# Eliciting Individual Preferences for Immigrants in the Dominican Republic 

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## 1. Motivation

- Increasing focus on south-south migration.
- Developing countries play a relevant role:
- Over 35\% of the stock of immigrants are in developing countries
- Over the last decade, the immigration flows among emerging economies have growth at a faster pace than those from emerging to advance economies.
- This trend is likely to grow further, exposing poor countries to a population influx for which they are unprepared, risking political and social turbulence.
- Increasing negative public opinion toward immigrants (similar to those observed in advanced economies)


## 2. Literature

- If literature suggests that immigration increases net social welfare, why such a negative view?
- Hypothesis:
- Economic Factors (e.g. labor market competition; fiscal weight)
- Non-Economic Factors (e.g. norm adherence, religious beliefs, language, ethnicity)
- Broadly two types of literature:
- Studies on natives' attitudes on immigration based on public opinion surveys.
- Studies on natives' attitudes on immigrants based on conjoint analysis.


## 3. Question 8 Contribution

- Which immigrant profile is supported for admission into the country?
- Probably the first application of choice experiments (CE) for immigration in a developing country:
- Do previous findings hold for developing countries? (i.e. Do Dominicans perceive foreigners the same way that Americans?)
- A greater number of immigrant' attributes are evaluated.
- The model allows for heterogeneous preferences among respondents, as well as, for the examination of its drivers.
- Two types of CE are implemented to examine the effects of different decision settings (i.e.'forced choice', and 'with neither option')


## 3. Methodology - Choice Experiments

- Characteristics of CE:
- Two types of choice situations (CS): Forced Choice; and Neither Option
- 3 immigrant profiles per CS and 3 CS per respondent. Only one candidate can be choose by CS.
- Each "profile or candidate" has 10 attributes
- CS were unlabeled, and order of attributes within each CS were randomly sorted
- Efficient design based on a MNL. I generated a design with 600 profiles grouped into three profiles per choice set and three choice sets per respondent.


## Example of Choice Situation

| Attributes | Candidate A | Candidate B | Candidate C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Work experience | More than 5 y | Between 1-2 y | Less than 1 y |
| Gender | Women | Women | Women |
| Reasons for application | Search of employment | Family reunification | Family reunification |
| Profession | No profession | No profession | Nurse |
| Language | Fluent Spanish | Does not speak Spanish | Broken Spanish |
| Education | No formal education | Complete bachelor | Technical education |
| Migratory status | Tourist visa | Illegal | In country of origin |
| Religion | Non-determine | Catholic | Protestant |
| Country | USA | Haiti | Italy |
| Age | $26-35$ y | 46-55 y | $36-45$ y |

Or None of them (D)

## 3. Methodology

- RUM:

$$
\begin{gathered}
U_{i, s, j}=X_{s, j}^{\prime} \alpha_{i}+\varepsilon_{i, s, j} \\
\alpha_{i, k}=\alpha_{0}+W_{i} \beta_{k}+u_{i k} \quad, \text { for the } k \text { attribute }
\end{gathered}
$$

- Assumed decision rule:

$$
Y_{i, j}=\left\{\begin{array}{rr}
1, & U_{i, j}>U_{i, g} \text { for all } j \neq g \\
0, & \text { otherwise }
\end{array}\right.
$$

- Implies a probability such that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
P\left(Y_{i s j}=1 \mid \alpha\right) & =P\left[U_{i s j}>U_{i s g}\right] \\
& =P\left[\varepsilon_{i s j}-\varepsilon_{i s g}<\left(X_{s j}^{\prime}-X_{s g}^{\prime}\right) \alpha\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

- Assuming $\varepsilon$ is EV-I:

Random sample of 2,479 respondents in 7 cities of the Dominican Republic.

| Variables | Forced Choice |  | With Neither Option |  | Mean test |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mean | SE | Mean | SE | Diff. |
| Per capita household income, US\$ | 185 | 2.28 | 182 | 2.00 | 2.85 |
| Gender (female=1) | 0.71 | 0.00 | 0.69 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Age | 48.6 | 0.1 | 48.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Schooling | 8.33 | 0.04 | 8.42 | 0.04 | -0.09 |
| Employment status | 0.59 | 0.00 | 0.60 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| Household size | 3.67 | 0.01 | 3.71 | 0.01 | -0.04 |
| 1 if profile is admitted | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.00 | 0.083*** |
| 1 if father born in DR | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.99 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| \# Respondents | 1,230 |  | 1,249 |  | 2,479 |

Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, 10 percent level.

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|  | Forced Choice |  |  | With neither option |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\alpha^{\prime} s$ | p-SD | $\beta^{\prime} s(e d u c)$ | $\alpha^{\prime} s$ | p-SD | $\beta^{\prime} s(e d u c)$ |
| Education level | .147** | *** | 0.00202 | .153** | *** | -0.001 |
| Gender | 0.06795 |  |  | 0.064 |  |  |
| Age range | -.053** |  |  | -.090*** |  |  |
| Labor experience | 0.037 |  |  | .079** |  |  |
| Language | -. 136 *** |  |  | -. 215 *** |  |  |
| China | 0.292 | *** | -.081** | -0.463 | *** | 0.016 |
| Spain | 1.403*** |  | -.117*** | 0.442 |  | 0.024 |
| Haiti | -1.030*** | *** | -0.028 | $-1.756^{* *}$ | *** | 0.019 |
| O Japan | 0.405 |  | -.066* | -0.328 | *** | 0.028 |
| $\geq$ Ecuador | -0.073 |  | -0.014 | -0.472 |  | -0.004 |
| $\stackrel{\text { ¢ }}{\substack{\text { c }}}$ | 0.145 |  | -0.051 | -.902* |  | 0.033 |
| $\bigcirc$ Oeru | 0.532 |  | -0.066 | 0.083 |  | -0.030 |
| Italia | .820** | *** | -.092*** | 0.163 | *** | -0.010 |
| USA | 1.521*** | *** | -.110*** | .809** | *** | -0.002 |
| Religion: Protestant | -. $447^{* * *}$ |  | 0.001 | -0.143 | *** | -0.020 |
| Non-determine | -.609*** | ** | 0.024 | -.346** | *** | -0.013 |
| Reason of applic. (seek a job) | -.216* |  | 0.011 | -0.227 | ** | 0.015 |
| Without profession | -0.293 | *** | -0.014 | -. 410 * | *** | -0.019 |
| $\bigcirc$ Nurse | .932*** |  | -0.031 | .826*** |  | -0.022 |
| $\cdots$ Professor | .871*** | ** | 0.002 | 1.055*** |  | 0.013 |
| OTS Scientific | 1.289*** | ** | -0.038 | 1.245*** |  | -0.019 |
| - Medical doctor | 1.304*** | ** | 0.007 | 1.958*** |  | -0.031 |
| Entrepreneur | .923*** | *** | 0.006 | 1.190*** | *** | -0.006 |
| Legal status: In RD w/ tourist visa | -0.157 |  | 0.012 | -0.291 | * | 0.029 |
| In RD illegally | -0.217 | *** | -0.010 | -0.171 | *** | -0.003 |
| McFadden Pseudo R-squared |  | 0.149 |  |  | 0.239 |  |

## Heterogeneity in Preferences that Doesn't Depend on Income of the Residents

## Distribution of Coefficients for Country of Origin <br> by Income Levels of the Respondents

Forced Choice


With Neither Option


Richest

## Preferred Immigrant Attributes by Dominicans



Note: Excludes gender, immigrant legal status, and reason for applying to the country.

## Immigrant Profiles: Who Meet the Cut?



## Differences Persist Across Educational Levels

Probability of Admission by Educ. Level and Country of Origin of the Immigrant


## Distribution of Probability of Admission



Note: Kernel density estimates of individual probability of admission to the country.

## Conclusions

- Some results are aligned with previous literature. E.g. Education, occupation, language, and country of origin affect the support for admission.
- Other results don't:
- Immigrant status seems not to be determinant.
- Premium/penalty for some countries seems to persist.
- Preferences are heterogenous and accounting for it improves the performance of the model. However, it seems not to be explained by observable factors, suggesting that most of the heterogeneity is idiosyncratic.
- The choice setting (with/without outside option) matters. Further, the CE with neither option increases the fit of the model.

