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# PREFERENCE FOR BOYS, FAMILY SIZE AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN INDIA 

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#### Abstract

Using data from nationally representative household surveys, we test whether Indian parents make trade-offs between the number of children and investments in education and health of their children. To address the endogeneity due to the joint determination of quantity and quality of children by parents, we instrument family size with the gender of the first child which is plausibly random. Given a strong son-preference in India, parents tend to have more children if the first born is a girl. Our IV results show that children from larger families have lower educational attainment and are less likely to have ever been enrolled and to be currently enrolled in school, even after controlling for parents' characteristics and birth-order of children. The effects are larger for rural, poorer and low-caste families and for families with less educated mothers. However, we find no evidence of a trade-off for health outcomes.


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## 1. Introduction

High population growth has long been considered a potential deterrent for economic growth and development because it reduces savings and generates overuse of scarce resources. By contrast, human capital accumulation is considered one of the main determinants of income growth. An educated and healthy population is essential for the production of more sophisticated goods and a key determinant of technical change in the economy. At the household level, family size and human capital also move in opposite directions; a larger family has less resources to devote to each child's education and health. That is, resource-constrained households may face a quantity-quality trade-off in terms of their child-rearing decisions (Becker and Lewis 1973). ${ }^{3}$

In this paper, we test the empirical validity of a children quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off in India. Testing the Q-Q trade-off in the Indian context is interesting because QQ trade-offs are likely to affect additional margins of education and are likely to be stronger in resource-constrained households in developing countries. In addition, we are able to exploit the cultural phenomenon of "son preference" in India as a natural experiment to examine the causal effect of the quantity of children on the investments that parents make on their children. By contrast, in high income countries, the preference for gender balance among children is often used as an exogenous source of variation for family size.

Finally, the Indian context is important in its own right if one is trying to understand low human capital investments in one of the most populous countries in the world. Today, India is the second most populous country in the world with over 1.2 billion people, and it

[^0]is projected to become the most populous country in the world by 2025. Population growth in India has been high over the last few decades and continues at $1.4 \%$. Its fertility rate is still above replacement levels with 2.5 children born per woman. Yet, many children in India lack access to a good education and health services. According to the 2011 Indian Census, the literacy rate (age 7 and above) is $73 \%$, meaning that India is home to about 330 million illiterates. The school drop-out rate is alarming as over 80 million children failed to complete the full cycle of elementary school in 2011 (IHDR, 2011). Furthermore, an estimated $30 \%$ of the world's malnourished children live in India. The recent HUNGaMA report (2011) found that $42 \%$ of children are underweight and 59 per cent are stunted by the age of 24 months. The United Nations estimates that 2.1 million Indian children die before reaching the age of five every year. Thus, against this background, it is important to quantify the extent to which households make Q-Q trade-offs to understand if family planning or other policy initiatives that reduce the number of children could also encourage increased human capital investments by parents.

Empirical testing of the Q-Q trade-off is challenging because fertility decisions and investments in children are jointly determined and depend on common factors (Browning 1992; Haveman and Wolfe 1995). For example, more educated parents may choose to have fewer children, but the children of more educated parents are likely to receive more education themselves. Even if a researcher controls for observable parental characteristics, parental preferences and other unobservable household characteristics may affect both the number of children and investments in children. For example, parents who are more concerned about future opportunities for their children may choose to have fewer children and also spend more time and educational resources to educate each child. Omitted variable
bias of this type will tend to exaggerate the negative relation between family size and human capital investments.

To address this concern, we employ an Instrumenal Variable strategy (IV) and use the gender of the first child to instrument family size. A key identification assumption is that the gender of the first child is a good predictor of the number of children and in the absence of sex-selective abortion, the gender of the child is random. The preference for male children in India means that when a household has a first born who is a girl, parents will continue to have more children until they have a boy. Thus, in a son-biased society, the first child's sex should be a good predictor of the probability of having a second child or of the total number of children in the household. Son preferences are indeed widely documented in countries such as India, China, and Korea and this preference is deeply rooted in social, economic and cultural factors (Pande and Astone, 2007).

The other key identification assumption is that the gender of the first-born does not have an independent impact on the educational performance or health of subsequent children in the household. There is, indeed, little evidence that households who have a firstborn who is a female are different in other ways from those who have a first-born male. However, one reason why the gender of the first-born may be related to educational performance for reasons other than family size is if selective abortions are likely to reduce the chances of having a first-born who is a girl. Several studies find no evidence of selective abortions for the first-birth in India, which means that this is unlikely to be a concern in our study.

We use the District Level Household Survey (DLHS-3) from 2007-08 to examine the impact on educational outcomes and the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) from 2005-06 to examine the impact of family size on weight and height of young children. Our

Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results show negative correlations between family size, school attendance and years of schooling. While our regressions control for a large number of children and parental characteristics, there could be unobservable factors related to both household size and investment in children. We instrument family size by gender of the first born to address the endogeneity of family size. First-stage results show that having a firstborn who is a female is strongly positively correlated with family size; Anderson-Rubin and Stock-Wright tests of weak instruments are all rejected.

The IV results show that an extra child in the family reduces schooling by 0.1 years and reduces the probability of ever attending or being enrolled in school by between 1 and 2 percentage points, respectively. We also find interesting heterogeneous effects. We find larger effects for rural, poor, and low-caste households as well as for households with illiterate mothers. The impacts of an extra child in terms of reducing enrollment and attendance double and the impact of an extra child on years of schooling increase fourfold for illiterate and poor mothers, suggesting much larger gains from reducing family size in disadvantaged households. On the other hand, our IV estimates of the impacts of family size on health outcomes, including, height, weight, height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-height, malnutrition and stunting show no significant effects. The impact on education but not on health of children may be due to differences between the public education and health care systems in India. The public education system is poor and dysfunctional, while the Indian health care system is designed to provide basic health support even to poor families; households may also find alternative ways to gain access to health services outside of the formal health care system.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 includes a review of the literature and highlight the contribution of our paper. In Section 3, we present the empirical
strategy for the Q-Q trade-off analysis, and Section 4 describes the data. In Sections 5 and 6, we present average and heterogenous effects of family size on education results. The effects of family size on health are discussed in Section 7, and we conclude in Section 8.

## 2. Literature Review

Since Becker and Lewis developed the quantity-quality model, a number of studies have tried to quantify the magnitude of the Q-Q trade off. These studies address the endogeneity of family size by taking advantage of exogenous variation in policy experiments (e.g., the one-child policy in China, forced sterilization in India), natural occurrences of twin births, and sibling sex composition. While the original causal test of the Q-Q trade-off was conducted using data from India in the 1980s, there has been renewed attention on this topic in developed and developing countries over the last decade.

Twins have been the most commonly used instrument to study the Q-Q trade-off in high-income countries, including the U.S., France, Israel, the Netherlands, and Norway. Black et al. (2005) use twins as an instrument for family size using Norwegian data and found no evidence that family size affects educational attainment of children, after controlling for birth order and other potential confounding variables. Similarly, Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) use multiple births and same-sex siblings in families with two or more children as instruments for family size in Israel. They also fail to find a significant relation between family size and schooling and employment, but they do find an effect on women's early marriage. Haan (2010) concludes that having more children in the family does not have a significant effect on the educational attainment of the oldest child either in the U.S. or in the Netherlands. However, a few studies in developed countries did find evidence of a Q-Q trade-off. Using the Public Use Microdata Sample from the U.S. Census and gender composition of the first two children as an instrument, Conley and Glauber
(2006) demonstrate that children living in larger families are less likely to attend private school and are more likely to fall behind in school. Similarly, Caceres-Delpiano (2006) finds that an additional younger sibling in the family reduces the likelihood that older children attend private school, reduces mother's participation in the labor market, and increases the likelihood of their parents' divorce in the U.S. In contrast, the impact of family size on measures of child well-being such as highest grade completed and grade retention is weak and unclear in this study. In a recent working paper, Juhn et al. (2013) instead use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data to examine the impact of family size on cognitive and non-cognitive abilities during youth as well as long-term outcomes for the U.S. This study shows that growing up with an additional sibling reduces a child's educational attainment by a third of a year; a larger family size decreases labor market participation and family income, but increases the likelihood of criminal behavior and teenage pregnancies. A similar study in France also supports Q-Q trade-offs; the school performance of children from large families was worse than children with smaller families (Goux and Maurin, 2005). Finally, using marital fecundability-as measured by the time interval from the marriage to the first birth - as a source of exogenous variation in family size, Klemp and Weisdorf (2011) document a large and significantly negative effect of family size on children's literacy in the UK.

Small or no effects of family size on education and other human capital investments in developed countries may be caused by the presence of a well-functioning public education system, which may substitute for private education and may still allow parents to provide a good education (Li et al., 2008). By contrast, child labor practices and the absence of good public education may make this trade-off more pronounced in developing countries, where parental investments in education are a substantial part of a family's
budget.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) were the first to examine the empirical validity of Becker-Lewis's Q-Q trade-off model in a developing country context. They exploited twins as an exogenous increase in the family size and found a weak negative effect of family size on educational attainment as well as on consumption durables for non-twin children. However, the study was based on a small non-representative sample of 1,633 households that only included 25 households with twins.

In recent years, the Q-Q literature has attained prominence in developing countries due to bigger families, lower capital investments and failure of family planning policies in many developing countries. In China, the evidence on Q-Q trade-off is mixed (Li et al., 2008; Qian, 2009; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). Li et al. (2008) use data from the $1 \%$ sample of the 1990 Chinese Census and rely on twin births as an instrument. They found that larger family size reduces a child's education even after controlling for birth order effects, especially in rural China. In contrast, Qian (2009) uses a sample of households from China's Health and Nutritional Survey and relies on the relaxation of the one-child policy to examine the impact of family size on children's human capital. She finds a positive effect of family size on education which she attributes to economies of scale. Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), who also rely on twins as an exogenous source of incease in the number of children, show that an extra child significantly decreases schooling progress, expected college enrollment, grades in school, and self-assessed health of all children in the family, thereby concluding that a Q-Q- trade-off does exist in China. However, they argue that the use of twins as instrument generates upward biases on estimates of the Q-Q trade-off because of differences in birth weight between twins and non-twins, which changes parental behavior and overall resource allocation within the household.

Studies for other developing countries that mainly rely on the twinning experiment tend to show either small or no effects. An exception is a study by Jensen (2012) that does not rely on the twinning experiment; instead infertility was used as an instrument to explore the causal effects of family size on a child's nutrition in India and found significant results only for girls. ${ }^{4}$ Millimet and Wang (2011) use mixed sex composition to identity the impact of family size on health outcomes in Indonesia and find evidence of a Q-Q trade-off only in some families. They find statistically significant results on the Q-Q trade-off only at the upper and lower tails of the BMI distribution i.e., the $20^{\text {th }}$ and $85^{\text {th }}$ percentile. Using twinning as an instrument, Ponczek and Souzay (2012) also report negative effects on educational outcomes in Brazil. Additionally, Glick et al. (2007) use twinning at first birth and find that unplanned fertility increases the nutritional status and school enrollment of later-born children in Romania. Using Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey from Bangladesh, Peters et al. (2013) found little evidence of trade-off between child quantity and health. Dang and Rogers (2013) find that larger family size constrains investments on schooling in Vietnam.

Sarin (2004) and Lee (2008) are the only other studies, aside from ours, to use preference for boys as an instrument to study Q-Q trade-off in an under-resourced country. In a working paper, Sarin (2004) finds no relationship between family size and weight-toheight ratio using sex of the first-born and multiple births as instruments for family size. ${ }^{5}$ Lee (2008) is another study that uses preference for boys as an instrument for family size.

[^1]However, instead of using direct measures of educational attainment, Lee's study uses parents' monetary investment in education to measure child's quality. Lee's IV estimates show large effects - per-child investment in households with two children and three children are 74.6 and $57.6 \%$ higher, respectively, compared to households with no children.

Our paper adds to the existing literature on Q-Q trade-off in a number of important ways. First, our study uses a credible and novel instrument, son-preference, in a developing country context combined with good measures of child quality. This is important because most studies have relied on the twinning experiment. Second, while many studies have focused on China and other regions of the developing world, this is the first study to focus on the impact of family size on educational outcomes in India since the original twinning study of the 1980s which relied on a very small sample. Not only is India host to $17 \%$ of the world's population and important in its own right, but lack of good public schools are likely to affect the extent and severity of the Q-Q trade-off in education. Third, only a handful of studies have examined the effect of family size on child health; most of the previous studies have focused on educational attainment/progress. By including health as an outcome, we contribute to the scant literature on the effect of family size on child health in a Q-Q framework.

## 3. Empirical Framework

We estimate the effect of family size on children's educational and health outcomes using OLS and 2SLS (instrumental variable) regression analyses. We first estimate the following OLS model:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{c h d}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} \text { FamilySize }_{h d}+\beta_{2} X_{c h d}+\mu_{d}+\epsilon_{c h d} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y_{\text {chd }}$ is the educational or health outcome of child $c$ in household $h$ residing in district d. The educational outcomes of the child are the probability of ever attending school, probability of being currently enrolled in school, and years of schooling. We also estimate similar regressions for several child health measures, including the height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-height and whether the person is underweight, stunted and wasted. The variable FamilySize $_{h d}$ is the number of children under 21 years of age in the family; $X_{\text {chd }}$ is a vector of covariates, and $\epsilon_{c h d}$ is an error term. $\mu_{d}$ is the district fixed-effects to adjust for fixed characteristics of the districts. The covariates include the following characteristics of children and parents: age, gender, caste, birth order and place of residence (rural vs. urban), and the age and education levels of the parents. The main coefficient of interest is $\beta_{1}$ which captures the existence of the Q-Q trade-off. A negative value of $\beta_{1}$ would mean that a trade-off between the quantity and quality of children does exist in India.
$\beta_{1}$ will provide the causal impact of family size on child quality only if family size is exogenously determined. However, there are several factors that may render the family size variable endogenous and non-random. One such factor is the fact that fertility decisions and decisions about investments in children's quality are jointly determined. In this case, the OLS estimate of $\beta_{1}$ in Equation 1 is subject to endogeneity bias and is unlikely to capture the causal effect of family size on child quality. The OLS estimates may be downwardly or upwardly biased depending on the nature of endogeneity. For example, in a country like India, wealthier households may have fewer children and also invest more in their children's schooling, thus generating an upward bias in the Q-Q trade off. However, highly committed parents may have more children and also invest more in their children's education, thus generating downward biases.

In order to capture only exogeneous variation in family size, we rely on an Instrumental Variable (IV). The challenge with any instrument is to identify a variable that predicts FamilySize but is uncorrelated with the error term in Equation 1. We use an indicator for a first-born girl (FBG) as an instrument and estimate the following two-stage least square model:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \text { FamilySize }_{h d}=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} F B G_{h d}+\alpha_{2} X_{\text {chd }}+\mu_{d}+u_{\text {chd }}  \tag{2}\\
& Y_{\text {chd }}=\pi_{0}+\pi_{1} \text { FamılySıze }_{h d}+\pi_{2} X_{\text {chd }}+\mu_{d}+v_{\text {chd }} \tag{3}
\end{align*}
$$

where $F B G$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the first-born is a female and 0 otherwise and is used as the instrument for family size. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Equation 2 is the first-stage while Equation 3 is the second-stage regression. The second stage regresses the outcomes on the predicted value of family size from Equation 2 and other exogenous variables. In addition, we estimate the 2SLS regressions for a number of sub-groups including: different castes, different levels of household wealth, and different levels of educational attainment of the mother and for urban and rural sub-samples, separately.

A key condition for the gender of the first child to be a valid instrument is that family size be highly correlated with the gender of the first child, i.e., $\operatorname{Corr}(F B G$, FamilySize $) \neq 0$. In India, there is a long-standing social and cultural norm of sonpreference for several reasons (Pande and Ashtone, 2007). First, only sons are allowed to carry forward the family legacy and name. More importantly, since India is a patriarchical society, sons inherit the family's patrimony. Second, parents also prefer male children because sons are supposed to provide financial support and care for their parents in old age.

In addition, since men are more likely to enter the labor force and earn higher wages, they further contribute to a family's preference for boys. In Indian tradition, daughters are married out and become part of another family. Because parents have to provide a dowry when daughters get married, a family will prefer to have boys so they can receive a dowry when their sons gets married. In this type of patrilineal familial system, the gender of the first-born is likely to have important implications for family size. In particular, if the first born is a girl, parents are likely to want to continue having children until a son is born. In Section 5, we test for this by estimating the first-stage relationship in Equation 2.

The second key underlying assumption behind this identification strategy is that the sex of the first born is uncorrelated with educational or health outcomes other than through family size, i.e., $\operatorname{Corr}($ FamilySize, $v)=0$. Since sex of the first child is determined by nature, this is considered a random event uncorrelated with educational attainment and health. However, if parents have any control over births, and they make decisions over births depending on sex, the sex of the first birth will not be random. Therefore, the presence of sex-selective abortion may undermine the validity of the instrument because the access to ultrasound use and abortion services allows parents to choose the sex of their children. Sexselective abortions are not as big a concern given that the Pre-natal Diagnostic Technique Act was passed in India in 1996 making fetal-sex determination illegal. In addition, many previous studies have shown that parents do not use sex-selective abortions for first-borns but only for subsequent births in India; these studies find that the sex-ratio at first birth lies within the biologically range of 1.03-1.07 (Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Jha et al., 2011;

Portner, 2015; Rosenblum, 2013 ${ }^{\text {a }} .{ }^{6}$ Using the same data as ours, Rosenblum (2013 ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) reports lack of sex-selection abortion at the first-parity. About $36 \%$ of women report induced abortions at the second and third-parities. Given that sex-selection abortion became illegal in India in 1996, zero and positive reporting of induced abortion at first and highorder, respectively, further provides confidence that sex-selection at first-parity is not rampant and gender of first-born can be treated as exogenous. Additionally, using the first two rounds of the National Family and Health Survey, Retherford and Roy (2003) report little or no evidence of sex selection at the first-birth. Jha et al. (2011) use the National Family Health Survey and find no significant declines in the sex ratio for first-births or second-order births if the first-born was a son. Sociological studies also provide evidence that parents only have a strong preference for sons after the first birth (Patel, 2007). Taken together, these studies provide evidence that sex of the first-born is indeed exogenous and random.

To further address the exogeneity of the instrument, we explore whether the instrument, $F B G$, is correlated with other observable characteristics of the household to gauge whether the sex of the first-born can also be assumed to be uncorrelated with unobservables. Results of the probability models of the sex of the first-born on a vector of explanatory variables are reported in the next section.

## 4. Data Description

For educational outcomes, we use data from the Indian District Level Household Survey (DLHS) collected in 2007-08. The sample is representative at the district level,

[^2]which is the lowest tier of administration and policy-making in India. The DLHS covers 601 districts and on average draws a random sample of 1,000-1,500 households from each district.

DLHS has four parts: a household questionnaire: a questionnaire for ever-married women (15-49 years); a questionnaire for unmarried women (15-24 years); and a module covering village and health facilities characteristics. Our study is based on the household questionnaire, which collected information on assets, number of marriages and deaths in the household since January 2004, and socio-economic characteristics of all members of the household. In particular, the survey collects the following information for each household member: age, gender, schooling attendance, and years of completed schooling. We identify individuals who are labeled sons/daughters and estimate the family size by counting the number of sons/daughters in the household, and then merge these data to the parents' information.

We restrict the sample in the following ways. First, we restrict the sample to individuals who are either parents (head of the household and spouse) or who are either sons/daughters of the head of the household. ${ }^{7}$ Second, we restrict the sample to households with at least one child so that we can use the gender of the first child as the instrument. Third, we restrict the sample to children of school-going-age who are 5 years of age or older but are under 21 . We use 5 as the lower age bound because the household roster only collects education information of all individuals older than 4. In India, primary school (grades 1 to 5 ) begins at age 5 or 6 and ends at age 10 or 11, while high school is usually completed by age 18 . However, completion of either primary or secondary schooling might

[^3]get delayed due to deferred enrollment or grade repetition. We exclude mothers over 35 years of age to minimize the possibility that adult children may have already left the household. Finally, we exclude households with missing or unreliable information on any of the variables used in the analysis. This yields a sample of 393,510 children.

The main outcome variables we analyze in this paper are different measures of educational attainment. The outcome measures include: an indicator of whether the person ever attended school or not; an indicator of whether the person is currently enrolled in school or not; and years of schooling. We control for the following covariates in all of the models: caste, religion, an asset-based standard of living index, mother's age, father's age, mother's education, and father's education. For the caste variable, we consider three groups: scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are combined together to constitute the low caste category (a group that is socially segregated and disadvantaged), other backward classes (officially identified as socially and educationally backward) are considered as middle caste, and the upper caste (comprising Brahmins and other higher castes who are privileged) are classified as high caste. We consider four major religious groups: Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians. The DLHS data does not contain information on individual or household incomes. The survey asked a multitude of questions about the ownership of assets including ownership of a car, television, real state property, and other assets. The DLHS uses ownership of assets to create a standard of living index with three categories: low, middle and high. ${ }^{8}$

[^4]Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these individual and household variables. The average age of children in the sample is 10 years and the average years of schooling is 3.08. About $49 \%$ of first born children are female. Fathers are older than mothers; the average age of mothers is 31 years and the average age of fathers is 36 . As expected, mothers have less education than fathers. The average years of schooling for mothers and fathers are 3.0 and 5.5 years, respectively. The average family size is 3.54 . Approximately $82 \%$ of children live in rural areas. About $41 \%$ of the children are from low caste and $20 \%$ are from high caste. Finally, around $49 \%$ of children have the lowest standard of living index, $39 \%$ a middle standard of living, and $12 \%$ the highest standard of living.

For health outcomes, we use the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) from 200506. NFHS is India's primary and only source of data on health and nutrition. Women between the age of 15-49 were sampled and interviewed to collect anthropometric data for their children who were under 5 years of age at the time of the survey. The survey collects anthropometric data for children present in the household at the time of the interview. Therefore, for analyzing health outcomes, we are constrained to use households where the oldest child is at most 5 years old at the time of the survey. In particular the survey collects information on height and weight of the children. Using these anthropometric information, the NFHS also reports height-for-age z-score, weight-for-age z-score, and weight-forheight z -score based on World Health Organization guidelines.

We analyze several health outcomes such as weight in kilograms, height in centimeters, height-for-age z-score (haz), weight-for-age z-score (waz), and weight-forheight z -score (wfh). In addition, we examine the impact of family size on the probability of being of underweight (waz $<-2$ s.d.), on the probability of stunting (haz $<-2$ s.d.), and on the probability of the child being wasted (wfh $<-2$ s.d.). We use the same set of controls
as used in the analysis of educational outcomes. The only difference in the econometric specification is that instead of district fixed-effects, we include state fixed-effects since, unlike the DLHS, the NFHS does not provide district information.

Our health sample is comprised of 10,090 children with non-missing data on height and weight. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the health analytical sample. The average age of children in the sample is 28 months. The average weight-for-age $z$-score and height-for-age $z$-score are -1.63 and -1.47 , respectively. Z -scores of minus one and plus one indicate that a child is one standard deviation below and above the median of the reference population, respectively. About $39 \%$ of sampled children are underweight and $35 \%$ of them are stunted. The percentage of wasted children is $15 \%$. A majority of the children live in rural areas (61\%) and the average family size is 2.17 .

Table 3 reports the results of linear probability and probit models of the likelihood that the first-born is a girl on the characteristics as reported in Table 1 to investigate whether the instrument is likely to be exogeneous. Table 3 shows that most of the explanatory variables are statistically insignificant except for mother's age. The older the mother is, the higher the probability is that the first-born will be a girl. Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, given that about $49 \%$ of first-born are female indicating that the sex-ratio at first-birth is in the biological range coupled with the results in Table 3, it is reasonable to argue that the gender of the first-born is likely exogenous.

## 5. Effects of Family Size on Educational Attainment

The outcome variables in this study include a set of indicators of educational attainment or educational progress. These include: (a) ever attended school; (b) current school enrollment; and (c) years of schooling for those who ever attended school. Except for years of completed schooling, all other variables are binary and are coded as 1 or 0 . The
main independent variable, household size, is continuous and is measured by the total number of 0-20 years old children in the family at the time of the survey.

### 5.1. OLS and IV Impacts of Family Size on Schooling

Table 4 reports the results from the OLS regression. Columns 1-3 report results that only control for district fixed-effects to account for time-invariant district characteristics. Columns 4-6 report results with children's controls, and columns 7-9 report results controlling also for parents' characteristics. These results highlight the importance of controlling for parental characteristics. The magnitude of the estimates of Q-Q coefficient is bigger when district fixed effects and children's controls are included but parental controls are excluded. Adding parental controls in columns 7-9 reduces the coefficient of family size for all three educational outcomes. The coeffient on ever attended school falls from -0.022 to -0.018 ; the coefficient on years of schooling falls from -0.229 to -0.202 ; and the coefficient on current enrollment falls from -0.016 to -0.014 . These results thus imply that children in families with one additional child are 1.8 percentage points less likely to have ever attended school, and the likelihood that they are currently enrolled in school is 1.4 percentage points lower. For years of schooling, the point estimate is -0.2 , suggesting that on average children in families with 5 more siblings will end up with a a year less of schooling.

Recognizing the limitation of interpreting the OLS estimates in Table 4 as causal, we then proceed to instrument the main endogenous variable, family size, by an indicator for the first born being a girl, and then estimate the same relationship using 2SLS. We first check for the relevance condition in Table 5. From the first-stage regression, it follows that the instrument is highly significant and has a positive effect on family size. The first row in

Table 5 shows that family size increases by 0.22 children when the first-born is a girl and the effect is significant at $1 \%$ level of significance. ${ }^{9}$

The second row in Table 5 presents results from the estimation of the 2SLS model. The IV results presented in Table 5 show a negative and significant impact of family size on children's quality. The IV estimates for ever being in school and current enrollment are negative and statistically significant confirming that the detrimental effects of family size on children's education comes from both not ever attending school and from dropping out of school along the way. Columns 1 and 3 show that the probability of ever attending school and being currently enrolled drop by 1.8 and 1.1 percentage points when an additional sibling is added to the family. Consequently, years of schooling fall as well. The IV estimate indicates that an exogenous increase in household size of one extra child decreases the years of schooling by 0.08 compared to 0.2 when relying on OLS estimates, or $2.6 \%$ instead of 6.5\%.

Once we account for the endogeneity of family size (using IV), the coefficients are smaller (or less negative) compared to the ordinary least square estimates. The IV estimates suggest that OLS coefficients over-estimate the true trade-off and are biased toward finding effects that are too large suggesting that unobservables which drive parents to have big families also drive parents to invest too little in their children.

Table 5 also reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald test to detect if the instrument suffers from a weak-IV problem. The first-stage F-stat and Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Stat, both are significant, suggesting that our analysis does not suffer from weak identification.

[^5]We also provide Anderson-Rubin F-test Statistic and Stock-Wright S-statistic in Table 5 to assess that our second-stage results are robust to weak-instrument inference.

### 5.2. Potential Threats to Identification

The results in Table 5 show that having a first child who is a girl has a strong positive effect on family size. Having a first child who is a girl increases the number of children by a fifth of a child. Moreover, the different tests show that our identification does not suffer from a weak instrument problem.

Next, we focus on the second key assumption that having a first-child who is a girl is unlikely to be correlated with other factors associated with educational outcomes. One potential problem is if the gender of the first child is related to the total children who are boys in the household. In the U.S., Butcher and Case (1994) find that the sibling sex composition and, in particular, having more male siblings increases the educational attainment of girls but not boys in the U.S., probably because girls push themselves more when they are around male siblings. By contrast, Kaestner (1997) does not find this similar effect. In the context of a developing country, sibling rivalry or competition for limited resources may mean that having more male siblings reduces resources for girls. ${ }^{10}$ To control for this possibility, Table 6 reports IV estimates controlling for the number of boys in the household. The results are similar to the IV results without the number of boys but are somewhat larger. Since the number of boys does itself have a negative impact on some of the educational outcomes, in the following analysis we continue to control for number of boys. ${ }^{11}$

[^6]Another potential reason why the use of gender of the first born could be related to other factors affecting education is if the likelihood of having a first born who is a girl increases the likelihood that a mother works in order to be able to pay a dowry for her daughter's marriage. We estimate a regression of the likelihood that a mother was employed in the last 7 days or 12 months on an indicator that the first born was a girl; we find no effect (Appendix Table 1).

A study by Rosenblum ( $2013^{\text {b }}$ ) shows evidence that son-preferring stopping rules may mean that the likelihood of survival of a girl is lower. ${ }^{12}$ Since we only observe surviving girls who are first born this may mean a positive selection bias in our observed sample implying we may only be surviving very strong girls with better health. If one believes that other younger girl siblings following the first born girl are also likely to be strong, then this would bias the estimates downward, since the strong children in these households would grow up with more siblings but also would likely do better in school and in terms of health outcomes. However, a study by Milazzo (2014) instead finds that having a first born who is a girl increases the likelihood of mortality of the mother after age $30 .{ }^{13}$ If the death of the mother affects the educational outcomes of children in these households, this would exaggerate the educational impact atributed to family size. Our analysis is limited to mothers under 35, and when we further limit our analysis to mothers under 30 the results are similar (Appendix Table 2).

[^7]
## 6. Heterogeneity in the Quantity-Quality Trade-Off

### 6.1. Caste Differences in the Q-Q Trade Off

Given the disadvantaged situation of lower castes in India, one may expect lower and even middle castes to have less access to good public schools and less access to markets than higher castes.

We capture the heterogeneity in the Q-Q trade off across different caste categories by interacting family size with caste. Results from Panel A in Table 7, shows that once the family size is instrumented, ${ }^{14}$ the effect of family size on the likelihood of ever attending school and actual years of schooling is greatest for low caste individuals. For example, an extra sibling in low and midlle caste households reduces the years of schooling by four tenths of a year compared to children of high caste households. Similarly, an extra sibling in low and middle caste households reduces the likelihood of ever attending school by 0.079 and 0.064 , respectively, compared to high caste households, although they are not significantly different from each other. Likewise, growing up with an extra sibling reduces the likelihood of being currently enrolled by between 0.05 and 0.06 for children in low and middle caste households compared to those in high caste households. These results thus suggest that family size has a more negative impact on lower caste families which cannot overcome educational and liquidity constraints.

### 6.2. Rural-Urban Differences in the Q-Q Trade Off

Given the lack of good public schools in rural areas in India, we may expect for the Q-Q trade-off to be greater in rural than in urban areas. Indeed, there are large rural-urban

[^8]gaps in educational attainment. For our sample children, the primary school completion rate is $35 \%$ in rural areas while it is $41 \%$ in urban areas.

Indeed, the impact of having a larger family size is larger and statistically significant in rural compared to urban areas, suggesting the quantity-quality trade-off is more pronounced in rural India. Panel B in Table 7 reports the IV results from models that interact a rural dummy with the family size variable. The impact of family size on the likelihood of ever attending school, on years of schooling, and being currently enrolled is greater in rural than urban households. The coefficients in Table 7 suggest that an extra child reduces the likelihood of ever attending school or currently attending school by 0.06 and 0.008 and years of schooling by half a year in rural households compared to urban households. This finding is similar to Li et al. (2008) who also report that trade-off was more evident in rural parts of China and was negligible in urban areas.

### 6.3. Wealth and the $\mathbf{Q}-\mathrm{Q}$ Trade Off

The degree of the trade-off may also differ by household wealth. Wealthier households are less likely to be subject to credit constraints when making the choice between the number of children and the educational opportunities offered to each child. We classify households by wealth level and estimate interacted IV models with wealth levels to explore whether the trade-off differs among children from low, median, and high wealth households. The results in Panel A of Table 8 show the IV results by wealth levels. The effect of an extra child on the likelihood of going to school, years of schooling, and on the likelihood of being currently enrolled in school are all greatest for children in poor households. An extra sibling reduces the likelihood of attending school and being currently
enrolled by 0.217 and 0.118 and years of schooling by a year and a month for children in poor households compared to children in the wealthiest households.

### 6.4. Does Mother's Educational Attainment affect the Q-Q Trade Off?

Mothers play a key role in the household by making decisions in regard to expenditures and by providing a supportive environment for children. Less educated mothers will generally be worse positioned to provide support for children in their studies and may not be well informed about possible alternatives to support their children leading to a bigger $\mathrm{Q}-\mathrm{Q}$ trade off.

Panel B in Table 8 presents the coefficients of the IV regressions for illiterate mothers and mothers with less than primary schooling in comparison to the primary schooled mothers. The IV results show that the detrimental effects of an extra child on educational attainment are greatest for children of illiterate mothers. The effect of an extra sibling on years of schooling for the children of illiterate mothers is a little over eight months compared to those of mothers with at least primary schooling. Even children of mothers with less than primary education experience a substantially greater trade-off compared to children of mothers with primary schooling or more. The effect of an extra child reduces years of schooling by a little over 4 months for those in households of mothers with less than primary education compared to mothers with a primary education or more. The trade-off differences are significant for mothers with different education levels.

Similarly, the impacts of an extra sibling on ever having been enrolled or on current enrollment are greatest for those with either illiterate mothers or mothers with less than a primary education. An extra sibling reduces the likelihood of ever been enrolled and being currently enrolled by 0.14 and 0.065 , respectively, in households of illiterate mothers
compared to mothers with a primary education or more. Children whose mothers have less than primary education compared to those with primary schooling experience a significant reduction in the likelihood of ever or being currently enrolled due an extra sibling of 0.076 and 0.056 . The $\mathrm{Q}-\mathrm{Q}$ trade off is significantly stronger for illiterate mothers..

All in all, the Q-Q trade offs are more pronounced among lower caste, rural, and poorer households, as well as for households headed by less educated mothers, probably because these households face the greatest credit constraints, attend worse public school systems, and are less able to compensate for bad schooling by educating their children at home or by private tutoring.

## 7. Effect of Family Size on Children's Health

Child malnourishment is another serious issue that affects investment in human capital. There is a growing literature on the interaction between early-life health and human capital accumulation (see Bleakley, 2010, for detail). Bleakley (2010) argues that poor childhood health might depress the formation of human capital, which in turn can affect lifetime income either by reducing schooling or limiting labor-market productivity. About $48 \%$ of all children in India are malnourished, either moderately or severely underweight (IIPS, 2010). For many years now, the government of India has implemented several health programs including the Integrated Child Development Scheme and the National Rural Health Mission to improve the nutritional status of children. Despite this, malnourishment levels among Indian children are very high compared to other South Asian countries. It is plausible that high fertility rates and large families may be contributing to the problem of malnourishment in India. Given that health is another component of child quality, we test
whether there is a trade-off between the number of children and the health of each child in this section.

We use the National Family Health Survey to examine the trade-off in children's health. Table 9 examines the effect of family size on a number of nutrition measures including height, weight, height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-height, and whether the person is underweight, wasted, or stunted. Panel A in Table 9 shows the estimates from OLS while Panel B shows the results from the 2SLS model. The OLS shows that children of larger families have worse health. Results indicate that an additional child in the household is associated with a lower average weight of 177 grams and lower average height of 0.8 cm . Columns 6 and 7 of Table 9 show that children born in larger families are also more likely to be underweight and stunted, repectively.

Panel B shows the corresponding IV estimates. The IV analysis fails to detect any significant evidence of Q-Q trade-off in health outcomes. None of the estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. This implies that once we control for the endogeneity of family size, the Q-Q trade-off between family size and health outcomes disappears. One plausible explanation for these insignificant effects of family size on nutrition could be that the health system in India, unlike the education system, provides support to families so that vast trade-offs for children may not be visible. ${ }^{15}$

## 8. Conclusions and Discussions

Testing the theoretical trade-off between the quantity and quality of children has been on the research agenda for a long time, but the empirical evidence supporting the

[^9]prediction of the Beckerian model is still limited, especially in developing countries. Moreover, the empirical evidence has been mixed in general so far. A few studies have found a negative effect of family size on the quality of children, measured by either education or health status (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980). In contrast, others reported no empirical support for the child quantity-quality trade-off (Black et al. 2005; Haan 2010). A variety of instruments including twinning, sex of first child, sex of first two children, infertility, and policy experiments were used to address the endogeneity concern.

In this paper, we use data from households in India to test the empirical validity of the quantity-quality trade-off. A strong preference for sons over daughters in the Indian society allows us the use of a novel instrumental variable, namely whether the first child is a girl, to test the Q-Q trade-off. Testing this model has important policy implications as it is important to know the extent to which a policy formulated to control population improves the human capital of the country and quality of the labor force.

We find that family size has a significant negative causal impact on educational outcomes of children. After controlling for potential endogeneity, an additional child in the family reduces the likelihood of ever having been enrolled and of currently being enrolled in school as well as years of schooling. The observed trade-off persists after including child and parent characteristics. We find that the negative relationship between family size and children's education is more pronounced among rural households who are severely budgetconstrained. The effect also differs by caste, mother's education level, and household wealth. For children belonging to low and middle castes, the trade-off is severe compared to high-caste children. More educated mothers are also able to mitigate the trade-off because the trade-off is only evident for illiterate mothers and mothers with less than primary schooling. Similarly, we observe a wealth-gradient in the trade-off across wealth
groups; the trade-off is more pronounced in low-wealth households with an extra child reducing the years of schooling by as much as a year and a months.

Quantifying the causal estimate of family size on child quality is also important from a policy perspective. Since the majority of large families in developing countries are poor, less educated, and resource-constrained, our findings can help us better understand why poverty persists and how people can be moved out of poverty. Improving access and uptake of family planning methods and public policies aimed at increasing awareness about the benefits of having a smaller family may help weaken the severity of the trade-off. Furthermore, policymakers in developing countries can supplement family planning policies with more investment in education and health in regions and households for which the trade-off is severe in order to mitigate the adverse impacts of larger families.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample

| Children's Age | All | First Born Girl | First Born Boy |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 9.60 | 9.41 | 9.79 |
|  | (3.45) | (3.34) | (3.55) |
| First Born Girl | 0.49 |  |  |
|  | (0.49) |  |  |
| Ever Attended School | 0.9 | 0.89 | 0.91 |
|  | (0.30) | (0.31) | (0.29) |
| Currently Enrolled | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.95 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.22) |
| Years of Schooling | 3.08 | 2.94 | 3.22 |
|  | (2.92) | (2.85) | (2.98) |
| Mother's Age | 30.94 | 30.88 | 31.00 |
|  | (3.36) | (3.34) | (3.37) |
| Father's Age | 36.48 | 36.42 | 36.54 |
|  | (4.81) | (4.79) | (4.82) |
| Mother's Years of Schooling | 2.99 | 3.05 | 2.93 |
|  | (4.06) | (4.09) | (4.03) |
| Father's Years of Schooling | 5.48 | 5.56 | 5.40 |
|  | (4.74) | (4.76) | (4.72) |
| Family Size | 3.54 | 3.70 | 3.40 |
|  | (1.33) | (1.33) | (1.31) |
| Rural | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.82 |
|  | (0.39) | (0.39) | (0.39) |
| Low Caste (SC \& ST) | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| Middle Caste (OBC) | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.39 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| Low Wealth | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.49 |
|  | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.50) |
| Medium Wealth | 0.39 | 0.4 | 0.39 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| No. of Observations | 393,510 | 193,263 | 200,247 |
| No. of Districts | 601 |  |  |

Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. All sampled children were 5-20 years old at the time of survey (2007-08). The analytical sample is restricted to 20-35 year old mothers.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Health Sample

| Children's Age (months) | All | First Born Girl | First Born Boy |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 28.0 | 28.31 | 28.57 |
|  | (17.01) | (17.04) | (16.99) |
| First Born Girl | 0.51 |  |  |
|  | (0.49) |  |  |
| Weight (Grams) | 10251.72 | 10142.56 | 10363.79 |
|  | (3123.52) | (3061.12) | (3182.72) |
| Height (Centimeters) | 81.85 | 81.62 | 82.10 |
|  | (13.34) | (13.27) | (13.42) |
| Weight-for-Age (WAZ) | -1.63 | -1.64 | -1.63 |
|  | (1.16) | (1.17) | (1.16) |
| Height-for-Age (HAZ) | -1.47 | -1.46 | -1.48 |
|  | (1.50) | (1.52) | (1.48) |
| Weight-for-Height(WHZ) | -0.92 | -0.92 | -0.94 |
|  | (1.13) | (1.12) | (1.13) |
| Child is Underweight | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.39 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| Child is Stunted | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 |
|  | (0.48) | (0.48) | (0.48) |
| Child is Wasted | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
|  | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.36) |
| Family Size | 2.17 | 2.20 | 2.16 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.44) | (0.39) |
| Rural | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.60 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| Low caste (SC \& ST) | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.32 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.47) | (0.47) |
| Middle caste (OBC) | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.47) | (0.47) |
| Low Wealth | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.29 |
|  | (0.45) | (0.45) | (0.45) |
| Medium Wealth | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 |
|  | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.41) |
| Mother's Age | 24.09 | 24.14 | 24.04 |
|  | (3.75) | (3.75) | (3.74) |
| Father's Age | 29.38 | 29.46 | 29.30 |
|  | (4.79) | (4.85) | (4.73) |
| Number of Observations | 10,090 | 5,111 | 4,979 |
| No. of States | 29 |  |  |

Table 3: Regression of First Born Girl on Control Variables

|  | Dependent Variable: First Born Girl |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | LPM | Probit |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ |
| Rural | -0.003 | -0.008 |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.011)$ |
| Medium Wealth | -0.002 | -0.004 |
|  | $(0.007)$ | $(0.017)$ |
| Hindu | -0.004 | -0.009 |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.013)$ |
| Scheduled Caste/Tribe | 0.006 | 0.016 |
|  | $(0.00)$ | $(0.011)$ |
| Other Backward Caste | 0.004 | 0.009 |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.011)$ |
| Mother's Years of Schooling | 0.002 | 0.006 |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.010)$ |
| Father's Years of Schooling | 0.002 | 0.004 |
|  | $(0.001)$ | $(0.003)$ |
| Mother's Age | -0.0001 | -0.0001 |
|  | $(0.001)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| Father's Age | $0.037 * *$ | $0.093 * * *$ |
| District Fixed Effects | $(0.007)$ | $(0.017)$ |

Notes: ${ }^{*},{ }^{* *}$, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard errors, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Column 2 reports marginal effects from the probit model.

Table 4: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Family Size on Education

|  | Ever <br> Attended <br> School | Years of <br> Schooling | Currently <br> Enrolled | Ever <br> Attended <br> School | Years of <br> Schooling | Currently <br> Enrolled | Ever <br> Attended <br> School | Years of <br> Schooling | Currently <br> Enrolled |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ | $(6)$ | $(7)$ | $(8)$ | $(9)$ |
| Family Size | $-0.024^{* * *}$ | -0.005 | $-0.019^{* * *}$ | $-0.022^{* * *}$ | $-0.229^{* * *}$ | $-0.016^{* * *}$ | $-0.018^{* * *}$ | $-0.202^{* * *}$ | $-0.014^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.001)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.0007)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.0006)$ |
| Children's Controls | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Parents' Controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.07 | 0.007 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.70 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.15 |  |
| No. of Observations | 393,510 | 393,510 | 345,985 | 393,510 | 393,510 | 345,985 | 393,510 | 393,510 | 345,985 |

Notes: ${ }^{*},{ }^{* *}$, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard errors, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Children's controls include age, age squared, gender and birth order. Parents' control includes education levels of father and mother, household religion, household caste, rural, and household socioeconomic status. Family size is total number of 0-20 year old children in the family at the time of the survey.

Table 5: IV Estimates of the Effect of Family Size on Children's Educational Outcomes

|  | Instrument: First Born Girl |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Ever Attended <br> School | Years of Schooling | Currently <br> Enrolled |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ |
| First Stage | $0.219^{* * *}$ | $0.219^{* * *}$ | $0.228^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.007)$ | $(0.007)$ | $(0.007)$ |
| Family Size |  |  |  |
|  | $-0.018^{* * *}$ | $-0.080^{* *}$ | $-0.011^{* * *}$ |
| Weak-Identification Tests | $(0.006)$ | $(0.033)$ | $(0.007)$ |
| Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-stat | $1,071.10$ |  |  |
| Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat | $4,280.87$ | $1,071.10$ | $1,071.10$ |
|  |  | $4,280.87$ | $4,280.87$ |
| Weak-Instrument-Robust - |  |  |  |
| Inference | 9.43 |  |  |
| Anderson-Rubin F | 0.002 | 5.85 | 10.74 |
| P-value | 9.16 | 0.016 | 0.001 |
| Stock-Wright S stat | 0.003 | 5.71 | 10.49 |
| P-value | 0.017 | 0.001 |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Children's Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Parents' Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed Effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.09 | 0.68 | 0.14 |
| No. of Observations | 393,510 | 393,510 | 345,985 |

Notes: ${ }^{*},{ }^{* *}$, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard error, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Children's controls include age, age square, gender, birth order, religion, caste, SES and rural dummies. Parents' controls include age, age square, and education levels of father and mother. Family size is total number of $0-20$ year old children in the family at the time of the survey.

Table 6: IV Estimates of the Effect of Family Size on Children's Educational Outcomes

|  | Instrument: First Born Girl |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Ever | Years of | Currently |
|  | Attended | Schooling | Enrolled |
| School |  |  |  |
| Family Size | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ |
|  | $-0.023^{* * *}$ | $-0.232^{* * *}$ | $-0.023^{* * *}$ |
| Number of Boys | $(0.003)$ | $(0.016)$ | $(0.002)$ |
|  | -0.002 | $-0.053^{* * *}$ | -0.004 |
| Children's Controls | $(0.001)$ | $(0.007)$ | $(0.0006)$ |
| Parents' Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed Effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | Yes | Yes |  |
| No. of Observations | 393,510 | 0.68 | 0.14 |

Notes: *, **, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard error, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Children's controls include age, age square, gender, birth order, religion, caste, SES and rural dummies. Parents' controls include age, age square, and education levels of father and mother. Family size is total number of $0-20$ years old children in the family at the time of the survey.

Table 7: 2SLS Estimates of the Effects of Family Size on Education by Caste and Residence

|  | Ever Attended School | Years of Schooling | Currently Enrolled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Panel A: By Household Caste |  |  |  |
| Family Size $\times$ Low Caste | $\begin{gathered} -0.079 * * * \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.436 * * * \\ (0.131) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.050 * * * \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size $\times$ Middle Caste | $\begin{gathered} -0.064^{* *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.440 * * * \\ (0.125) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.061^{* * *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ |
| Low Caste | $\begin{gathered} 0.252 * * \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.384^{* *} \\ & (0.444) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.160 * * * \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ |
| Middle Caste | $\begin{gathered} 0.218^{* *} \\ (0.076) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.470 * * * \\ (0.428) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.206 * * * \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size | $\begin{aligned} & 0.041^{*} \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.165 \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032^{* *} \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ |
| No. of Boys | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 * * \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.061 * * * \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 * * * \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Panel B: Rural vs. Urban |  |  |  |
| Family Size $\times$ Rural | $\begin{gathered} -0.066^{*} \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.537 * * \\ (0.164) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.075 * * * \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.261 \\ (0.139) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.050^{* * *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rural | $\begin{aligned} & 0.240^{*} \\ & (0.101) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.960^{* * *} \\ (0.56) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.259^{* * *} \\ (0.059) \end{gathered}$ |
| No. of Boys | $\begin{gathered} -0.003^{* *} \\ (0.001) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.065^{* * *} \\ (0.006) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.007^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Child's Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Parents' Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of Observations | 393,510 | 393,597 | 345,985 |

Notes: *, **, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard errors, by clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Children's controls include age, age square, caste, SES and rural dummies. Parents' controls include age, age square, and education of father and mother, gender, birth order, religion, Family size is total number of $0-20$ years old children in the family at the time of the survey. Poor is defined as households in bottom two wealth quartiles. Low caste is scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) households, while the middle caste is other backward caste (OBC).

Table 8: 2SLS Estimates of the Effects of Family Size on Education by Household Wealth and Mother's Education

|  | Ever Attended School | Years of Schooling | Currently Enrolled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Panel A: By Household Wealth |  |  |  |
| Family Size $\times$ Poor | $\begin{gathered} -0.217^{* * *} \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.117 * * * \\ (0.312) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.118 * * * \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size $\times$ Medium | $\begin{gathered} -0.155^{* *} \\ (0.053) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.905 * * \\ (0.288) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.116 * * * \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size | $\begin{gathered} 0.163^{* *} \\ (0.053) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.772 * * \\ (0.283) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.095 * * * \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ |
| Poor | $\begin{gathered} 0.628^{* * *} \\ (0.175) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.890 * * \\ (0.937) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.314 * * * \\ (0.094) \end{gathered}$ |
| Medium | $\begin{gathered} 0.436^{* *} \\ (0.153) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.407 * * \\ (0.836) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.318 * * * \\ (0.085) \end{gathered}$ |
| No. of Boys | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.057 * * * \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 * * * \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Panel B: by Mother's Education |  |  |  |
| Family Size $\times$ Illiterate | $\begin{gathered} -0.140 * * * \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.693 * * * \\ (0.141) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.065 * * * \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size $\times$ Less than | $\begin{gathered} -0.076 * * * \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.357 * * \\ (0.122) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.056 * * * \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size | $\begin{gathered} 0.090 * * * \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.337 * * \\ (0.115) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 * * * \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ |
| Illiterate | $\begin{gathered} 0.428 * * * \\ (0.079) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.020 * * * \\ (0.452) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.190 * * * \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ |
| Less than Primary | $\begin{gathered} 0.233 * * * \\ (0.063) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.035 * * \\ & (0.376) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.170 * * * \\ (0.040) \end{gathered}$ |
| No. of Boys | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.051 * * * \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 * * * \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Child's Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Parents' Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of Observations | 393,510 | 393,510 | 345,985 |

Notes: *, **, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard errors, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Children's controls include hge, age square, gender, birth order, religion, caste, SES and rural dummies. Parents' controls include age, age square, and education of father and mother. Family size is total number of $0-20$ years old children in the family at the time of the survey. Poor is defined as households in bottom two wealth quartiles.

Table 9: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Family Size on Child's Health Outcomes

| Weight <br> $($ gram $)$ | Height <br> $(\mathrm{cm})$ | Weight- <br> for-age z- <br> score | Height- <br> for-age z- <br> score | Weight- <br> for-height <br> z-score | Underweight <br> $(W A Z<-2)$ | Stunting <br> $(\mathrm{HAZ}<-2)$ | Wasting <br> (WHZ $<-2)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ | $(6)$ | $(7)$ | $(8)$ |


| Panel A: OLS Results |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Family Size | $-177.0^{* * *}$ | $-0.755^{* * *}$ | $-0.114^{* * *}$ | $-0.182^{* * *}$ | -0.00350 | $0.0371^{* * *}$ | $0.0483^{* * *}$ | 0.00962 |
|  | $(46.63)$ | $(0.158)$ | $(0.0295)$ | $(0.0344)$ | $(0.0270)$ | $(0.0132)$ | $(0.0119)$ | $(0.00915)$ |

## Panel B: IV Results



Notes: Family size is the number of 0-59 month old children in the family at the time of the survey. All models include child's age, birth order, birth size, gender, religion, caste of the household, rural dummy, mother's education, father's education, mother's age, father's age, socio-economic status of the household and state fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. Data source: NFHS

Appendix Table 1: Effect of Gender of Child on Mother's Employment

|  | Worked in Last 7 <br> Days | Worked in Last 12 <br> Months |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ |
| First Born Girl | 0.004 | 0.0008 |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ |
| Children's Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Parents' Controls | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed Effect | Yes | Yes |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.21 | 0.26 |
| No. of Observations | 369,586 | 369,586 |

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard error, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Regression includes the following control varaibles: household size, caste, wealth quartile, religion, literacy status, age, husband's age, land ownership, and below poverty line status of the household.

Appendix Table 2: IV Estimates of the Effect of Family Size on Children's Educational Outcomes for Young Mothers (Mother's age < 30)

|  | Instrument: First Born Girl |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Ever Attended School | $\begin{gathered} \text { Years of } \\ \text { Schoolin } \\ \mathrm{g} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Currently Enrolled |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| First Stage | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.219 * * * \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.188 * * * \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.195 * * * \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ |
| Family Size | $\begin{gathered} -0.026^{* * *} \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.126^{* *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008^{* *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ |
| Weak-Identification Tests |  |  |  |
| Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-stat | 547.88 | 547.88 | 567.50 |
| Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat | 1640.85 | 1640.85 | 1558.87 |
| Weak-Instrument-Robust Inference |  |  |  |
| Anderson-Rubin F | 5.63 | 10.67 | 4.08 |
| P -value | 0.018 | 0.001 | 0.04 |
| Stock-Wright S stat | 5.53 | 10.29 | 4.04 |
| P -value | 0.019 | 0.001 | 0.04 |
| Children's Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Parents' Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| District Fixed-Effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.10 | 0.66 | 0.06 |
| No of Observations | 179,247 | 179,247 | 157,737 |

Notes: *, **, and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance levels of 10,5 , and 1 percent. Robust standard error, clustered by district, are shown in parentheses. Children's controls include age, age, square, gender, birth order, religion, caste, SES and rural dummies. Parents' controls include age, age square, and education levels of father and mother. Family size is total number of 0-20 years old children in the family at the time of the survey.


[^0]:    ${ }^{3}$ Becker and Lewis (1973) coined this term and developed the original quantity-quality model.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ However, infertility treatments may be used by households, especially by high income households, so this may not be a credible exogenous source of variation.
    ${ }^{5}$ Our paper differs from Sarin (2004) in that we include education in addition to health outcomes. We also use a larger data set, which allows us to include a more complete set of controls (including sibling ordering) and which, covers the time period after the legal ban on fetal sex determination and, thus, provides a more convincing time period to avoid contamination due to sex-selective abortions.

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ In the absence of any interventions, the probability of having a son is approximately 0.512 , and this probability is independent of genetic factors (Ben-Porath and Welch, 1976; Jacobsen, Mïller and Mouritsen, 1999).

[^3]:    ${ }^{7}$ We drop individuals who are sons- or daughters-in-law, grandchildren, parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters, brothers- or sisters-in-law, nieces or nephews, and other relatives.

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ By combining household amenities, assets and durables, the DLHS data computed a wealth index and divided into quartiles. The principle of factor loading to amenities, assets, and durables derived by factor analysis is used for the computation of the wealth index. Households are categorized from the poorest to the richest groups corresponding to the lowest to the highest quartiles.

[^5]:    ${ }^{9}$ The first stage coefficient is smaller than the twins first-stage of about 0.6 in the Angrist and Evans (1998) study. It is possible that the birth of a girl as the first-born results in a smaller increase in family size due to the fact that Indian families are larger to begin with.

[^6]:    ${ }^{10}$ Akresh and Edmonds (2011) study find evidence of sibling rivalry in Burkina Faso when households face constraints.
    ${ }^{11}$ However, when we interact an indicator for being a girl with family size, we find no significant difference, suggesting that girls are not particularly hurt by being in larger families. Instead, Barcellos, Carvalho and Lleras-Muney (2014) examine the differential resources invested in boys and girls, controlling for the

[^7]:    possibility that this might simply be due to girls being in families with more children.
    ${ }^{12}$ Similarly, Hu and Schlosser (2015) find that sex-selective abortion reduces malnutrition for surviving girls.
    ${ }^{13}$ Heath and Xu (2015) examine the impact of the presence of girls (not just the first born) on mother's autonomy.

[^8]:    ${ }^{14}$ Note that the first stage is similar for different households from different castes, with different wealth levels, with mothers of varying educational levels and for urban and rural households.

[^9]:    ${ }^{15}$ In addition, it is important to point out that while the IV effects are similar or bigger than the OLS effects, the 2SLS results are much less precise. Because we only observe mothers with children younger than 5 years of age, fertility histories of mothers are incomplete in the NFHS sample and the first-stage is not very strong.

