0.767	0.633	0.859	0.917

Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. All specifications include state and year fixed effects and the baseline set of controls (literacy rates, real per capita GDP and its square, SC to non-SC share of the population and its square, urbanization). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.15$.