Student Performance and the Effects of School Quality versus School Fit

Kehinde Ajayi

Department of Economics Boston University

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This Paper

Question

How do schools affect student performance?

Potential channels

1. School quality \rightarrow Access to better academic inputs

2. School fit \rightarrow Access to a preferred type of school

This Paper

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How do schools affect student performance?

Potential channels

- 1. School quality \rightarrow Access to better academic inputs
- 2. School fit \rightarrow Access to a preferred type of school

	Available schools	Students' 1st choice
Private	0.063	0.001
Single sex	0.111	0.253
Colonial	0.102	0.250
Christian	0.188	0.238
Boarding	0.634	0.867
Small	0.249	0.056
Specialized	0.214	0.104
N	537	139073

This Paper

Empirical strategy

- 1. Track a cohort of Ghanaian high school students
- 2. Exploit merit-based school assignment process

Results


- 1. School quality
 - Increases likelihood of staying in same school
 - Generates modest improvements in exam performance
- 2. School fit
 - Increases likelihood of staying in same school
 - No significant effects on exam performance
- 3. Prioritizing school quality maximizes student learning

Context and Data

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Context: Ghana

Computerized school selection and placement system




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Free compulsory education

Context: Ghana

Computerized school selection and placement system




Free compulsory education

Coordinated school choice for students


- 1. Submit ranked list of up to three Senior High School programs
- 2. Take Basic Education Certification Exam (BECE)
- 3. Admitted to one program based on BECE score and ranked list

Peer Quality by Rank of Selected Choices



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Peer Quality by Rank of Assigned Choices



Data: Administrative Records on a Cohort of Students

BECE candidates (senior high school applicants) in 2005

- Background information: name, age, sex, junior high school
- Ranked list of choices
- BECE performance and admission outcomes

SSCE candidates (senior high school graduates) in 2008 + 2009

- Background information: name, age, sex, senior high school
- SSCE performance

Outcomes: Link BECE to SSCE candidates using name, age, sex

Research Design

1: Basic Model

$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + f(BECE_i) + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_{is}$$

- Y_{is} 12th grade outcomes (exam taking and scores)
- Q_s mean BECE score of assigned SHS peers
- BECE_i 9th grade exam score
- ► X_i age, gender, JHS mean BECE score, indicator for public JHS

Identification challenge:

Endogenous selection of students into schools

2: Selection on Observables

$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + f(BECE_i) + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta \mathbf{Z}_i + \nu_{is}$

• δZ_i : control for student application behavior

- mean selectivity of chosen schools
- fixed effect for ranked list of schools
- fixed effect for ranked list of schools \times programs

Identification assumption:

Controlling for application behavior controls for unobserved student ability


3: School Fit

$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + f(BECE_i) + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta Z_i + \phi_r + \theta Fit_s + v_{is}$$

- ϕ_r : fixed effect for student's ranking of assigned school
- Fit_s: similarity between student's assigned school and selected choices
 - 1. private
 - 2. single-sex
 - 3. colonial (34 schools established by the British, pre-1957)
 - 4. Christian affiliated
 - 5. equipped with boarding facilities
 - 6. small (admits fewer than 185 students \rightarrow lowest quartile)
 - 7. specialized (offers fewer than 4 programs \rightarrow lowest quartile)


- 8. in a student's JHS district
- 9. in a student's JHS region

School Fit Distribution




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
School Fit Distribution




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
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Summary of Descriptive Results

- 1. Large variation in school fit
- 2. Correlated with student retention but not exam performance

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Regression Results

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Matched program lists		w/ group-specific score slope	w/ cubic score function		
	(1)				
Panel A. Take SSCE Assigned SHS peers	0.059 (0.024)**				
School fit					
Panel B. Take SSCE on tir Assigned SHS peers	ne 0.081 (0.029)***				
School fit					
Panel C. Take SSCE in ass	signed school				
Assigned SHS peers	0.211 (0.030)***				
School fit					
Rank of Assigned SHS Observations	No 32153				

Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

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	w/ group-specific score slope	w/ cubic score function
(1)	(2)	
0.059 (0.024)**	0.053 (0.032)	
ie		
0.081 (0.029)***	0.055 (0.038)	
gned school		
0.211 (0.030)***	0.093 (0.044)**	
No	Yes	
	(1) 0.059 (0.024)** e 0.081 (0.029)*** igned school 0.211 (0.030)***	(1) (2) 0.059 0.053 (0.024)** (0.032) ne 0.081 0.055 (0.029)*** (0.038) igned school 0.211 0.093 (0.030)*** (0.044)**

Matched program lists	w/ group-specific score slope			w/ cubic score function
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Panel A. Take SSCE				
Assigned SHS peers	0.059 (0.024)**	0.053 (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)	
School fit			0.060 (0.088)	
Panel B. Take SSCE on til	me			
Assigned SHS peers	0.081 (0.029)***	0.055 (0.038)	0.052 (0.038)	
School fit			0.080 (0.108)	
Panel C. Take SSCE in as	signed school			
Assigned SHS peers	0.211 (0.030)***	0.093 (0.044)**	0.082 (0.042)*	
School fit			0.306 (0.113)***	
Rank of Assigned SHS Observations	No 32153	Yes 32153	Yes 32153	

Matched program lists		w/ group-spe	w/ cubic score function		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Panel A. Take SSCE					
Assigned SHS peers	0.059 (0.024)**	0.053 (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)	0.051 (0.032)	
School fit			0.060	0.075	
			(0.088)	(0.111)	
Panel B. Take SSCE on tim	e				
Assigned SHS peers	0.081	0.055	0.052	0.053	
	(0.029)***	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	
School fit			0.080	0.149	
			(0.108)	(0.145)	
Panel C. Take SSCE in assi	gned school				
Assigned SHS peers	0.211	0.093	0.082	0.087	
0	(0.030)***	(0.044)**	(0.042)*	(0.041)**	
School fit			0.306	0.457	
			(0.113)***	(0.145)***	
Rank of Assigned SHS	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	32153	32153	32153	32153	

Matched program lists		w/ group-spe		$w/\ \text{cubic}\ \text{score}\ \text{function}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Take SSCE						
Assigned SHS peers	0.059 (0.024)**	0.053 (0.032)	0.050 (0.032)	0.051 (0.032)	0.054 (0.009)***	0.032 (0.012)***
School fit			0.060 (0.088)	0.075 (0.111)		0.059 (0.047)
Panel B. Take SSCE on til	me					
Assigned SHS peers	0.081 (0.029)***	0.055 (0.038)	0.052 (0.038)	0.053 (0.038)	0.087 (0.010)***	0.052 (0.013)***
School fit			0.080 (0.108)	0.149 (0.145)		0.143 (0.060)**
Panel C. Take SSCE in as	signed school					
Assigned SHS peers	0.211 (0.030)***	0.093 (0.044)**	0.082 (0.042)*	0.087 (0.041)**	0.200 (0.012)***	0.092 (0.014)***
School fit			0.306 (0.113)***	0.457 (0.145)***		0.462 (0.063)***
Rank of Assigned SHS Observations	No 32153	Yes 32153	Yes 32153	Yes 32153	No 32153	Yes 32153


School Fit

Matched program lists	v	v/ group-spec	$w/\ \text{cubic}\ \text{score}\ \text{function}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel D. SSCE passes						
Assigned SHS peers	0.013 (0.064)	0.076 (0.102)	0.076 (0.103)	0.076 (0.102)	0.034 (0.025)	0.084 (0.034)**
School fit			0.003 (0.267)	-0.022 (0.348)		-0.145 (0.141)
Rank of Assigned SHS R ²	No 0.799	Yes 0.799	Yes 0.799	Yes 0.799	No 0.492	Yes 0.492
Observations	20941	20941	20941	20941	20941	20941
Panel E. SSCE score						
Assigned SHS peers	-0.003 (0.065)	-0.017 (0.097)	-0.013 (0.097)	-0.010 (0.094)	0.055 (0.024)**	0.128 (0.030)***
School fit			-0.089 (0.235)	-0.448 (0.287)		-0.405 (0.121)***
Rank of Assigned SHS	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.884	0.884	0.884	0.885	0.709	0.710
Observations	20941	20941	20941	20941	20941	20941

Alternative Identification Strategy


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Regression Discontinuity Design: First Stage




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Effects: School Retention




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Effects: SSCE Performance




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Implications of Moving: School Completion



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Implications of Moving: SSCE Performance



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Summary of Additional Results

- Similar results using alternative approaches
- Schools have much larger effects on student retention than on exam performance

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 Negative correlation between switching schools and exam performance

Conclusions

- Prioritizing school quality over school fit maximizes gains in student performance
- Implications:
 - 1. Information emphasizing school quality over other attributes might better enable families to reap the academic benefits of school choice programs
 - 2. Public education investments more likely to raise student performance by expanding access to high quality schools instead of expanding range of attributes of available schools

Limitations: cannot observe nonacademic outcomes

Appendix

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Context: Merit-based assignment

Deferred acceptance algorithm

- 1. All students apply to first choice
 - Schools conditionally accept highest scorers, reject others
- 2. Rejected students apply to second choice
 - Schools consider all applicants (conditionally accepted and new) and conditionally accept highest scorers, reject others
- 3. Rejected students apply to next choice on their list
- 4. Algorithm stops when students have exhausted their choices
- 5. Unsuccessful applicants assigned to undersubscribed programs

Student Characteristics

	Analysis sample		Matched applicants same school list		Matched applicants same program list	
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation
Student Characteristics						
Age	16.633	1.727	16.577	1.714	16.533	1.727
Male	0.592		0.585		0.598	
JHS Public	0.751		0.743		0.730	
Standardized BECE score	0.011	1.005	0.083	1.025	0.195	1.055
Mean BECE of JHS peers	0.004	0.780	0.053	0.797	0.116	0.818
Mean BECE of assigned SHS peers	0.016	0.857	0.089	0.885	0.155	0.921
Admission Outcomes						
First choice program	0.306		0.297		0.299	
Second choice program	0.206		0.207		0.210	
Third choice program	0.261		0.266		0.275	
Administrative assignment	0.227		0.230		0.217	
Secondary School Performance						
Take SSCE	0.725		0.738		0.750	
Take SSCE in three years	0.549		0.568		0.589	
Take SSCE in assigned school	0.441		0.464		0.488	
SSCE core subjects passed	2.080	1.604	2.138	1.597	2.205	1.592
Standardized SSCE score	0.012	1.016	0.059	1.031	0.134	1.066
Selectivity Range within Matched Sets						
Range in schools applied to			0.999	0.502	0.961	0.464
Range in schools admitted to			1.297	0.911	0.786	0.793
Ν	139073		94918		32153	

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School Characteristics

	Available schools		All students		SSCE takers			
	Un- weighted (1)	Weight by vacancies (2)	1st choice school (3)	Assigned school (4)	1st choice school (5)	Assigned school (6)	SSCE school (7)	
Private	0.188	0.063	0.001	0.065	0.001	0.056	0.078	
Single sex	0.090	0.111	0.253	0.111	0.282	0.130	0.138	
Colonial	0.052	0.102	0.250	0.104	0.273	0.122	0.127	
Christian	0.208	0.188	0.238	0.191	0.251	0.201	0.210	
Boarding	0.525	0.634	0.867	0.640	0.882	0.667	0.673	
Small	0.532	0.249	0.056	0.238	0.049	0.208	0.224	
Specialized	0.457	0.214	0.104	0.212	0.102	0.195	0.209	
JHS region			0.773	0.790	0.764	0.781	0.628	
JHS district			0.448	0.419	0.441	0.421	0.342	
N	648	537	139073	139073	100240	100240	100240	

3: School Fit

$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + f(BECE_i) + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta \mathbf{Z}_i + \phi_r + \theta Fit_s + v_{is}$$

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- ϕ_r : fixed effect for student's ranking of assigned school
- ► *Fit_s*: similarity between student's assigned school and:
 - 1. First choice school
 - 2. Application portfolio

3: School Fit

A. Similarity to first choice:

$$Fit_s = \frac{1}{C}\sum_{c}^{C}\mathbb{1}(c_s = c_1)$$

Does student's assigned school s have the same characteristic c as her first choice school (c_s = c₁)?

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Fit_s ranges from 0 to 1

3: School Fit

B. Similarity to portfolio:

$$Fit_{s}^{'} = \frac{1}{C}\sum_{c=1}^{C} \left[(\mathbb{1}(c_{s}=1) \times \mathbb{1}(c_{p}=3)) + (\mathbb{1}(c_{s}=0) \times \mathbb{1}(c_{p}=0)) \right]$$

- ► Was student assigned to a given type of school (c_s = 1) she listed for all three choices in her portfolio p? OR
- ► Was student not assigned a type of school (c_s = 0), she didn't list for any of her choices (c_p = 0)?

Fit[']_s ranges from 0 to 1

Regression Results

1.
$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + \beta BECE_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_{is}$$

2.
$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + \beta BECE_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta Z_i + \nu_{is}$$

$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + \beta_1 BECE_i + \beta_2 BECE_i^2 + \beta_3 BECE_i^3 + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta \mathbf{Z}_i + \mu_{is}$$

$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + \beta BECE_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta Z_i + \pi (BECE_i \times Z_i) + \eta_{is}$$

3.
$$Y_{is} = \alpha Q_s + f(BECE_i) + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \delta Z_i + \phi_r + \theta Fit_s + v_{is}$$

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Selection on Observables

	Basic model (1)	Control for selectivity of choices (2)	Matched school lists (3)	Matched program lists (4)	Prog. list w/ cubic score (5)	Prog. list w/ group slope (6)
Panel A. Take SSCE						
Assigned SHS peers	0.021 (0.004)***	0.019 (0.004)***	0.027 (0.005)***	0.042 (0.009)***	0.054 (0.009)***	0.059 (0.024)**
R^2	0.057	0.057	0.260	0.432	0.433	0.765
N	139073	139073	94918	32153	32153	32153
Mean Dep. Variable	0.725	0.725	0.738	0.750	0.750	0.750
Panel B. Take SSCE on	Time					
Assigned SHS peers	0.042 (0.006)***	0.045 (0.006)***	0.057 (0.006)***	0.073 (0.010)***	0.087 (0.010)***	0.081 (0.029)***
R^2	0.087	0.087	0.295	0.463	0.464	0.773
N	139073	139073	94918	32153	32153	32153
Mean Dep. Variable	0.549	0.549	0.568	0.589	0.589	0.589
Panel C. Take SSCE in A	Assigned School	,				
Assigned SHS peers	0.121	0.140	0.165	0.185	0.200	0.211
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.030)***
R^2	0.121	0.130	0.343	0.502	0.503	0.785
N	139073	139073	94918	32153	32153	32153
Mean Dep. Variable	0.441	0.441	0.464	0.488	0.488	0.488

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of assigned SHS reported in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Selection on Observables

	Basic model (1)	Control for selectivity of choices (2)	Matched school lists (3)	Matched program lists (4)	Prog. list w/ cubic score (5)	Prog. list w/ group slope (6)
Panel D. SSCE Passes						
Assigned SHS peers	0.002 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.025)	0.034 (0.025)	0.013 (0.064)
R^2	0.126	0.127	0.336	0.490	0.492	0.799
N	100842	100842	66259	20941	20941	20941
Mean Dep. Variable	2.869	2.869	2.905	2.962	2.962	2.962
Panel E. SSCE Score						
Assigned SHS peers	0.169	0.154	0.102	0.138	0.055	-0.003
0 1	(0.020)***	(0.020)***	(0.017)***	(0.027)***	(0.024)**	(0.065)
R ²	0.405	0.406	0.575	0.697	0.709	0.884
N	100842	100842	66259	20941	20941	20941
Mean Dep. Variable	0.032	0.032	0.089	0.197	0.197	0.197

Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Validity of Selection on Observables

Is school assignment independent of observable student characteristics, after controlling for application behavior δZ_i?

	Dependent variable: Mean BECE Score of Assigned SHS Peers						
	Basic model	Control for selectivity of choices	Matched school lists	Matched program lists	Prog. list w/ cubic score	Prog. list w/ group slope	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Male	-0.014	-0.005	-0.032	-0.012	-0.010	0.008	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.005)***	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)	
Age	-0.014	-0.006	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
JHS public	-0.018	0.008	0.005	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	
	(0.008)**	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.017)	
JHS peers	0.146	0.113	0.097	0.081	0.040	0.020	
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.011)***	(0.008)***	(0.015)	
R ²	0.741	0.749	0.835	0.903	0.911	0.973	
N	139073	139073	94918	32153	32153	32153	

Notes: Regressions also include controls for individual BECE score. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

School Fit

Does student ranking of assigned school affect outcomes?

	School Retention			Exam Performance		
	Take SSCE	Take SSCE on Time	Take SSCE in Assigned School	SSCE passes	SSCE score	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Assigned SHS peers	0.053 (0.032)	0.055 (0.038)	0.093 (0.044)**	0.076 (0.102)	-0.017 (0.097	
Admitted to first choice	0.005 (0.063)	0.046 (0.074)	0.257 (0.090)***	-0.198 (0.207)	0.083 (0.167	
Admitted to second choice	0.028 (0.049)	0.073 (0.058)	0.252 (0.069)***	-0.028 (0.148)	-0.069 (0.124	
Admitted to third choice	0.033 (0.042)	0.082 (0.049)*	0.250 (0.060)***	0.002 (0.118)	-0.064 (0.105	
R ²	0.765	0.773	0.787	0.799	0.884	
Observations	32153	32153	32153	20941	20941	
Mean dep. variable	0.750	0.589	0.488	2.962	0.197	

Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Regression Discontinuity Design

Compare students on opposite sides of admission cutoffs

$$Q_{s} = \gamma 1\{BECE_{i} \ge \underline{BECE}_{p}\} + a(BECE_{i}) + \lambda_{p} + \eta_{i}$$

$$Y_{is} = \delta E(Q_{s} \mid BECE_{i}) + a(BECE_{i}) + \lambda_{p} + \mu_{i}$$

- ▶ $1\{BECE_i \ge \underline{BECE}_p\}$: indicator for scoring above admission cutoff
- ► a(BECE_i): control function for BECE scores
- λ_p : cutoff fixed effects
- Restrict sample to narrow bandwidth of binding admission cutoffs.
 Normalize cutoff scores to 0 and pool data across cutoffs (p = 257)

Identification Assumption: Students with similar scores would have had the same outcomes if there were no admission cutoffs

Robustness Checks

- Alternative functional forms for BECE scores
- Varying RD bandwidth
- Bounding estimates to correct for missing data

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