

# Leaving work behind? The impact of emigration on female labour force participation in Morocco

Anda David (AFD)

Audrey Lenoël (INED)

UNU-WIDER conference on 'Migration and Mobility - new frontiers for research and policy'



- International migration and societal change in origin country
- "Women left behind" in the "migration-development nexus"
  - Female relatives of migrants who stay in the origin communities gained more and more attention
  - Hypothesis: male emigration could lead to female empowerment in the origin household
- Growing economics literature on the impact of migration and/or remittances on the labour-market outcomes of the 'left-behind'
  - However: rarely linked to female empowerment through paid work
- Question:

How does emigration & remittances impact female activity rates in Morocco and what are the implications in terms of empowerment?

Research objectives

 Test the validity of hypotheses on the link between migration and employment patterns of women in Moroccan case

- Investigate the causes of the female labor market participation in Morocco
- Use quantitative and qualitative approaches to highlight the underlying mechanisms for the migration-labor market participation nexus

### Literature

- Labor substitution effect of emigration (Taylor, 1984; Sorensen, 2004)
- Impact of remittances on reservation wage (Acosta, 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006; Lokshin & Glinkskaya, 2009; Mendola & Carletto, 2012)
- Remittances lift budget constraints for the hiring of agricultural workers (Steinmann, 1993; Sorensen, 2004)

Literature

### However...

- The gender division of work is rather rigid in the MENA region (Binzel & Assaad, 2011)
- Resilient cultural norms (Louhichi, 1997; Menjivar & Agadjanian, 2007)

### Moroccan context

# Migration

- International migratory movements have long been a salient phenomenon for Morocco's economy and society
- 20 to 50% of households in the Rif mountains, the Souss and the southern oases have at least one member abroad (De Haas, 2006)
- Without remittances, poverty would go up by more than 4 percentage points (Soudi & Teto, 2003)

### Moroccan context

Women in the Moroccan labor market

- Female economic activity rate went from 12.6% in 1971 to 27.1% in 2007.
- Remains lows despite investments in human capital, increased levels of female educational attainment and delayed age of first marriage.
- Actively employed women are mainly unpaid family workers (76%).
- Socio-cultural factors are important in explaining the low levels of female employment (Belarbi, 2013).

# Methodology and data

Explanatory mixed-methods approach (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011)

### **Quantitative data**

- 2006-2007 Morocco Living Standard Measurement Survey
- Around 7 000 households and 36 000 individuals
- Aprox. 12 000 women between 15 and 60 years old

### Qualitative data

- 12 in-depth interviews conducted with women living in international migrant households
- Rural area of Anti-Atlas mountains in Southern Morocco (Souss-Massa Draa region)

# **Descriptive statistics**

# Household level

	Type 1 households (No IM-No rem)	Type 2 households (IM- No rem)	Type 3 households (IM- Rem)	Total
Percentage	86.3%	2.5%	11.2%	100.0%
Percentage of female HoH	14.5%	17.1%	32.3%	16.6%
Monthly expenditure (dirham)	54 763.15	107 853.1	71 263.49	57 930
Number of employed	1.9	2.0	1.4	1.8
Number of unemployed	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3
Number of income earners	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.3
Percentage of households having a production unit	21.0%	22.6%	19.7%	20.9%
Maximum level of education				
Pre-school or no education	11.4%	4.4%	12.9%	11.4%
Primary	52.4%	33.0%	43.2%	50.9%
Secondary 1st cycle	17.1%	23.7%	23.5%	18.0%
Secondary 2nd cycle	10.0%	19.0%	13.1%	10.6%
Higher education	9.1%	19.9%	7.3%	9.2%

# **Descriptive statistics**

Differences between women living in different types of households according to migratory status

	Type 1 households	Type 2 households	Type 3 households	
	(No IM-No rem)	(IM-No rem)	(IM-Rem)	
Rural area	0.45	-0.03*	-0.25***	
Literacy	0.45	0.09***	-0.05	
Age	34.34	1.27**	8.91***	
Living with mother-in-law	0.1	0.06***	-0.07***	
Marital status				
Single	0.36	0.10***	-0.27***	
Married	0.55	-0.8***	-0.04	
Divorced	0.03	0.01*	0.08***	
Widow	0.05	-0.03***	0.22***	
Labor market outcomes				
Having a Production unit	0.0147	0.001	0.037**	
Labour market participation	0.39	-0.06***	-0.13***	
Occupational status				
Unemployed (never worked)	0.04	-0.002	-0.02***	
Wage work	0.13	-0.03***	-0.01	
Self-employed	0.05	-0.02***	0.04*	
Family worker	0.17	-0.004	-0.13***	
Inactive	0.61	0.06***	0.13***	

# **Empirical strategy**

### First model: determinants of labor market participation

$$LM_i = \propto_1 + \propto_2 Migrant_i + \alpha_3 Remittances + \propto_n X_{i,n} + \varepsilon_i$$

### Second model: separate regressions on:

- the probability of being an unpaid family worker
- the probability of having an income generating activity

### Instrumental approach:

- Migration → historical regional intensity of emigration
- Remittances → remittance norm at the village level (Taylor, 2003)

**Results**Labor market participation

			First	First stage		
	OLS	2SLS	Migration	Remittances		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
HH has an international migrant	-0.00	1.21**				
	(0.06)	(0.58)				
Remittances	0.00*	-0.03**				
	(0.00)	(0.02)				
Dummy married	-0.98***	-0.21***	-0.04***	-0.56***		
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.15)		
Nb of children under 6 years	-0.09***	-0.02***	-0.00	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.07)		
HH has livestock	0.34***	0.08***	0.01	-0.13		
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.24)		
HH has a production unit	-0.21***	-0.08***	0.01*	-0.29**		
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.14)		
Lives with parents-in-law	-0.06	-0.06*	0.07***	0.99***		
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.21)		
Consumption expenditure per person	-0.06***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.57***		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.05)		
Historical emigration intensity			0.01***	0.01		
			(0.00)	(0.10)		
Remittance norm			0.00***	0.02***		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Constant	-5.22***	-0.67***	-0.07	-0.59		
	(0.44)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(1.07)		
Region controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
F-stat			53.2	54.4		
Observations	12,251	12,251	12,251	12,251		

**Results**Labor market participation


			First	First stage		
	OLS	2SLS	Migration	Remittances		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
HH has an international migrant	-0.00	1.21**				
	(0.06)	(0.58)				
Remittances	0.00*	-0.03**				
	(0.00)	(0.02)				
Dummy married	-0.98***	-0.21***	-0.04***	-0.56***		
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.15)		
Nb of children under 6 years	-0.09***	-0.02***	-0.00	0.04		
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.07)		
HH has livestock	0.34***	0.08***	0.01	-0.13		
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.24)		
HH has a production unit	-0.21***	-0.08***	0.01*	-0.29**		
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.14)		
Lives with parents-in-law	-0.06	-0.06*	0.07***	0.99***		
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.21)		
Consumption expenditure per person	-0.06***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.57***		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.05)		
Historical emigration intensity			0.01***	0.01		
			(0.00)	(0.10)		
Remittance norm			0.00***	0.02***		
			(0.00)	(0.00)		
Constant	-5.22***	-0.67***	-0.07	-0.59		
	(0.44)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(1.07)		
Region controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
F-stat			53.2	54.4		
Observations	12,251	12,251	12,251	12,251		

**Results**Determinants of specific labor market outcomes

	Unpaid family workers		Income-generating activity		
	OLS 2SLS		OLS	2SLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
HH has an international migrant	-0.02*	1.83*	-0.05***	0.33	
	(0.01)	(1.09)	(0.01)	(0.60)	
Remittances	0.00	-0.06**	-0.00	-0.02	
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.02)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observ ations	10,036	10,036	9,875	9,875	

### **Results**

Probability of participating in the labor market for each age category and average age at the time of marriage



### **Robustness checks**

Potentially endogenous controls

Households with migrants and without remittances

# Potentially endogenous controls

Correlations between variables of interest and potentially endogenous controls

	International mig	ırant	Remittances		
	Pearson correlation coefficient	Spearman rho	Pearson correlation coefficient	Spearman rho	
Consumption expenditure per person	0,123	0,174	0,122	0,162	
HH has an internal migrant	0,058	0,058	-0,009	-0,018	
Number of children under 6 years	-0,045	-0,064	-0,025	-0,036	
HH has livestock	-0,019	-0,019	-0,04	-0,053	

# Potentially endogenous controls

Coefficients of variables of interest in the model with and without potentially endogenous control variables

	Labour market participation		Unpaid family worker		Income-generating activity	
	All controls	Only exogenous controls	All controls	Only exogenous controls	All controls	Only exogenous controls
HH has an international migrant	1.21**	1.33**	1.83*	2.63**	0.33	0.06
	(0.58)	(0.54)	(1.09)	(1.17)	(0.60)	(0.53)
Remittances	-0.03**	-0.04***	-0.06**	-0.09**	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)

# Households with migrants and without remittances

Results for the sub-sample of households without student migrants

	Labour market participation	Unpaid family worker	Income-generating activity
HH has an international migrant	1.25**	1.73*	0.29
	(0.59)	(0.98)	(0.60)
Remittances	-0.03**	-0.06**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
All controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Case study findings

# Channels at play

- Social pressure to maintain a certain social status.
- A woman's engagement in paid-work is likely to be interpreted as a sign of her husband's inability to provide for the family.
- Additional workload taken up by women in non-migrant or internal migrant households.
- Animal husbandry appears as an enduring practice in international migration households.
  - → a form of a personal safety net

# Case study findings

The importance of the who is the remittance-receiver

"Every time I asked him [the brother-in-law] for money - if I needed to buy something, like clothes for example - he would always say no and would reply "Wait for the idiot you married. When he'll come, he'll buy you everything you want. He received the money from my husband but he would not give me any." (Leila, 59)

 The importance of income-generating activities for women's status

"I would like to work because when you earn your own money, you can buy whatever you want, like clothes, clothes for you and for your children.[...] Even if they don't have anything, they are proud, and they prefer their women to stay at home" (Rokia, 31)

# **Concluding remarks**

- Migration labor supply compensation effect
- Remittances spare women from having to resort to the least attractive and low paid jobs locally available.
- Unpaid family worker labor supply driven
   →Impacted by migration
- Income-generating activity labor demand driven
   →Not impacted by migration
- International migration is unlikely to play a role in women's empowerment in Morocco.

# **THANK YOU!**

#WorldInCommon