

# Forced Migration and Attitudes towards Domestic Violence: Evidence from Turkey

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# Introduction

- ▶ Civil wars can have long-run consequences on economic outcomes (Blattman and Miguel, 2010)
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- ▶ We know little about the long-run effects of conflict and forced migration on cultural norms and attitudes
- ▶ **Question:** Can conflict-induced forced migration affect gender norms? If so, through what mechanisms?

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- ▶ I explore the long-term consequences of internal forced migration caused by the Turkish-Kurdish conflict during 1984-1999 on women's attitudes towards domestic violence
  - ▶ During this period, many Kurdish villages were destroyed, nearly 1 million people were forced to move to urban centers.

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- ▶ I use Turkish DHS (2008 and 2013) to estimate the effects of forced migration on whether the respondents (women) thought DV was acceptable, using a triple-difference strategy that exploits differences across:
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  - ▶ ethnicity
  - ▶ place of origin
  - ▶ timing of migration
- ▶ Supportive evidence from the universe of applicants to a women's shelter NGO during 2009-2011.

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- ▶ *Cultural diffusion*: Migrants may be exposed to different cultural norms in their destination and have different attitudes over time.
  - ▶ In TDHS domestic violence is on average less acceptable in urban areas relative to rural → forced migration may expose migrants to more progressive attitudes

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  - ▶ live in poorer households.
- ▶ Among Kurdish applicants to the women's shelter NGO, forced migrants have been in an abusive relationship for longer and suffered more extensive violence.
- ▶ Overall, the findings suggest that the forced migration in our context changed women's attitudes towards domestic violence, forcing them to view it as more acceptable.

## Related Literature

- ▶ Domestic violence and ...
  - ▶ conflict: can increase domestic violence in the long-run, through different mechanisms (Justino et al 2015, La Mattina 2017, Noe and Rickmann 2013); little evidence on the effects of conflict-induced forced migration (Calderon et al 2011)



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  - ▶ women's bargaining power: An improvement in women's economic power is typically associated with a fall in DV in high-income settings, but the relationship may be reversed in low-income settings, and depending on norms (e.g. Aizer, 2010; Alesina et al 2016; Angelucci 2008; Bobonis et al, 2013; Heath, 2014; van den Berg and Tertilt, 2015)

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- ▶ Migration and the diffusion of cultural norms (Barsbai et al 2017): often difficult to estimate effects on migrants' attitudes due to endogeneity of the migration decision.
  - ▶ Studying forced migration can be one way to circumvent the selection problem, as it is exogenous to pre-existing differences in attitudes.

# Outline

1. Background
2. Data Description and Identification Strategy
3. Results from TDHS dataset
4. Mechanisms
5. Supportive evidence from Applicants to Women's Shelter
6. Conclusion

## Background

- ▶ Conflict between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) escalated in 1984, continued at high intensity until 1999.
- ▶ Between 1984-99, many villages were evacuated and/or destroyed in 12, largely Kurdish eastern and southeastern provinces. Three reasons (Turkish Parliamentary Commission 1998):
  - ▶ collapse of agriculture and animal husbandry
  - ▶ PKK's eviction of villagers cooperating with the state
  - ▶ eviction by security forces of villagers refusing to cooperate
- ▶ Number of displaced (official figure): 925,000 to 1.2 million (TGYONA 2005)
- ▶ Most of the displaced were from rural areas, some from towns (Kurban et al 2007)
- ▶ As of 2009, less than 20% of the displaced had returned (IDMC 2013)

Map of Turkey and the affected area



Source: TGYONA (2005)

- ▶ Green: Provinces sending forced migrants during 1984-99
- ▶ Blue: Provinces receiving most forced migrants

# Data Description I: DHS

TDHS, waves 2008 and 2013

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- ▶ Migration history
  - ▶ place of birth
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  - ▶ timing and direction of all migrations after childhood

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- ▶ Attitudes towards domestic violence:
  - ▶ “Now I will list some situations. Can you tell me whether you agree or disagree with a husband’s performance of physical violence to his wife under these situations?”
    - ▶ If she burns the food?
    - ▶ If she neglects the children?
    - ▶ If she answers him back?
    - ▶ If she wastes money?
    - ▶ If she refuses to have sexual intercourse?
    - ▶ If she doesn't cook? (in 2008 wave only)
    - ▶ If she neglects housework? (in 2008 wave only)

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    - ▶ If she refuses to have sexual intercourse?
    - ▶ If she doesn't cook? (in 2008 wave only)
    - ▶ If she neglects housework? (in 2008 wave only)
- ▶ Ethnicity: mother tongue Kurdish/Turkish



## Descriptive Statistics, TDHS Sample

	Full sample	<i>From conflict region</i>		p-value
		Migrated during the conflict	Did not migrate during the conflict	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Panel A: Respondent's Characteristics</b>				
Age	32.272	36.472	28.559	0.000
Kurdish	0.192	0.766	0.756	0.566
Education (years of schooling)	6.711	3.048	4.454	0.000
Employed	0.300	0.202	0.164	0.022
Wealth class (1-5)	2.921	2.226	2.086	0.009
<b>Panel B: Women's Attitudes Towards Domestic Violence</b>				
Domestic violence (DV) is justified under any scenario	0.203	0.377	0.297	0.000
Fraction of scenarios in which DV is justified	0.080	0.169	0.130	0.001
Scenario 1: if she neglects children's needs	0.129	0.268	0.192	0.000
Scenario 2: if she argues with her husband	0.096	0.192	0.152	0.015
Scenario 3: if she refuses to have sex	0.045	0.108	0.088	0.130
Scenario 4: if she burns the food	0.022	0.064	0.051	0.184
Scenario 5: if she wastes money	0.103	0.201	0.154	0.005
Scenario 6: if she doesn't cook *	0.058	0.126	0.125	0.953
Scenario 7: if she neglects household chores *	0.123	0.224	0.223	0.970
Number of observations	16216	752	2108	

**Source:** Author's calculations based on data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys.

## Identification

- ▶ I estimate a triple-difference-in-difference model:

$$y_{ipt} = \beta K_i + \rho M_{it} + \sigma K_i C_p + \delta k_i M_{it} + \theta C_p M_{it} \\ + \lambda K_i C_p M_{it} + \gamma' X_i + \sum_{p=1}^{81} \mu_p + S_t + \varepsilon_{ipt}$$

- ▶  $y_{ipt}$  is respondent's attitude towards DV
  - ▶  $K_i = 1$  if respondent Kurdish,
  - ▶  $C_p = 1$  if from conflict region,
  - ▶  $M_{it} = 1$  if from moved during 1984-1999.
  - ▶  $X_i$  is a vector of controls: respondent's age, age<sup>2</sup>, parents' education
  - ▶  $P_p, S_t$  are province and survey wave fixed effects
  - ▶ Standard errors clustered at the province level
- 
- ▶  $\lambda$  gives the triple difference in difference across ethnicity, place of origin and the timing of migration

## Effects of Forced Migration on Attitudes towards Domestic Violence

	Domestic violence is justified under any scenario	Fraction of scenarios in which domestic violence is justified	First principal component
	(1)	(2)	(3)
From conflict region x Migrated during conflict x Kurdish	0.163*** (0.035)	0.064*** (0.021)	0.504** (0.213)
Joint p-value	0.000		
Mean level of outcome (full sample)	0.203	0.080	-.008
Mean level of outcome (subsample)	0.321	0.145	0.622
Adjusted R-squared	0.088	0.097	0.077
Number of observations	16197	16197	15762

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys.

- ▶ Kurdish women from the region who moved during the conflict are 16ppt more likely to think DV is acceptable in at least 1 situation
- ▶ This is a large effect: 50% relative to the comparison group, 80% relative to sample mean.

## Placebo Test : Pre-Conflict Migration and Attitudes

	Domestic violence is justified under any scenario	Fraction of scenarios in which domestic violence is justified	First principal component
	(1)	(2)	(3)
From conflict region x Migrated <i>before</i> the conflict x Kurdish	-0.057 (0.110)	-0.063 (0.064)	-0.373 (0.640)
Joint p-value	0.648		
Mean level of outcome (full sample)	0.203	0.080	-.008
Mean level of outcome (subsample)	0.345	0.156	0.700
Adjusted R-squared	0.086	0.095	0.075
Number of observations	16197	16197	15762

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys.

- ▶ Kurdish women from the region who moved *before* the conflict are no more likely to think DV is acceptable (point estimate is small, negative and imprecise)
- ▶ Suggests the previous estimate was not driven by differential trends or any migration

## Attitudes towards Domestic Violence – Breakdown

	Respondent thinks a husband is justified in beating his wife if she:						
	neglects children's needs	argues with her husband	refuses to have sex with him	burns the food	wastes money	doesn't cook	neglects household chores
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
From conflict region x Migrated during conflict x Kurdish	0.142*** (0.032)	0.083** (0.038)	0.046* (0.026)	0.023 (0.017)	0.014 (0.033)	0.022 (0.036)	0.082 (0.058)
Joint p-value	0.000						
Mean level of outcome (full sample)	0.129	0.096	0.045	0.022	0.103	0.058	0.123
Mean level of outcome (subsample)	0.208	0.168	0.102	0.063	0.174	0.154	0.257
Adjusted R-squared	0.058	0.051	0.043	0.041	0.079	0.068	0.084
Number of observations	16126	16060	15985	16172	16119	6918	6895

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys.

Notes: Each column provides the result of estimating specification (1) on respondents' attitudes towards domestic violence. In 2008, respondents were asked to state if they found domestic violence by a husband towards her wife acceptable under 7 different scenarios, while in the 2013 TDHS only 5 of these scenarios were used. In columns (1) - (7), the dependent variables are dummy variables =1 if respondent thought a husband was justified in beating his wife if the relevant situation occurred (for example, in column (1), if the wife neglected needs of the children in the household). The scenarios in columns (6) and (7) (if she doesn't cook and if she neglects household chores) were only used in the 2008 survey, hence the sample is restricted to respondents from the 2008 TDHS in these two columns. "From conflict region" is a dummy variable =1 if the respondent was born and/or grew up in one of the conflict provinces (Adiyaman, Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirtak, Tunceli, Van). "Migrated during conflict" is a dummy variable =1 if the respondent migrated at least once during the conflict years (1984-1999). "Kurdish" is a dummy variable =1 if either the mother or the father of respondents' first language was Kurdish. "From conflict region x Migrated during conflict x Kurdish" is the triple interaction term that identifies the effect of being forced to migrate due to the conflict. All regressions control for the following covariates: a dummy variable =1 if the respondent's mother ever went to school; a dummy variable =1 if the respondent's father graduated from primary school, a dummy variable =1 if the respondent's father graduated from secondary school or above; a dummy variable =1 if the respondent's parents are related by blood; province of birth and TDHS wave fixed effects. The reported "Joint p-value" is from a test for joint significance of estimates for "From conflict region x Migrated during conflict x Kurdish" using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for columns (1) through (7). The row "mean level of outcome (subsample)" gives the mean of the outcome among Kurdish women from the conflict region who did not migrate during conflict. Robust standard errors are clustered by birth province. \*\*\* (\*\*) (\*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.

- ▶ Effects are stronger and more precise for (i) neglects children (ii) argues with husband (iii) refuses to have sex
- ▶ positive point estimates for all 7 scenarios

# Mechanisms

- ▶ Respondents' employment rates are lower on average in urban areas than in rural
- ▶ For men (respondent's husbands) the reverse is true
- ▶ The relationship is stronger for women with lower education
- ▶ Most forced migrants went from rural to urban sector, with low schooling
- ▶ Therefore it is likely that forced migration reduced women's economic opportunities relative to their spouses

## Employment Rates by Gender, Location and Schooling Level

	<i>Women</i>			<i>Men (Respondent's Spouse)</i>		
	Urban (1)	Rural (2)	p-value (3)	Urban (4)	Rural (5)	p-value (6)
All	0.288	0.389	0.000	0.925	0.881	0.000
Schooling <5 years	0.168	0.334	0.000	0.789	0.804	0.580
5<= Schooling <8 years	0.258	0.448	0.000	0.910	0.875	0.013
8<= Schooling <12 years	0.242	0.267	0.449	0.931	0.890	0.012
12<= Schooling years	0.585	0.621	0.766	0.954	0.855	0.642

**Source:** Author's calculations based on data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys.

**Notes:** The table shows the employment rates of respondents and their spouses in the TDHS data. Columns (1)-(3) show statistics related to the female respondents and columns (4)-(6) for their spouses. Columns (1) and (4) include the sample living in urban areas, columns (2) and (5) in rural areas and columns (3) and (6) provide the p-value for the test of equality of means between the urban and rural samples (using within-province variation only). The table further breaks down the sample(s) by schooling level. In row labeled "Schooling <5 years" the sample is restricted to individuals with 0-4 years of schooling, in "5<= Schooling <8 years" to individuals with 5 to 7 years of schooling, in rows labeled "8<= Schooling <12 years" to individuals with 8-11 years of schooling, and in the final row to individuals with 12 or more years of schooling.

## Forced Migration and Attitudes towards Domestic Violence – Mechanisms

	Husband is employed, respondent is not	Above middle wealth class
	(1)	(2)
From conflict region x Migrated during conflict x Kurdish	0.112* (0.067)	-0.117** (0.054)
Mean level of outcome (full sample)	0.592	0.372
Mean level of outcome (subsample)	0.708	0.081
Adjusted R-squared	0.082	0.233
Number of observations	13733	13733

**Source:** Author's calculations based on data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkish Demographic and Health Surveys.

- ▶ Forced migrant women are 11ppt more likely to have their husband working while they do not
- ▶ They live in poorer households
- ▶ In line with the bargaining power mechanism



## Data Description II: Applicants to Women's Shelter

Universe of applicants between 2009-2012 to one of the largest NGOs that provides support to women who experience violence

- ▶ Information recorded upon application on:
  - ▶ type of violence
  - ▶ duration
  - ▶ consequences – e.g. miscarriage?
  - ▶ previous help sought
  - ▶ migration status: ever migrated; if so why?
  
- ▶ Goal: Test if forced migrants have stayed in an abusive relationship for longer and suffered more severe violence before applying.
  - ▶ controlling for being a migrant (in general) and background characteristics (e.g age, timing of marriage, literacy, housing)

## Descriptive Statistics, Applicants to Women's Shelter

	<i>All Kurdish applicants</i>	<i>Forced migrants</i>	<i>Other applicants</i>	p-value of differences between col. (2) vs (3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Panel A : Background Characteristics</b>				
Age	37.797	40.198	37.362	0.000
Literate	0.506	0.335	0.537	0.000
Age at marriage 15 or younger	0.342	0.393	0.333	0.036
Age at marriage 16-17	0.286	0.312	0.281	0.251
Forced to marry against her will	0.183	0.347	0.154	0.000
<b>Panel B : Experience of Domestic Violence</b>				
Violence has been going on for 10+ years	0.304	0.447	0.278	0.000
Received any treatment due to violence	0.117	0.135	0.114	0.291
Filed a legal complaint	0.040	0.020	0.044	0.007
Complained to anyone	0.518	0.433	0.533	0.001
Forced to have sex against her will	0.494	0.587	0.477	0.000
Had a miscarriage due to domestic violence	0.083	0.153	0.071	0.000
Number of observations	2278	349	1929	

**Source:** Author's calculations based on applicant data collected by the women's shelter NGO.

## Forced Migration and the Extent of Domestic Violence among Applicants

	Violence has been going on since the start of a 10+ year relationship		Received medical or psychological treatment		Filed a legal complaint		Complained to police, court, family or friends	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Forced migrant	0.069** (0.029)	0.069** (0.029)	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.027 (0.030)
Migrant	0.002 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.009 (0.010)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.038* (0.021)	-0.041* (0.021)
Basic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean level of outcome	0.304		0.129		0.060		0.597	
Adjusted R-squared	0.204	0.217	0.255	0.264	0.036	0.041	0.269	0.275
Number of observations	2278	2278	2272	2272	2276	2276	2278	2278

**Source:** Author's calculations based on applications to the shelter NGO.

**Notes:** Sample includes Kurdish women who applied to the women's shelter between October 2009 and December 2011 in order to seek assistance with physical or sexual domestic (intra-household) violence. Additional controls include: "Housing: Gecekondu" is a dummy variable =1 if the applicant lives in a "gecekondu", which is a make-shift house put up quickly without legal permissions, often by squatters. "Household size" is the number of people living in the applicant's household. "Literate" is a dummy variable =1 if the applicant reported that she is able to read and write. "Age at marriage 15 or younger" is a dummy variable =1 if the applicant first got married when she was younger than 16 years old, "Age at marriage 16-17" is a dummy variable =1 if the applicant first got married while she was 16 or 17. "Forced to marry against her will" is a dummy variable =1 if the applicant reports that she was forced into the marriage she is currently in. "Has independent source of income" is a dummy variable =1 if the applicant reports that she has an income source that is not dependent on her husband or other men in her family. All regressions control for province, month and year of application fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by province.

## Forced Migration and the Extent of Domestic Violence among Applicants

	Forced to have sex against her will		Had a miscarriage due to the violence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Forced migrant	0.048 (0.031)	0.060* (0.032)	0.041** (0.017)	0.035** (0.017)
Migrant	-0.044** (0.022)	-0.042* (0.022)	0.011 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)
Basic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean level of outcome	0.494		0.083	
Adjusted R-squared	0.261	0.267	0.199	0.205
Number of observations	2093	2093	2274	2274

**Source:** Author's calculations based on applications to the shelter NGO.

# Discussion

- ▶ Among the applicants, forced migrants are
  - ▶ 23% more likely to remained in an abusive relationship for more than 10 years
  - ▶ 42% more likely to have had a miscarriage due to DV
  - ▶ less likely to have received any treatment, or applied elsewhere before the NGO
- ▶ Robust to controlling for age, age at marriage, housing type, literacy, being forced into marriage
- ▶ Suggests that forced migrant women have endured domestic violence for a longer period and in greater severity before deciding to seek help from the NGO

# Conclusions

- ▶ Conflict-induced displacement can have long-term consequences on gender norms
- ▶ Evidence from the Turkish-Kurdish conflict suggests that women who were forced to migrate from rural to urban areas 10-15 years ago are more likely to find domestic violence acceptable
- ▶ One possible mechanism is through a fall in women's economic opportunities, relative to men.
- ▶ Effects may differ depending on the context, and the type of migration
- ▶ Policies on forced migration need to take into account their long-term consequences on women's wellbeing and gender norms.