



# Migration and Negative Extraversion

Recent developments in Euro-African cooperation on migration: theoretical implications and potential effects

Ferruccio Pastore

(Forum of International and European Research on Immigration – FIERI, Torino, Italy)

WIDER Development Conference on «Migration and Mobility»

Accra 5-6 October 2017

# Structure of my presentation

- Some background on recent African migration to Europe and how it shapes perceptions and policies
- Key development: a dramatic change in policy priorities: growing prioritisation of Sub-Saharan Africa in European policies on migration, **but also** growing prioritisation of migration in European policies in Sub-Saharan Africa
- My main focus: The impact of such changing priorities on African countries - a crucial but still neglected issue (and field of study)
- My theoretical lens: "Negative extraversion" and perverse effects of Europe's new migration strategy in Africa
- Some concluding remarks on implications for future research

If one googles "African migrants"...




# The official narrative


“...a steady increase in migration pressure from the African continent, and in particular West Africa” (Frontex 2017)

# The current situation


Countries of origin – Arrivals to Italy and Greece, Q1-2 2017 (Source: IOM)



The growth trend in irregular arrivals from Sub-Sahara Africa closely associated with **contingent situation in Libya**




# 2016: an all-time peak, with big seasonal variations





# But the trend is reversed since July 2017





2 February 2017



31 March 2017



...the outcome of a longstanding diplomatic effort

21 May 2017



But, beside Libya, Sub-Saharan Africa emerges as the key priority for European migration policies

- 2015 "refugee crisis": EU's failure to impose a physical redistribution of refugees among EU Member States
- Shift to an "external response" based on deterrence and prevention of arrivals: EU-Turkey agreement (March 2016)
- Valletta Summit (November 2015): Sub-Saharan Africa as new priority
- Establishment of EU Emergency Trust Fund "for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa" (2.7 billions euros by the EU, only 155 millions by Member States so far)
- June 2016: launch of the "Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration"



The new Partnership Framework innovates especially in the much greater geographical prioritisation compared to the past:



# Territorial priorities in the New Partnership Framework:


- Official migration priorities ●






# Territorial priorities in the New Partnership Framework:

- Official migration priorities ●
- Priorities associated with Syrian exodus ●



# Territorial priorities in the New Partnership Framework:


- Official migration priorities ●
- Priorities associated with Syrian exodus ●
- Unofficial migration priorities ●





# Territorial priorities in the New Partnership Framework:

- Official migration priorities ●
- Priorities associated with Syrian exodus ●
- Unofficial migration priorities ●
- Semi-official super-priority ●





# A deep transformation of the European strategic approach to Africa

- NOT JUST a growing prioritisation of Sub-Saharan Africa in European external policies on migration
- BUT ALSO a growing prioritisation of migration in European policies in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Especially in the field of development policies, but also in other areas (e.g. trade, i.a. in the context of the post-Cotonou debate on the future of the EU-ACP Partnership)
- A sort of "**pan-migratory**" strategic approach to Africa is emerging, with potentially deep and worrisky social and political implications
- BUT little public and scholarly attention (*see paper*), at least in Europe

# Conceptual ambiguities and practical dysfunctionalities

- CONCEPTUALLY:

**Development as a way to prevent migration?** Most economic and social sciences literature points in the opposite direction

- PRACTICALLY:

In the short term, most funds go don't go to development priorities and actors, but rather to security and migration control ones

- RISK:

**Only temporary reduction of migration pressure, constant if not augmented propensity to emigrate, plus other potential perverse side-effects**

# "Negative extraversion": a brief theoretical focus

- Starting from Jean-François Bayart's historical sociology of the state in Africa and his **theory of extraversion** (2000, 2009)
- Away from mainstream dependency theory: asymmetries of wealth and power **not necessarily implying passiveness**
- Extraversion as a strategy of governance and a form of agency defined as the capacity of African elites to "compensate for their difficulties in the autonomization of their power [by] intensifying the exploitation of their dependants by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment" (Bayart 2009)
- Traditionally African "extraverted" oligarchies act as **gatekeepers controlling the access of external actors to domestic natural resources** (including, for centuries, slaves) and extracting value from this intermediation
- "Negative extraversion", on the contrary, **capitalizes on perceived "threats"** stemming from Africa (migration, terrorism, organized crime), that Western actors want to prevent or avert
- In this context, the profit margin for African leaderships resides in their capacity to present themselves as **credible candidates for effective security outsourcing**

# Mapping potential **negative side-effects** of unbalanced migration control externalisation fostering "negative extraversion"

- 1) Privileged relation with security apparatuses → **reinforcement of authoritarian trends** in partner countries (possible examples: Ethiopia, Turkey, Sudan)
- 2) Outsourcing migration repression → **undermining consensus to local elites** (Schengen visa restrictions as fuel for 2011 uprisings?)
- 3) Pressure for border controls in origin regions → **weakening regional economic integration** (e.g. ECOWAS)
- 4) Increased controls → **boost to smuggling and corruption + redirection along riskier routes** (e.g. USA, Niger)

# Perhaps even more fundamentally, it is a matter of international standards and values

*“Governments in Africa are watching what Europe is doing. They see how Europe wants to prevent migration because Europeans think of migration as a problem. As a consequence, some of our governments are changing their approach and copying the European template. They have started to make deals with other countries to make sure that people stay there. [...]*

*Some African governments are now using Europe as an excuse for not taking responsibility. They say: ‘If Europe doesn’t do it, why should we – with fewer resources – do it?’”.*

(Sipho Mthathi, Oxfam’s Executive Director for South Africa, European Development Days, 20 June 2017)

# Implications for future research

- My paper is essentially a theoretical and methodological enquiry, not yet the result of a full-fledged and targeted empirical study
- Its essential aim is to raise questions for future research in what I view as a crucial and highly complex research agenda
- **Methodological challenges** → requires in-depth and systematic cooperation across disciplines (IR, political science, migration studies, ...) and between European and African scholars
- **Practical challenges** → logistic obstacles and and political restrictions may limit access to the field (e.g. in border regions or in the remote areas where refugee camps are often located)
- BUT a **politically crucial issue**, where research can really contribute to the future of EU-Africa relations

# Thank you for your attention!