Estimating the scale of corporate profit shifting: An FDI approach

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
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






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 $Source: \ http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2014/10/irelands_soft_pedaling_tax_avo.php\#.WVp1GoiGPhg$

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Illegal movement of money from a higher-tax jurisdiction to a lower-tax jurisdiction

→ lower total tax paid by a multinational corporation

What is corporate profit shifting?

Illegal movement of money from a higher-tax jurisdiction to a lower-tax jurisdiction

- ightarrow lower total tax paid by a multinational corporation
 - Ways to do so:
 - trade mispricing
 - debt financing
 - sale of intangibles or services
 - etc.

How it works

Czech Republic

Introduction

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How it works

Czech Republic


Introduction

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





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Motivation

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Motivation

1. Is there corporate profit shifting?

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Motivation

- 1. Is there corporate profit shifting?
- 2. How much corporate profit is shifted and from which countries?

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Motivation

- 1. Is there corporate profit shifting?
- 2. How much corporate profit is shifted and from which countries?
- 3. How much do these countries lose on tax revenue as a result?

1. Is there corporate profit shifting?

► Building on UNCTAD's World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2015)

The FDI approach

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The basic idea:

If there is profit shifting from high-tax jurisdictions to tax havens, this will show in data as deflated reported profits in high-tax jurisdictions

The FDI approach


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
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
Introduction

If there is profit shifting from high-tax jurisdictions to tax havens, this will show in data as deflated reported profits in high-tax jurisdictions

→ More FDI from tax havens is associated with lower reported profits







Available data on FDI

Stock

- ► IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey: bilateral FDI stock data matrix
- ► UNCTAD FDI Statistics: unilateral FDI stock

Available data on FDI

Stock

- ► IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey: bilateral FDI stock data matrix
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- Rate of return
 - ▶ IMF Balance of Payments: rate of return on FDI

- Definition: the share of inward FDI from "risky" countries
- Risky countries:
 - ► Tax havens (Cayman Islands, Jersey, Bermuda, ...)
 - Special purpose entity (SPE) enabling countries (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, ...)

The offshore indicator




The offshore indicator

FDI in country X




FDI from tax havens


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
The offshore indicator



The offshore indicator



First look at the data



2. How much corporate profit is shifted and from which countries?

The profitability gap

- ▶ Definition: the difference in rate of return on FDI with respect to the expected rate of return
- We assume that this profitability gap is due to profit shifting

The profitability gap

	Rate of return	Rate of return – equity component
Offshore indicator (OI)	-0.143***	-0.115***
OI*Low income	Omitted (= base)	Omitted (= base)
OI*Lower middle income	0.229***	0.204***
OI*Upper middle income	0.285***	0.235***
OI*High income: non-OECD	0.237***	0.226**
OI*High income: OECD	0.339***	0.330***
OI*Sub-Saharan Africa	Omitted (= base)	Omitted (= base)
OI*Europe & Central Asia	-0.209***	-0.222***
OI*East Asia & Pacific	-0.152**	-0.165**
OI*Latin America & Caribbean	-0.276***	-0.264***
OI*Middle East & North Africa	-0.125*	-0.115
OI*North America	-0.133	-0.175**
OI*South Asia	-0.390***	-0.397***
Observations	509	498
R-squared	0.340	0.361

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Mozambique (and others..)


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Missing profit


- ▶ The missing profit due to profit shifting can be easily derived from the profitability gap
- Missing profit = Profitability gap * Offshore indicator * Total FDI Risky FDI in USD


Tax revenue effects

- ► If the missing profits were not missing, how much more would countries collect in corporate tax?
- Tax revenue loss = Missing profit * Effective corporate tax rate



	Rate of return		Rate of return on equity	
	Tax revenue	Share on	Tax revenue	Share on
Country	losses	GDP	losses	GDP
	(USD million)	(%)	(USD million)	(/1000)
Sint Maarten	23.10	6.242	19.47	5.261
Mozambique	366.08	2.441	294.51	1.963
Uganda	259.59	0.927	208.84	0.746
El Salvador	233.87	0.900	215.90	0.830
Honduras	171.11	0.856	157.97	0.790
South Africa	2,119.79	0.684	1,785.61	0.576
Zambia	124.75	0.594	128.75	0.613
Curacao	18.01	0.581	15.18	0.490
Brazil	9,551.08	0.531	10,306.46	0.573
Georgia	71.64	0.512	77.60	0.554





Conclusion

Support for previous high numbers

Conclusion

- Support for previous high numbers
- Lower income countries lose more in relative terms

Conclusion

- ► Support for previous high numbers
- Lower income countries lose more in relative terms
- At the same time, it is harder for lower income countries to fight back

Drawbacks

► Solvable (?)

Introduction

- Derive shares of corporate taxes (data now available in GRD)
- Limited coverage
- Still partly relies on a dichotomous classification of tax havens
- ▶ Unique features of some countries (Belgium, ...)
- Include tax treaties data
- Not solvable
 - Only practices that require a direct investment link
 - ► Inherently imperfect method (country-fixed or group-fixed effects, ...)
 - ▶ Effective vs. nominal corporate tax rates

Thank you!

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References

UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2015 - Reforming International Investment Governance. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, USA and Geneva, Switzerland, 2015.